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Chapter 1: The socio-economic conditions of women in contemporary 
societies and their economic well-being: theories, concepts 
and hypotheses 
 
1.1.   Introduction 
Some decades ago the gender movement faced a challenging goal: 
protesting for more gender equality, the feminists pushed for woman‟s education 
and paid work. Women were looking for knowledge, the right for economic 
independence and career, the equal opportunities and the appreciation of their 
potentials. And since the „female revolution‟ began in the early 1960‟s, a 
changing role of women has become one of the greatest achievements of the 
economically developed modern society: modern women get better education that 
leads to better career opportunities (Blossfeld and Drobnic 2001), they accrue 
their own salaries and maintain their financial independence, their decisions 
increasingly depend on their preferences so they can opt to either fully commit to 
their jobs,  fully commit to their families or take one of the solutions in between 
(Gerson 1985, 2009; Hakim 2000). Finally, marriage has also become a woman‟s 
personal choice rather than a pure economic necessity (Esping Andersen 
2002a:2). 
 However, there is something quite special about „female revolution‟; even 
though all women have benefited largely from it, the biggest beneficiary have 
been the married women. Not long time ago, married women‟s main aspirations 
were associated with a „cosy family nest‟- raising children and providing 
emotional support for the whole family while today their employment is not only 
possible but it is regarded by many a precondition for fertility and motherhood, 
and crucial to financially sustain aging societies (Esping- Andersen 2009:83). In 
other words, earnings and the labour market participation of married women have 
exceeded the original feminist connotation and have become more present on the 
agenda of politicians and social scientists. 
 Last but not least, changes in woman‟s life opportunities have also 
brought the need for a different form of partnership between men and women 
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where specialization is being replaced by similar partner roles. This means that 
marriage is changing but also there has been a leap in other forms of unions which 
are increasingly socially acceptable. Here we also refer to cohabitation as a new 
living arrangement that favours equality of gender roles. 
Of course, these changes are not universally considered positive or 
successful and there are sceptics who underline the problems and challenges in 
woman‟s new role rather than achievements. Some of them argue that woman‟s 
labour market participation has not been as successful as expected because female 
working patterns are still quite atypical, and vary in type and scope from men‟s 
(Blossfeld and Drobnic 2001:6). Others add that economic dependency of women 
is very persistent as wives are still secondary earners (Sorensen and McLanahan 
1987; Bernhardt 1993; Blossfeld and Drobnic 2001). Also, there are some who 
support the view that female labour participation will lead to lower fertility and 
will negatively impact family life instead of reforming it (Becker 1981; Sorensen 
1995).  
But, independently of the perspective, the three important factors which 
among others reflect the overall change in the role and behaviour of women 
outside of the family (women‟s earning capacity via human capital accumulation, 
woman‟s employment and new way of partnering) are likely to influence in one 
way or another, the women‟s behaviour within family, in terms of bargaining 
power, decision making and their welfare. In other words, societal change 
resulting from „female revolution‟ has perhaps had its implications on micro intra-
household relations. Indeed, the economic and sociological literature confirms the 
positive link between macro developments in women‟s employment with their life 
opportunities and well-being at the micro-level. For instance, economists largely 
find that the better the married woman‟s earnings capacity, the better her 
bargaining stance and individual welfare (Pollak and Lundberg 1996). 
Sociologists are interested in the positive impact of particular employment 
patterns, future career prospects and commitment to personal occupation for 
married woman‟s welfare (Hochschild and Machung 1989; Gerson 1993). But 
from another angle, the expansion of opportunities for women comes also with 
some costs especially if we consider the housework burden and the total number 
of hours that married women dedicate to paid and unpaid work. Important studies 
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(Brines 1993, 1994; Greenstein 2000; Bittman et al. 2003) have shown that 
economic exchange determines the negotiations of housework but domestic 
responsibilities remain unfairly attributed more to women. In this respect, 
woman‟s well-being might be negatively influenced by the „female revolution‟, 
also because society has failed to completely adapt to woman‟s new role. The new 
study of Stevenson and Wolfers (2009) provides empirical evidence in this 
direction, claiming that woman‟s well-being (measured in happiness1) today has 
declined  in comparison to the past, as authors explain, also due to the overburden 
and high personal expectations and pressures that modern women face.  
 However, while we focus on the ambivalent direction of the relationship 
between wider macro change and well-being of married women, the impact of 
income, work and cohabitation on woman‟s well-being will also depend on what 
happens to „female revolution‟ in the distinctive national contexts that mediate 
their impact on an individual. The literature suggests that the transition from 
breadwinner to the dual earner model resulting from woman‟s changed role            
is closely associated with the dominant model of welfare (Blossfeld and Drobnic 
2001; Blossfeld and Hofmeister 2008). For instance, the prevalence of female 
employment varies through welfare regimes: in the Socio-democratic and liberal 
block of countries,  women participate in the labour market in large numbers 
either as full-time employed or part- time workers, while in Mediterranean and 
Conservative model, their exit to work appears more limited. Welfare regimes are 
partly responsible also for dealing with the issues such as gender wage gap, 
occupational segregation, state support to mothers, opening to the new forms of 
civil unions and so on, which are important for understanding the individual well-
being of married women.  
 The goal of this work is to analyse the economic dimension of well-being 
of a married woman and intra-household decision making in relation to rising 
earnings, variety of employment opportunities and formation of new partnerships, 
all as distinct outcomes of gender revolution. We ask whether contemporary 
changes in woman‟s role strengthen the economic well-being of a married woman 
and analyse if and how various welfare regimes influence the observed relations. 
                                                          
1
 Happiness is another term for subjective well-being. 
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The thesis is organized as follows: in the first chapter we introduce the 
topic, define its theoretical framework, choose the adequate concept of well-being 
and review the relevant empirical literature. Finally, we propose our hypotheses 
and research questions. In the second chapter, methodological framework is 
outlined. We explain our motivation for the choice of the data and techniques. In 
the third chapter, we empirically analyse the impact of woman‟s income on her 
economic well-being. Fourth chapter explains the association between woman‟s 
employment and career prospects with her economic well-being whereas in the 
fifth chapter we deal with the implications of the type of union for women. 
Finally, in the last chapter, we present our concluding remarks. 
1.2.   Earnings, employment and cohabitation over time: the consequences 
for woman’s well being 
Earning dependency of women has been a norm in the relationship 
between husband and wife for centuries. Zelizer (1997), who describes economic 
dependency of women in an industrial society at the turn of the 20th century and 
its implication for woman‟s life and well-being, gives a historical overview. In 
many examples, she provides evidence of the financial hardship that women faced 
for the lack of control over household income and for the men‟s legal ownership 
over the household resources. Her research emphasized the variety of means, 
which were available to women to get hold of household money: doles and 
household allowances were the dominant practice, then the joint accounts were 
regarded the best model for equal sharing. But, the study concludes that the 
outcomes of woman‟s economic dependency changed little even when woman‟s 
supplementary income started entering household finances, because wife‟s 
income was never high enough to balance out the husband‟s contributions. And 
even if it was high enough, it came to be seen as of a different „value‟ for the 
family due to the dominant breadwinner notion.  
So, the woman‟s dependency was acknowledged in the literature but till 
recently, it was not seriously studied. The mainstream view in science and politics 
was that dependency was not problematic for equal economic position of spouses: 
the assumption that premised for years social stratification research was that the 
head of the family translates equally his employment relations and corresponding 
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material benefit to all family members including his wife (Goldthorpe 1983; 
Sorensen and McLanahan 1987). This view followed the dominant economic 
model of family, introduced first by Talcott Parsons and then sustained by Gary 
Becker, where family appeared as a single unit without intra-household 
inequality.  
But, what were the reasons for disregarding the importance of woman‟s 
earnings for their economic well-being? The economic and philosophical theory 
suggests that an individual income is an important precondition for a life control 
and a full participation in society because an individual needs a minimum 
command over resources to be able to claim certain civic and political rights. If 
women‟s income was considered minor for their well-being and if the women‟s 
needs were set equal to the family needs, a serious gender-structured inequality 
might have been the reason. 
In addition, what is the situation today? Economic dependency of woman 
is steadily decreasing but it persists. For instance, Hakim (1996) reflects on 
woman‟s current earning dependency despite them being engaged in formal 
employment. She argues that gender occupational segregation and wage gap,  
accompanied with the spread of part time employment keeps woman‟s earnings 
lower than men‟s, and maintains certain  level of woman‟s economic dependency 
in marriage. This view is shared by Sorensen and McLanahan (1987) who found 
the persistence in married women‟s economic dependency from 1940-1980, 
despite woman‟s employment, acknowledging though that some change occurred 
with more hours that women spend in paid employment. However, the view of 
woman‟s economic dependency has changed significantly. There are varieties of 
approaches who instead of focusing purely on households, adopt an individual 
perspective. The unitary models of households of Becker and Parsons are 
challenged by resource bargaining perspectives. Also, the stratification theory has 
allowed for alternative approaches. For instance, the class position of the 
household is alternatively obtained using the dominance principle, that is, the 
class position of the household member who is more attached to the labour market 
(Erikson 1984; Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992). Moreover, household class 
measures based on social classes of both partners have become more common 
(Leiulfsrud and Woodward 1987). Finally, woman‟s economic dependency comes 
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to be seen as „essential force in maintenance of gender inequality‟ (Sorensen and 
McLanahan 1987) or a direct form of female subordination (Smith 1984).  
 Many factors have influenced this new interest in social science and 
women‟s exit to the labour markets is definitely one of the most important ones: 
Work for women meant more power equilibrium in family and women‟s freedom 
outside of the family. Yet, analysing families through centuries, we realize that 
work for women is not a modern invention because women participated in 
agriculture and in household production even before the industrial revolution. 
What was different then was not so much the woman‟s involvement in 
production, but rather the way it was perceived and appreciated. In other words, 
the main difference lied in the valorisation of woman‟s individual contributions to 
production, which was missing. In the time after the industrial revolution up to 
now, women passed through different stages:  from working mostly in the low 
paid jobs, to staying at home as a primary caregiver for the husband and the 
children during the dominance of breadwinner model, to the final return to work 
as a highly educated labour force. Thus, the woman‟s exit into the labour market 
in the late 1970‟s was innovative for two main reasons: first, because it enabled 
individualization of women‟s work in the form of income, second, because highly 
educated women led it. 
Nevertheless, thirty years later we still study woman‟s employment. Why? 
First, the reality of work has changed since 1970‟s; Women are offered a variety 
of employment options: for instance, full time jobs are a standard but part-time or 
occasional jobs are also widely available. Besides, the choice of occupation and 
employment sequence further add to the understanding of woman‟s employment. 
Thus, we can no longer study the impact of woman at work in general, but we 
need to encompass the variety of work choices that are offered to them. Second, 
the tendency of course is that married women‟s labour market participation is 
increasing everywhere but certain issues are still at work- mostly occupational 
segregation and gender wage gap. In other words, although women compete better 
with men, some earnings and other differentials within labour markets remain 
(Blau 1999; Huber 1988) and the impressive educational attainment has not been 
adequately translated into career prospects and earnings. Lastly, woman‟s 
employment has not been equally distributed across countries. There are more or 
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less progressive societies in terms of woman‟s integration into labour markets, 
and even in the countries where woman‟s involvement is in its prime, problems 
like unequal pay are common. It is important to understand the role of institutions 
for different paces of woman‟s employment. 
Woman‟s greater economic autonomy relates, without doubts, to the 
transformation of institutions such as marriage or family: falling marriage rates, 
more children out of the wedlock and new forms of unions coincide with rising 
woman‟s independence. However, various theories have their own interpretation 
of that relation; the independence hypothesis of Gary Becker (1981) suggests that 
rising female labour participation and higher earnings lead to marriage 
dissolutions and lower fertility rates, due to high opportunity costs that women 
bear when entering a marriage based on traditional specialization. In this view, 
woman‟s education has its role in transforming marriage from traditional to 
modern, with respect to the division of domestic work and equality, and 
contributes to the rise of unmarried cohabitation as an alternative to marriage with 
a more egalitarian connotation (Sorensen, 1995). Thus, as Bernardi (2003) 
suggests, following Becker, the reason for popularity of cohabitation among the 
young women is the lack of the pre-established rules about the gender roles or, as 
put in Kiernan and Lelievre (1995:148)‟women may be anxious that the legal 
contract might alter their balance of power in their partnership arrangement and 
make the relationship less equitable‟. The second view represented by 
Oppenheimer (1988, 1995) argues that the economic logic of marriage for both 
men and women has changed but this does not undermine its popularity: one 
might postpone marriage but one still marries eventually because marriage is a 
source of emotional support and real companionship. In this context, unmarried 
cohabitation occurs because of increased uncertainty in the labour markets
2
, 
which affects the decision of young women in the process of family formation.  
In sum, both perspectives claim that marriage is being reformed and that 
the reformed marriage is at risk. However, they underline different reasons for the 
changes: Becker and the followers blame woman‟s paid employment (Becker 
                                                          
2
 In order to marry, women are waiting to have stable employment, better financial conditions etc. 
Modern times increase uncertainty of employment affecting, thus, the woman‟s decision to form a 
family. 
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1981), whereas Oppenheimer (1995) highlight global uncertainty. Both sources of 
change, though, affect the interdependence of labour and emotional relations in 
marriage and give rise to new forms of unions such as cohabitation.  
Cohabitation, however, is an old phenomenon whose presence can be 
traced to several centuries back. Here we talk mostly about a leap in modern 
cohabitation, which increasingly takes the form of an alternative union to 
marriage favoured by the youth. In the past, this form of union rose among the 
poor in Britain, France and Germany and Scandinavia (Kiernan 2004), and later 
was a common choice after separation when legal divorce was impossible. 
Today cohabitation is studied and compared to marriage for the potential 
differences between the two. The definition of cohabitation is still quite vague: 
cohabitation is seen as a short-lived union, as an occasional relationship, an 
introduction to marriage, an equal alternative to marriage, with a range of possible 
consequences for joint investments in a relationship and provision of long-term 
security. For this reason, cohabitation is also of importance for the economic well-
being of women. Importantly, as the effect of cohabitation on economic well-
being of women depends on its meaning, and the meanings vary over countries, it 
is also valuable to look at country differences in woman‟s economic well-being 
because of cohabitation.  
1.3.   The economic well-being of women in theory: five theoretical 
approaches 
Several approaches in the rational choice economic theory and 
sociological literature study the effects of income, work and unions on economic 
well-being of women.  
1.3.1.   Unitary approaches 
 
The first models of family behaviour that reflected on economic well-
being of women were unitary models and in the literature, we find their different 
variations, depending on whether they were written by sociologists or economists. 
The two most important examples are Parsonian model of family (Parsons 1956) 
and the model of Gary Becker (1981), the father of so-called “new home 
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economics”. Both models see an individual behaviour inseparable from the 
experience of the partner: the family operates on the basis of common goals to 
which all the members contribute with different means.  
The core of the Parsons‟ theory was the sex role aggregation or better, the 
role specialization between spouses. He suggested that women should play an 
“expressive” role in the family, offering an emotional support to both the husband 
and children, while men are given an “instrumental” role, providing the means for 
living. The woman‟s employment was welcome only to the extent that it did not 
change the standard allocation of formal obligations within it. However, the 
reasoning here was that the economic well-being of woman was not in danger 
since one of the main norms that regulated the interaction between the family 
members of the Parsonian ideal model of family was equal access to family 
finances by both husbands and wives (Cheal 2000). Thus, for Parsons, family was 
“one” rather than “two” and decisions were made to benefit all equally. 
The concept of collective well-being as explained by sociologist Talcott 
Parsons was, to some extent, further developed in economics: Gary Becker 
contributed to the economic theory with an introduction of the joint welfare 
function, which is maximized by the rational family members. In other words, 
individuals make rational decisions on their role specialization based on relative 
productivities with a goal of increasing the household utility. Becker also assumes 
that the time dedicated to housework is exchangeable to the time dedicated to 
market work as long as it benefits the interest of all. The fundamental aspect of 
the theory is that household preferences are equal to the preferences of the head of 
the family, who is assumed to be altruistic in his distribution of family resources, 
guaranteeing equal well-being for all family members. Thus, problems like 
inequality or conflict within the family are largely ignored in Becker‟s view, also 
because Becker believed that specialization should minimize potential conflicts 
within family by creating dependencies between wives and husbands and by 
stimulating efficiency. Furthermore, another issue of great importance here is the 
neglect of the concept of methodological individualism in the real sense of the 
word since the individual preferences of family members are substituted and 
modeled with a family preference. 
15 
 
In sociological stratification literature following Becker and Parsons, 
family was also the central unit of analysis, and individual class position was 
associated with the class position of their families (Goldhorpe 1983). It was 
assumed that the benefits of the employment relations of the family head 
influenced the living standard of all family members. But, the fact that the unit of 
analysis was not an individual but family had a major implication for the status of 
women, given that the heads of the family were mostly men. For instance, women 
were either attributed the class of their father when living with their parents, or the 
class of their husbands, once married, on the basis of the assumption of equality 
of sharing within household. Thereby, a major limitation of this approach, as well 
as the models of Parsons and Becker, is a black box view of reality: a total lack of 
interest for intra-household relations and decision-making.  
1.3.2.   Resource bargaining perspective 
 
The unitary family models offer a scenario for family behaviour that 
emerged when women participated little in the labour market and male 
breadwinner was the most common type of family model. As each theory largely 
reflects reality or at a least perception of such reality, it is not surprising that 
female emancipation and higher participation in the labour market coincided with 
an increased interest in theme of economic dependency, which led to the 
development of a recourse bargaining perspective. 
Until the resource bargaining perspective emerged in both economics and 
sociology (Manser and Brown 1980; McElroy and Horney 1981; Blood and 
Wolfe 1960), a family was mostly viewed as an institution with equilibrium 
between rights and duties on one side, and an exchange of power on the other 
(Therborn 2006:2). The resource bargaining theory however made it apparent that 
family can also be without equilibrium, because there are those with less power 
and more duties than rights, along with those, whose power matches their rights 
(ibid.). This theoretical approach assumed that options outside of the marriage 
lead the well-being of spouses within the marriage or more specifically, that 
income sources, or education and employment determine behaviour and outcomes 
of partners (husband and wife). In other words, women are allowed to actively 
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negotiate in the family, rather than be passive observers of the decisions of the 
head of the household. 
When explaining the intra-household relations, economists rely on several 
game theoretic models, namely cooperative, non-cooperative and collective 
models. The cooperation is central in the cooperative models where partners reach 
an enforceable agreement as a result of a cooperative game. In these models, the 
bargaining stance of each partner is determined by the external conditions that 
influence the individual‟s utility in the threat point, which is one‟s best alternative 
to a cooperative marriage. Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney 
(1981) introduce the cooperative model with divorce as a threat point, whereas 
Lundberg and Pollack (1993) suggest an alternative specification where the 
divorce threat is replaced by the non-cooperation threat. A second group of game 
theoretic models (Kanbur and Haddad 1994; Browning and Lechene 2001; 
Lundberg and Pollak 2003) rely on the principle of non-cooperation and self-
binding agreements between partners. Each spouse maximizes their personal 
utility given the behaviour of the other partner, deciding on the amount of public 
good that is willing to provide and share. Pareto efficiency of outcomes here is not 
a requirement. The last group of models (Chiappori 1988, 1992) encompasses all 
the previous ones regarding them a special application of the collective approach. 
The basic assumption of this model is an efficient allocation of resources between 
spouses, which is reflected in the negotiation of the sharing rule.  
The economic bargaining models address the criticisms of unitary 
framework in several ways: first, they acknowledge men‟s and woman‟s separate 
view of reality by modelling their individual utility functions; second, the models 
follow better the logic of methodological individualism which was misspecified in 
unitary models; third, the models explain economic well-being of individuals and 
inequality within family by individual external opportunities. Several bargaining 
theories are also in line with the feminist literature, which suggests that economic 
well-being of women cannot be identified with the economic well-being of the 
family because what fulfills family needs is not necessarily sufficient for women 
(Brenner and Ramas 1984; Smith 1984). 
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In sociology, the stratification literature has developed an alternative to the 
conventional approach (Goldthorpe 1983). The new approach relied on the 
dominance hypothesis which meant that the person with the strongest attachment 
to the labour market determined the social class of the family (Erikson 1984). 
However, there has been a stream of literature that regarded also this strategy 
insufficient, asking for a measure which uses the data on both partners in the 
family (Leiulfsrud and Woodward 1987). It was argued that increasing labour 
market participation of women made this topic important so that the class position 
of the family should be obtained as a combination of the individual social classes 
(ibid). 
Sociological theory further encompasses varieties of approaches for 
economic well-being of married women and intra-household sharing. The 
Bargaining view in sociology as a direct sociological equivalent to the economic 
theory, takes the form of resource theory of power and was first found in writings 
of Blood and Wolfe (1960) who underlined that the exchange of power in 
marriage draws on the individual financial contributions of spouses. The authors 
show in their study that woman‟s economic resources, their employment and the 
length of employment gave women more power in decision-making process. 
Blumstein and Schwartz (1984) reached similar conclusions when looking into 
the role of wife‟s income contributions for the balance of power between spouses. 
Finally, Sorensen and McLanahan (1987), developing so called „economic 
dependency‟ sub-approach also suggest that the power structure of the family is a 
function of married woman‟s economic dependency with its wider implications 
for societal gender relations.  To sum up, the resource theory focuses on 
negotiations that take place within the family, and where the household members 
exchange their education, earnings or unearned income from social security 
benefits and state transfers, for the power in intra-household relations. 
The resource theory of power in sociology found its major application in 
the research on housework as a measure of welfare, where one of the dominant 
views, so called exchange theory (Brines 1994; Greenstein 2000) is that economic 
exchange determines the negotiations of housework between partners. The 
essence of this approach is that the difference in the amount of housework 
between partners originates in the economic dependency of one partner on 
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another, and the partner who earns less is overall more prone to help in doing 
housework. As the resource theory suggests, the factors that may explain the 
negotiation of housework range from education, unearned income or social 
security benefits apart from rewards from employment. The exchange theory is 
thus a very straightforward approach because it attributes the changes of 
negotiating power regarding housework almost instantly to the rise or fall of 
earnings. This is however, the major source of its critique as well, which exceeds 
the framework of housework and applies to other subgroups of resource theory. 
The question is: is the economic exchange indeed neutral? 
On the example of housework, many empirical studies (Hochschild and 
Machung 1989; Brines 1994; Bittman et al. 2003; Breen and Cooke 2005) show 
that economic exchange is not neutral in its character because the gender of 
partner adds independently to the outcomes of negotiations. This is perhaps the 
reason why the economic exchange is often referred to as „quasi economic‟ 
exchange. In essence, women are more financially dependent on men and 
therefore, it is more difficult to understand men‟s patterns in doing housework if 
they were economically dependent on women. If the economic exchange indeed 
happens, unemployed men or those that majorly rely on the finances of their 
wives should do most of the housework. Still, there are examples in the literature 
that this scenario is not fully realistic. On the contrary, it has been often found  
that women breadwinners do relatively more housework to make up for men‟s 
loss of masculinity- this is a concept  acknowledged as “doing gender” 
(Hochschild and Machung 1989; Brines 1994) which explains the role of 
traditional gender stereotypes in everyday life between sexes. Esping Andersen 
(2010:4) points that „since domestic work symbolizes traditional feminine 
responsibilities, it also becomes an important arena for displaying and reaffirming 
„proper‟ gender identities, perhaps especially when they are threatened‟. Clearly, 
when it comes to the sociological explanation of the division of housework money 
does not always “talk” (Bittman et al. 2003) and reality seems to be additionally 
explained through the lens of factors other than pure money.  
But this is not the logic which applies only to the exchange of housework 
as a measure of welfare. As we enlarge our perspective, we see that gender roles 
do change the meaning of economic exchange also in other aspects of woman‟s 
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life. The classic study of Zelizer (1989, 1997) demonstrated that female earners 
were always treated differently in the household from their husbands, their money 
used to have a different meaning attached to it and a different value created by the 
societal norms. Basically, the meaning of money originated in the idea of male 
breadwinning, and as long as the society pictured the ideal family as a single 
earner family, woman‟s money was placed in the corner: its perceived value was 
relatively law. This consequently influenced the economic well-being of women. 
Apart from cultural and ideological factors, the power based on exchange 
of economic resources depends also on the characteristics of the system in which 
women and men exercise their right to work (Vogler 1998). For example, gender 
discrimination is present in many areas of work, and women are not equally paid 
as men for the same jobs they do. The effects of unequal pay are further translated 
into the household where regardless of the employment outside of the family, 
women may bring less money into the household. Moreover, even if women 
work, they might be segregated to certain professions that are more „convenient‟ 
for women but less paid, which again adds to the problem of economic 
dependency. Lastly, the pure economic information on the amount of money  do 
not often suffice in explaining the bargaining power because we need to rely on 
many other socio-economic characteristics to analyse the intra-household 
relations between a man and a woman. In the literature, many authors (Gerson 
1985, 1993; Hochschild, 1989; Hakim 1991, 1996, 2000) mention the role of 
woman‟s career prospects and work trajectories for the process of negotiation in 
the family and woman‟s well-being. Furthermore, how particular forms of labour 
market participation decrease the woman‟s dependence on men was also 
acknowledged (Hakim 1991, 1996; Hakim and Blossfeld 1997). Accordingly, 
there might be a difference between part-time work, low-paid non-career jobs 
even if fulltime and career jobs in their impact on economic well-being of women. 
And some sociologists (Safilios-Rothschild 1976; Hakim 2010) even focus on 
factors such as love, affection and sexuality for the decision making and well-
being of women as wives may compensate for the lack of earnings with more 
emotions and care. In sum, for economic well-being of women and intra-
household negotiation, sociologists regard relevant a complex set of their 
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intellectual, physical and affective characteristics rather than pure material 
achievement. 
1.3.3.   Gerson and Hakim: The emergence of the theory of preference 
 
Two complete sociological explanations arose from the existing literature 
on economic well-being of women. These views diverged from pure resource 
based approach. One is developed in United States from the 1980‟s in the work of  
Gerson (1985, 1993, 2009) whereas the other one grew in Europe from early 
1990‟s expressed in the work of Hakim (1991,1996, 2000). Both theoretical 
approaches are based on the principle of woman‟s preference to choose one 
particular life path. In Gerson‟s „Hard choices‟ (1985) we find for the first time 
the idea of „subtle‟ revolution in woman‟s roles. Following the new reality of 
American society from 1970‟s and on, Gerson defines domestic and nondomestic 
women as two possible female pathways. Domestic women are those whose focus 
is on family, homemaking and children, and they have a possibility to work, 
mostly in female professions while nondomestic women are oriented towards 
career and full employment, with or without children. She elaborates on 
motivations and factors influencing female decision to choose between career, 
homemaking and motherhood, outlining reasons that are related to past as family 
environment or present, in the form of opportunities. The two groups are further 
divided into working mothers, childless women, career committed women-the 
classification that was later taken over and further developed by Hakim (2000). 
The initial idea of woman‟s preferences is touched upon in the next study of 
Gerson (1993) but only to the extent that she analyses what helps women best to 
share more and have power in the household negotiations with husbands. These 
factors will also have direct implications for woman‟s well-being. She finds that 
equal sharing and egalitarian relationships are more common when men are in a 
relationship with a career-oriented woman. In principle, the study demonstrates 
the importance of woman‟s career for all types of sharing in family. In 
„Unfinished revolution‟ (2009), Gerson continues her research on modern couples 
implying that women have faced many changes, but the categories of women have 
not changed much: She similarly distinguishes between three groups of women, 
self-reliant, egalitarian and neo-traditional women that correspond to her first 
21 
 
classification (Gerson 1985) . Modern women choose between various options but 
self-reliance is still seen as the best way to protect from dependency on husband 
and maximize woman‟s well-being.  
The European equivalent of the Gerson‟s approach is characterized by the 
idea of woman‟s preference for work career or domesticity and  is found in  
Hakim‟s „Work-life style choices in the 21st century‟ (2000).The common feature 
with Gerson‟s work is the presence of choice and preference to describe the 
various options that are offered to women. Both theories have a similar standpoint 
to feminist theories in the sense that are concerned with individuals rather than the 
family, with women themselves who choose their own best interest. However, 
Hakim‟s view is somehow more radical. She believes that modern times have 
already brought a change in woman‟s position because women can work if they 
want to and can build a career if they are in favour of such path. The theory is, 
however, partly controversial due to Hakim‟s idea of already highly achieved 
equality, whose further developments depend only on women themselves.  She 
regards men and women different when it comes to life goals but she no longer 
sees the main frontier between men and women but between the three groups of 
women that she identified as: home- centered, adaptive and career- oriented 
women. It is, however, important to point the geographical placement of her 
theory, which is the Anglo-Saxon area of influence, and more notably two 
countries, which are argued to have achieved the highest level of liberalization 
and individualization: The United States and The United Kingdom. Yet, it is 
possible that this classification is not equally potent in other environments.  
While speaking about life choices and variety of life styles, Hakim also 
regards the different options equal to each other since she believes, there are no 
superior or inferior life styles: „The fact remains that women can do as well from 
marriage careers as do men from employment careers. More importantly, women 
today have a choice between using the marriage market or the labour market to 
achieve social status, self-expression and material well-being‟ (Hakim 2000:161). 
In her writings, she suggests that many women work only because they have to, in 
order to provide the resources for their families. This statement also implies that 
some women have no particular desire to achieve full financial freedom and 
correspondingly, they work in less prestige jobs and professions. However, in 
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explanation of the theory, Hakim emphasizes another factor that adds to intra-
family equality instead of personal finances and that is education. Her thesis is 
that educational equality in marriage along with cultural capital, are equally likely 
to protect a woman from unequal sharing within household, having the impact 
similar to personal earnings or career. This is perhaps because the theory of 
Hakim is a product of an era in which educational equality between genders was 
one of the most important achievements and as such valued highly. However, as a 
difference from Gerson‟s work, Hakim‟s theory is not tested by the author,  and 
she does not provide evidence on whether only education and cultural 
accumulation suffice to eliminate other forms of intra-family inequality as well as 
which preference is best for economic well-being of women. 
In her other work (Hakim 1991, 1996; Hakim and Blossfeld 1997) she 
examines the weights of different forms of employment such as part time, low-
paid full time, career oriented full time, etc. for women‟s economic dependency 
on men. However, her overview of potential work choices for women and their 
impact is often confusing, also due to an unclear typology of work-oriented 
women. Hakim (1996) recognizes that woman‟s labour participation is not 
homogenous, and as such might have a range of economic and social 
consequences. She then broadens the definition of work by dividing it on part 
time and full time with possible different applications on work attachment; she 
examines both woman‟s continuity of employment and flows into and out of the 
labour force and accounts for woman‟s occupational choices with the idea that 
certain professions imply higher work commitment. However, it is difficult to 
understand whether she believes that various woman‟s choices matter only at the 
macro level or also play a significant role for the real economic well- being of 
women and intra-household relations, that is to say, at the micro level. 
To conclude, comparing the two theories, we see different stances when it 
comes to the explanation of female well-being despite the same basic preference 
approach. While Gerson seems to imply that career orientation of women is 
beneficial for their economic well-being more than the other options, Hakim relies 
more on equality of the choices, without attaching any particular label concerning 
intra-household sharing and woman‟s economic well-being. However, the 
theoretical stance of Hakim is also problematic as she adds a range of life and 
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work possibilities for women, linking their impact only to the societal level and 
leaving a gap in the theoretical explanations of micro processes caused or 
influenced by woman‟s choices.  
1.3.4.   Vogler and Pahl:  The theories of money management 
 
Another important theoretical stance, which diverges from resource 
theory, is money management approach. The theories of money management 
enrich the resource theory of power with one important dimension, that is, the 
way in which money is managed and organized once it enters the household. Here 
we talk about executive control over money management, which was first studied 
by sociologists Pahl and Vogler (Pahl 1983; Vogler and Pahl 1994; Vogler 1998). 
The resource theory of power assumes that economic characteristics of partners 
influence their common decision-making. As a result, the theory predicts that the 
more women earn, the more control over decision-making they will be able to 
exercise. But, one confusing point in the resource theory is in its definition of 
power. Does power mean the ability to influence important decisions? Or any 
decisions? Is there any similarity with the economics where power relates more to 
control of household resources? To avoid confusion in their theory, Vogler and 
Pahl define two types of power: power over executive decisions and power over 
strategic decisions. The latter is used as a proxy of power relations within 
household, but according to this theory, the power in strategic decision-making 
will also depend largely on the power over executive decisions apart from 
economic characteristics of partners. That is, systems of money management are 
related to differences in power and living standards between partners in addition 
to all other socio-demographic characteristics of partners. In addition, gender 
inequalities could derive even more from woman‟s access to money than 
woman‟s relative income. 
In their major study (Vogler and Pahl 1994), Vogler and Pahl identify the 
differences in allocative systems
3
 among couples. The authors analyse 
heterogeneous systems of money management: female whole wage system, male 
whole wage system, housekeeping allowance system and three types of joint 
                                                          
3
 Terms allocative systems and financial management systems are interchangeably used. 
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pooling system- a female managed pool, a male managed pool and a joint 
managed pool. They further explain the characteristics of each: first, the female 
whole wage system is characterized by a full female executive control of all 
income except from husband‟s personal spending money; second, in the male 
whole wage system, the executive control is in the hands of the husband; third,  
the housekeeping allowance system allows for the wife‟s housekeeping allowance 
even though the rest of the money is managed by the husband; finally, in the joint 
system, couples pool and manage their money jointly. After the initial analyses, 
the authors conclude that the classification goes down to the four types of money 
management, as female and male managed pool turned to be very similar to a 
female or a male whole wage system. The authors conclude that the inequality is 
least present when resources are jointly managed whereas it reaches its maximum 
in housekeeping allowance system. 
 However, what are the factors that influence the executive control of 
money? It has been argued that ideological and cultural values of men rather than 
women‟s play an important role in the choice of management system and balance 
out (increase or decrease) husband‟s initial economic power. An example of such 
ideology is the notion of breadwinning. Indeed, the theory on money management 
relies on Lukes‟ three-dimensional model of power as a more general theory of 
power in the household that takes into account the ideological factors in decision 
making, so called Lukes‟ third dimension of power. Certainly, the advantage of 
this theory is that it provides us with an explanation why the resource theory does 
not depict the reality in some households where women have little power in 
decision making despite their own earnings. 
The first classification of allocative regimes did not, however, incorporate 
separate spheres management as more „individualized‟ forms of money 
management. But, newly emerging forms of relationships favour also new ways 
of controlling money, and introduce separate management in the standard 
financial organization. Lately, the dominant division of management systems is 
instead between the systems in which the couple is a single economic unit (female 
whole wage system, male whole wage system, housekeeping allowance system 
and joint pooling system) and systems in which individuals are separate units 
(independent management systems and partial pool). On the latter, in the 
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independent management system, individuals have separate responsibility over 
personal finances whereas in the partial pool, some money is collectively owned 
and some is private. Several points about the new systems are worth mentioning: 
It has been argued that new relationships are associated with more gender equality 
(Giddens 1992) and consequently, the management systems that characterize the 
new unions are expected to bring more balance of power in the relationship. 
Indeed, the new individualized model of money management arose from the dual 
earner relationships, which are quickly replacing the once dominant breadwinner 
model. Still, empirical confirmation that the new systems are associated with 
more equality of power did not arrive. On the contrary, several studies (Vogler, 
Brockmann and Wiggins 2006, 2008; Vogler, Lyonette and Wiggins 2008) found 
that the separate management is similar to many traditional systems because the 
higher earner still exercises more control and its principle of partners‟ equal 
financial contributions is more harmful for women who traditionally earn less. By 
and large, according to the management theory, pooled regimes maintain their 
position as the most egalitarian management practice. 
Importantly, systems of money management are a sociological theoretical 
approach, which share, however, two arguments with bargaining approach in 
economics. First similarity we find in the use of term „pooling‟ which appears  in 
sociology to mean joint executive control over money, and in economics to show 
that consumption is independent of who actually brings income (Bonke and 
Browning 2009a). Obviously, it is possible that joint control over money equals 
joint control of consumption but as Bonke and Browning argue, the definition can 
also diverge, since couples can jointly manage money while still the higher earner 
controls the consumption, or alternatively, the couples may apply separate 
management regime but still exercise equal control of consumption. More 
empirical research attempts to show the relation between the two use of „pooling‟ 
in order to help eliminate confusion between economic and sociological theory 
and some of the latest work (Bonke and Uldall-Poulsen 2007; Bonke and Browing 
2009a) confirms that pooling in economics, so called „Beckerian pooling‟ 
corresponds to joint pooling system in sociology. In these studies, relative 
incomes are found to affect the individual control over consumption sharing only 
in the households where joint money management is not a practice.  
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The second argument of money management on borderline with 
economics concerns the concept of efficiency. So, what is efficiency in money 
management and what in family economics? Apart from various factors above 
mentioned, the motivation for choosing one type of money management over 
another is also related to the minimization of transaction costs (Treas 1993). 
Couples prefer organizational forms that help them coordinate better their 
relationship, and any type of financial management may fulfil that role, depending 
on the particular interest of the couple. Treas explains the reasoning behind when 
a couple opts between a „joint pool‟ (collective system) and a „separate purse‟ 
(privatized system): 
‟The common pot of the collectivized marriage has an edge over privatized 
marriage when income pooling requires less coordination, leads to fewer 
disagreements, and makes monitoring of the many exchanges of married life 
easier… Couples who do not pool their resources say their arrangements are more 
efficient and less conflicted because neither partner is affected by the spending 
that benefits the other spouse alone‟ (Treas 1993:724). 
 Thus, the right choice of financial organization means more relationship 
efficiency. For this reason, couples with high relationship investments, children 
and common property often choose pooling regimes, to facilitate transactions 
(Bonke and Uldall-Poulsen 2007). 
In Economics, Pollak (1985) recognizes that marriage as a „governance 
structure‟ is likely to influence the behaviour of the family members, adding a 
non- market dimension to the market based intra-family bargaining. In his view, 
family features a business organization where also for the sake of efficiency 
business units merge, in the same way as two individuals who opt to form a 
family. He further argues that relationship investments directly contribute to better 
efficiency of union through their effect on transaction costs. 
1.3.5.   Collective factors in bargaining: Transaction cost approach 
 
In the economic and resource bargaining view to household behaviour, 
spouses are treated as independent members who are able to negotiate their own 
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position. Their interests are often conflicting and these conflicts are resolved by 
means of market based bargaining that takes place after the marriage is formed. 
As we saw in previous explanations, partners exchange their individual 
achievements, from incomes to career experiences, for more bargaining power. 
However, pure bargaining does not always represent well the real household 
behaviour. While bargaining is a feature of individualism, the union formation 
relies on collective investments: when people marry, they combine 
„individualism‟ with „collectivism‟, and they not only negotiate, but also invest in 
a new relationship. This is the dimension of human behaviour that easily relates to 
profit oriented-organizations which operate on the basis of common investment 
and efficiency. And indeed, the concepts of the economics of organization, 
namely transaction costs approach, serves as a model for explaining family 
behaviour in addition to resource bargaining perspective. 
Transaction cost approach was launched in the early eighties within the 
organizational theory (Chandlers 1962; Feller 1973; Macneil 1974; Williamson 
1981).The concept was different from other organizational theories, because it 
dealt with how firms generate efficiency by minimizing the costs of each 
individual transaction. Williamson (1981) initially suggested that the concept was 
meant for profit-oriented organizational environment but he did not exclude some 
other possible specifications given the concept‟s potential to adapt. Still, the 
transaction costs approach was extended to non-commercial settings only by R. 
Pollak (1985) whose work on bargaining models was essential in explanation of 
intra-household distribution of resources. He recognized the importance of union 
for the behaviour of family members, explaining that it helps to minimize the 
transaction costs of family life. In other words, bargaining within household takes 
place but, thanks to the collective character of investments in relationship, it 
becomes more „social‟. Consequently, economic well-being of women is a result 
of both individual and collective factors. 
As already mentioned, the transaction costs approach in sociology is used 
to explain efficiency gains in relation to the choice of the money management 
system. 
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1.4.   The mediation of the welfare regimes  
The economic well-being of women in the context of their economic 
dependency, employment and the choice of union is also related to the 
institutional framework to which individuals belong (Stier and Yaish 2008; 
Gornick and Mayers 2003; Esping Andersen 2002a). In other words,  country 
institutions often serve as „filters‟ in the effect of various factors on woman‟s 
decision to work and their bargaining position.  
For simplicity, countries are often grouped in various categories for the 
similarity of their institutions. Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999) launched the most 
cited typology „Three welfare regimes‟ which divides countries according to the 
prevalence of state, market or family in the combination of individual welfare 
inputs. This classification includes: Social-Democratic regimes, characterized by 
individual and universal entitlements for all citizens and the primary role of state, 
Liberal regimes that rely on the primary role of market, and the Conservative 
regimes, which place main value on family. Clearly, these regimes have their 
representation in Europe where Scandinavian countries belong to the socio-
democratic block, UK and Ireland form a part of Liberal group, and finally, the 
most numerous group are Conservative countries: France, Germany, Italy, Spain 
and Greece. Later some authors (Lessenich 1995; Ferrara 1996) made a strong 
case for the inclusion of Mediterranean countries as a separate block for they 
often appeared different from other conservative countries. Thus, the „modified‟ 
regime typology takes also into account a fourth category that is the 
Mediterranean block of countries  
Certainly, the existence of typology of welfare does not mean uniformity: 
country might be a part of one welfare regime and diverge in certain aspects from 
it. For that reason, there are also other useful classifications and for instance, 
Berthoud and Iacovou (2004:17) propose classifications according to geography 
and religion. It is known that neighbouring countries share many common 
characteristics because of their common history and geographical position, so the 
geographic typology of Berthoud and Iacovou divides Europe on Scandinavia, 
North-West islands, Continent and Southern Pensinsula.  They consider also 
religion a strong predictor of country policies distinguishing between protestant, 
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mainly protestant, catholic/orthodox and mainly catholic countries. Interestingly, 
this typology places Ireland in the same group with Italy, Spain and Greece which 
is in line with many empirical studies which confirm similarity between some 
southern countries and Ireland. For many, the strongest case in favour of variety 
of typologies is the possibility to find the one, which represents best the 
dimensions of interest.   
The economic well-being of women, woman‟s economic dependence and 
employment, along with the ideal model of union, depend on the existence of 
breadwinner and dual earner model in society. In some countries, dual earner 
model is already dominant while others are still in transition towards the dual 
earner model. In the explanation of differences between countries, the literature of 
welfare regimes points that welfare regimes are responsible for fact that transition 
to dual earner model varies among countries. The explanation derives from the 
broad concept of welfare, which, in practice, reflects history, policy and culture of 
the countries. Moreover, the welfare regimes, as different as they may be, often 
converge in certain policies, and several regimes are conducive to dual-earner 
model. In other words, it is possible to identify subgroups in the regimes, as 
alternative policies may serve for the same goal (Blossfeld and Drobnic 2001:40). 
So what are the predictions of the theory of regimes for the economic 
dependency of women, their employment, or choice of marriage? 
Regimes are supposed to influence the patterns of female employment and 
economic dependency. They also can favour one type of relationship, like 
traditional marriage, to more modern types of unions. The policies that favour 
wives‟ economic dependence and the male breadwinner wage are found, for 
instance, in conservative welfare regimes. The conservative model has the power 
to discourage more active labour participation of women because of the tax policy 
that discourages dual earner families along with lack of child care. In the 
Mediterranean model, family has central role that impedes women in their effort 
to work and be economically independent of their husbands. Both conservative 
and Mediterranean regimes also help traditional marriage with some possible 
exceptions. On the other hand, socio-democratic regimes are formed on the 
principle of egalitarianism, decommodification, universal benefits and state help 
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to family, and these regimes help woman‟s integration into the labour markets, 
and decrease economic dependency of women, also through the employment in 
public sector.  Finally, even though liberal regimes start from a series of different 
postulates from the socio-democratic block, and do not stimulate women to be 
economically independent per se, this regime impacts the decrease of male 
breadwinners wage, so that the woman‟s income becomes essential for the family 
living standards. Therefore, Liberal and Democratic regimes are very different but 
through either market or state, they manage to achieve the same goals: the 
growing dual earner concept. 
Comparing countries based on welfare regimes, we can reach only broad 
conclusions since the exact factors: policies, culture, tradition, etc. cannot be 
individualized. On the other hand, changes are more visible when comparing the 
whole context than the effects of single macro factors. In addition, the welfare 
typology may also be tested and critically assessed in the context of predictions 
that the theory offers, for there might be other typologies that explain better the 
country effect on economic well-being of women. Another concern when 
applying welfare typology is whether welfare policies reflect existing gender 
relations or cause them (Esping –Andersen 2010).  
1.5.   The definition of the concept of (economic) well-being 
In measuring human welfare, standard economic research for the whole 
last century relied on objective and observable outcomes. In other words, 
economics and other positivistic social sciences considered only „serious‟ subjects 
leaving subjective measures behind any possible consideration. For instance, 
human well-being was studied on various individually assignable outcomes, from 
individual income and consumption to leisure time and housework, with the idea 
to objectively capture individual conditions. Well-being of a nation was similarly 
studied though the national product so that it was possible to objectively compare 
living standards between the countries. In addition, social indicators such as life 
expectancy and school enrolment have also played a role in explaining human 
welfare as they sometimes provide with more information than the standard 
national product because of their non-material character. All in all, throughout the 
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th
 century utility in economics was reflected in revealed behaviour and 
measured with a simple number (Frey and Stutzer 2002b:20).  
Some exceptions to this trend were reflected in the work of economists 
Van Praag (1968) and Easterlin (1974) who understood that individual 
preferences and real human well-being may diverge from each other. So, their 
work rather focused on human happiness, which was a broad term to encompass 
various subjective outcomes. However, subjective measures of human well-being 
attract real public and scientific interest in economics and social science only with 
interesting studies of Clark and Oswald (1994), Frey and Stutzer (2000) who, with 
their alternative approach, show that material achievements, income and 
economic growth are not necessarily the most important determinants of human 
well-being. They suggest „reported happiness is one step closer than objective 
variables like income or goods to the subjective states real people experience‟ 
(Konow 2003:286). For these exact reasons, there has been a leap in the empirical 
research on subjective well-being in both micro and macro socio-economic 
research (Oswald 1997; McBride 2001; Pradhan and Ravallion 2000; Van Praag 
et al. 2003). 
Thus, growing economic and social literature, recognize that there are 
many reasons to study subjective outcomes. For instance, subjective measures 
have the potential to add new knowledge by capturing human well-being directly, 
which is rare if not impossible using the standard positivistic approach. After all, 
there is no one who gives a better judgment on one‟s well-being than the person 
involved (Frey and Stuzter 2002a).  Also, subjective outcomes account for various 
economic and non-economic factors which might have strong influence on 
individuals in addition to income; various studies show how employment 
situation, public policy, the perception of discrimination are equally important for 
one‟s well-being. In addition, well-being subjectively expressed is also „richer‟, 
because individuals evaluate their personal welfare considering past, present and 
future, for which objective measures do not allow. In sum, subjective measures, 
while being closely related to objective conditions, offer some additional 
advantages in measuring human welfare.  
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But what is really intended by subjective human welfare? And what does it 
consist of? As we already mentioned, the definition of human welfare in positivist 
sciences is rather straightforward as a direct response to observed conditions such 
as goods, services or leisure. Subjective well-being instead, defined in psychology 
as one‟s own evaluation of personal well-being, is interchangeably used with 
various terms, from happiness, satisfaction to subjective welfare, although each 
term may also have a separate meaning. Therefore, subjective well- being is a 
rather broad concept and often contains more than one dimension or, how some 
social scientists describe it, domains, which is rarely the case when measuring 
objective conditions. This means that it is possible to specify whether subjective 
well-being refers to overall well-being, or it refers to well-being with regards to 
finances, health conditions, housing conditions, family life and etc. Certainly, the 
aspect considered narrows the operational definition of subjective well-being. 
 Van Praag et al. (2003) suggest the following function to describe the 
overall satisfaction:  
GS= GS (DS1,…, DSj; z) where general satisfaction GS is a function of 
domain satisfactions DSj and unobserved characteristics z. 
And the domain satisfaction is expressed through the following function: 
DSj= DSj (xj, z) j = 1, 2,…, J where xj is a selection of observable 
objective variables that influence domain satisfactions and z is unobservable. 
When it comes to the economic well-being of married women, previous 
research mostly relied on objective outcomes and woman‟s economic conditions 
were explained by the levels of their consumption. But the same research
4
 points 
that economic well-being measured through consumption is often one sided, and 
does not offer a full picture of conditions which women face. That is, the use of 
subjective measures to explain economic well-being of married women offers a 
clear advantage of incorporating also non-material components important for 
women such as career prospects and the type of work. As we saw in the previous 
section, financial considerations have been historically of great significance for 
married women, and that motivated the interest in their economic well-being. On 
                                                          
4
 More explanations on this follow in the third chapter. 
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the other hand, financial satisfaction as a subjective economic well-being is often 
found the most important determinant of overall satisfaction and human well-
being (van Praag et al. 2003) because of its power to influence other domain 
satisfaction. For these reasons, the concept chosen to represent married woman‟s 
well-being is subjective economic well-being in the form of financial satisfaction. 
The issues that regard the operationalization of the concept and measurement are 
touched upon in the next chapters. 
1.6.    Building the research stance: Brief review of empirical literature 
The theoretical frameworks mentioned in the previous section point to 
different conclusions for economic well-being of married women. First approach 
comes from early economic and sociological work (Durkheim, Parsons, Becker) 
and considers the economic well-being of women inseparable from family life, 
that is, woman‟s economic well-being necessarily equals her partner‟s economic 
well-being. The other newer approaches consider woman‟s personal achievements 
and individual characteristics when explaining the woman‟s economic well-being. 
This group contains resource bargaining perspective and various theories that 
diverge from it. Then, the transaction costs approach introduces the importance of 
collective factors, namely union, for woman‟s economic well-being in addition to 
the individual features. Finally, welfare regime perspective filters the initial 
theoretical approaches by viewing woman‟s economic well-being in the context 
of the country welfare regimes; it assumes that the predictions of the theories on 
woman‟s economic well-being will be modified in specific country contexts. 
Thus, in line with the previous theoretical elaborations, this thesis covers 
three different perspectives:  
We start from economic resources, which are considered crucial in a life of 
an individual, having also an important effect for one‟s bargaining power. In other 
words, the more one earns the higher one‟s bargaining power, with the 
consequences for their economic well-being. Relative incomes are thus a useful 
way of testing the existence of the unitary framework that, as we know, suggests 
that only common resources matter for an individual. Indeed, the unitary models 
of economic behaviour are largely tested in the empirical research with various 
measures of income such as income contributions (relative income), unearned 
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income, earnings etc. However, researchers also operationalize bargaining power 
in other ways, testing the role of education, assets or wage rates for the economic 
well-being of women. In addition, the empirical tests are carried out on various 
datasets and national contexts, in single country studies or in a comparative 
perspective. 
When testing the theory, many studies found that unitary models do not 
adequately represent the reality of everyday life, so these models were often 
rejected against one of the bargaining approach alternatives. Obviously, the focus 
of empirical evidence is mostly on economic well-being of women and children, 
and woman‟s relative resources or other relative characteristics serve as proxies of 
bargaining power. The examples of such studies are numerous; for instance, in 
one of the most cited study, Lundberg, Pollak and Wales (1997) examine a policy 
change in the UK that shifts the right to child allowance from men to women. 
They provide evidence that both women and children benefit from this state 
transfer through an increase in personal spending and reject Becker‟s income 
pooling hypothesis. In his classic study Schultz (1990) use the Thai data from 
1981 to test whether woman‟s unearned income affects her labour supply 
differently than her husband‟s unearned income. This study also shows that 
economic well-being of woman is more sensitive to woman‟s own resources. 
Attanasio and Lechene (2002) link woman‟s higher personal consumption to the 
increase in her relative share of household money, on the data from Mexico.  
  Lately, more studies have been using alternative measures for woman‟s 
well-being, opposing the dominant economic stance to use observable conditions 
to explain well-being. The most recent examples are Bonke and Browning 
(2009b) who provide evidence against unitary framework on a Danish sample, 
using financial satisfaction as a proxy for economic well-being. The same author 
(Bonke 2008) performs similar analysis on cross sectional data, testing the unitary 
models in a comparative perspective. He finds mixed results depending on the 
national contexts and dominant welfare regimes. Alessie, Crossley and 
Hildebrand (2006) also find that woman‟s subjective economic well-being 
improves the more she contributes to the household finances. 
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All told, empirical evidence does support the bargaining framework in 
many instances and this leads us to argue against unitary models in explaining the 
economic well-being of women. Thus, in our first considerations of economic 
well-being of married women, we apply the resource bargaining perspective and 
assume the important role of individual factors, such as relative income, for 
married women‟s financial satisfaction. However, given the importance of 
institutional factors for individual choices, and consequently for woman‟s 
economic well-being, it is also assumed that welfare regimes may alter the results 
in various national contexts. 
However, economic theory, and also, as we saw, resource bargaining 
approach in general, does not provide us with a full understanding of the relations 
and processes related to woman‟s economic well-being5. Income is very useful in 
explaining some aspects of woman‟s life, but does not fully suffice (Goldthorpe 
2009). It is valuable to enrich the starting economic perspective with social 
concepts developed and explained in the theories of Gerson (1993) and Hakim 
(1996, 2000). Both sociologists suggest that a broader concept of work and   
career needs to be incorporated into the research on woman‟s economic well-
being, even though the two theories actually differ in the way they perceive the 
role of woman‟s career. For instance, Gerson assumes positive role for woman‟s 
career prospects, whereas Hakim does not seem to have a clear stance on it. 
Moreover, in some of her studies (Hakim 2000:161) it is implicit that all woman‟s 
choices are equal for woman‟s well-being, from homemaking to the choice of 
working career.   
The available empirical knowledge on the role of woman‟s career on her 
economic well-being does provide us with some answers but also leaves 
unanswered questions. Some examples from the empirical work include also 
Gerson‟s study „No men‟s land‟ (1993) where she examines the changing role of 
men but also looks at the changing possibilities for women. She argues in favour 
of woman‟s work career for her well-being. Boye (2009) analyses career through 
the lens of hours of work, and finds that more hours of work mean higher 
woman‟s well-being. But, she also allows for differentiated results according to 
                                                          
5
 See the previous section 
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the welfare regimes. As already mentioned, K. Hakim contributed to the literature 
by developing the concepts of career, but she produced little empirical evidence 
for micro-relations in the family. Also, there is a stream in the literature on well-
being that instead of directly focusing on career effects, rather investigates how 
overall employment status changes well-being. In addition, many of these studies 
(Winkelmann and Winkelmann 1998; Frey and Stutzer 2002a; Bonke and 
Browning 2009b) report how negative is the impact of unemployment on well-
being (and also woman‟s well-being).  
Therefore, our further considerations regard the role of woman‟s 
employment and career prospects on woman‟s financial satisfaction, as well as, 
the mediating role of welfare regimes in it. 
Lastly, as we already argued in the previous section, the approach based 
only on individual achievements is rather incomplete (Pollak 1985), given that 
bargaining within household mostly adopts a nonmarket form. This means that 
union as a „governance structure‟ is likely to add to the process of intra-family 
bargaining, and the more so, if the investments in the relationship are abundant. 
The problem arises when we need to compare different unions. Obviously, the 
idea of relationship in the last decades has evolved and there are various types of 
unions which are quickly replacing marriage. For instance, one can be either 
married or living in a consensual union. So, the question is whether these two 
unions have the same effect on woman‟s economic well-being, or better, whether 
they have the same „weight‟ as unions. Also, the review of the money 
management theory pointed that cohabitation and marriage potentially differ in 
the way in which the household money is managed. And different money 
organization might have various consequences for efficiency of the union and 
also, for woman‟s economic well-being. 
Many empirical studies consider the differences between marriage and 
cohabitation. The prevalent opinion is that the two unions are different (Waite 
1995; Brown and Booth 1996; Winkler 1997) but authors divide on whether the 
differences come from individual and relationship characteristics, or are due to 
superiority of one relationship over another, also reflected in their unequal legal 
treatment. Waite (1995) believes in the institution of marriage, and regards it 
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ultimate goal for every woman. In her view, marriage brings higher (economic) 
well-being to women than cohabitation. Though there are others (Willetts 2006) 
who oppose this view, and find no qualitative difference between the two. In other 
words, Willetts finds that both unions equally bring higher well-being.  When it 
comes to money management, there is a bunch of recent empirical work (Oropesa, 
Landale and Kenkre 2003; Heimdal and HouseKnecht 2003; Vogler 2005; 
Vogler, Brockmann and Wiggins 2008) which confirms the lack of income 
pooling in cohabiting couples. And the lack of income pooling often means lower 
economic well-being for women (Vogler 2005, Vogler, Brockmann and Wiggins 
2008). Lastly, it has been also argued that national differences in the meaning of 
cohabitation and its legal acceptance may be important for the impact of 
cohabitation on (economic) well-being (Heimdal and HouseKnecht 2003). 
Finally, we build on the previous knowledge on the impact of union on 
economic well-being of women, and consider how the type of union changes 
income pooling and woman‟s financial satisfaction in various welfare regimes. 
Union is a collective factor in family bargaining and its consideration represents 
the third research interest of this thesis, the first two being woman‟s income and 
woman‟s career prospects as individual bargaining factors. 
1.7.   The summary of hypotheses and organization of the thesis 
Following the previous review of theoretical and empirical literature, in 
this study we develop a set of general hypotheses regarding the role of woman‟s 
income, career prospects and the type of union to which she belongs on her 
economic well-being in various welfare regimes. In addition, each of the general 
hypotheses may be followed by a set of subject specific hypotheses that will be 
discussed elsewhere in the thesis. As already explained, we use the concept of 
financial satisfaction to measure woman‟s economic well-being. 
The first set of hypotheses derives from the economic bargaining theories 
and can be summarized as follows: 
1. The financial satisfaction of a married woman is positively related 
to her economic contributions to the family.  
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2. The positive impact of woman‟s economic contributions on her 
financial satisfaction will vary by the welfare regime. 
The next set of hypotheses relies on the theoretical stance of Gerson and 
Hakim who introduce the role of woman‟s employment and career prospects. The 
hypotheses are the following: 
1. Woman‟s financial satisfaction is positively related to her work 
commitment and bright career prospects. 
2. We expect that the positive relation between woman‟s career and 
her financial satisfaction will differ among countries that belong to 
various welfare regimes. 
Based on the transaction cost approach and the existing evidence on the 
differences between marriage and cohabitation, we develop a third set of the 
hypotheses. It is hypothesized that: 
1. Cohabitation is negatively related to the woman‟s financial 
satisfaction. 
2. There is a differential impact of cohabitation on woman‟s financial 
satisfaction based on the country context and welfare regime. 
3. Cohabiting women are less likely to pool the money with their 
partner within the household. 
4. Lack of money pooling within household among cohabiting 
couples will vary with the country context and welfare regime. 
In order to test the theories and explain the determinants of woman‟s 
economic well- being, this thesis applies the perspective of unified social science, 
which overcomes the divisions between traditional economic and sociological 
fields. Indeed, the three distinctive theoretical approaches mentioned in the 
previous lines come from both economics and sociology. Moreover, the outlined 
hypotheses are tested using the techniques of multivariate analysis common in 
both social sciences, namely fixed effects and multilevel models.  The hypotheses 
are examined in the longitudinal comparative framework: the economic well-
being of women is compared between five countries, which despite some 
common characteristics show variation in institutional systems and policies, and 
39 
 
belong to four different welfare regimes. These countries are UK, Italy, Denmark, 
France and Ireland. Each group of hypotheses is tested in one of the three 
empirical chapters that are organized as follows: 
In the first empirical chapter, we investigate how economic well-being of 
women changes with the presence of their personal income. Economics suggests 
various theories that explain the way family performs its functions and determine 
the well-being of its members. The theory of Gary Becker idealizes family seeing 
it as a rational unit where both wife and husband aim at the maximization of 
family resources. On the other hand, the bargaining perspective highlights that the 
households‟ behaviour depends largely on family dynamics and bargain between 
the family members. There is large empirical evidence against unitary models of 
household behaviour and this chapter presents another contribution to the 
empirics using financial satisfaction as a concept of economic well-being. We 
further enrich the analysis by: 1) incorporating the social context in explaining the 
bargaining between partners and woman‟s economic well-being, 2) testing the 
unified model of household at different household income levels.  
The second empirical chapter goes beyond the current studies on woman‟s 
economic independence. Economic theory is often limiting in its scope because it 
relies only on income in explaining the economic well-being of women. The 
sociological perspective broadens the economic view because it encompasses the 
employment patterns, future career prospects and commitment to personal 
occupation in economic well-being of women (Gerson, 1993, Hakim, 2000). We 
employ diversity of work choices and career orientation in the analysis of 
woman‟s economic well-being and her financial position within family. Career 
stability and attachment to work are analysed and compared to a choice of a more 
flexible path in various European countries. Flexibility is popular in globalized 
labour markets and is a frequent choice for women because it offers the 
opportunity to balance work and family. Nevertheless, how much is it beneficial 
for women themselves? We hypothesize that it is not relative incomes or pure 
employment that matter the most for woman‟s economic well-being but more 
likely the choice of relatively continuous and full-time work careers. We also 
analyse the value of a full time homemaking as a career, so called „marriage 
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career‟ for woman‟s well-being. Again, the results are commented considering the 
potential intra-household dynamics. 
  Finally, in the third empirical chapter  economic bargaining perspective is 
enriched with the transaction costs approach (Pollak, 1985) and the theories of 
money management (Pahl 1983, Treas 1993) to deal with the differences in 
income sharing between married and cohabiting unions. There is a growing 
tendency to see cohabitation as an equivalent alternative to marriage and we 
investigate how different these two unions are when it comes to efficiency. The 
type of union as a governing structure is a collective determinant of woman‟s 
economic well-being that adds to the bargaining process. 
However, before moving to the empirical section of this thesis, we first 
provide information on the operationalization of the concepts in use, then we 
describe the characteristics of our dataset and explain the econometric techniques 
relevant for our analyses. 
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Chapter 2: The operationalization of the concepts, data and methods 
 
2.1.   Operationalization of financial satisfaction 
Various doubts and concerns are linked to the operationalization behind 
the concept of subjective well-being. Frey and Stuzter (2002b:25) outline several 
ways to capture subjective well-being such as in the form of psychological and 
neurobiological indicators, observed social behaviour, nonverbal behaviour and 
finally, surveys. However, the most used method to get to the core of subjective 
well-being is the last one, so called self-reported survey questionnaire because 
people are able to report and self-evaluate their well-being. Other methods, 
although acknowledged, face many issues, either because they are not sufficiently 
developed or because they are unreliable. On one hand, psychological and 
neurobiological indicators are rare due to their complex functioning and on the 
other, observed social behaviour and nonverbal behaviour may often be 
misleading for there is often a discrepancy between behaviour and happiness as 
the same non-verbal and social behaviour might be seen in happy and unhappy 
persons. As a result, satisfaction or better reported satisfaction questionnaires are 
developed mostly by psychologists to measure the subjective individual well-
being. The individuals are asked to self-report the evaluation of their life, 
satisfaction or happiness depending on the purpose of the questionnaire. Thus, 
psychologists rely on more or less detailed questions on one‟s well-being and 
consequently, happiness can be reported in a single or multiple item questions. 
For certain analysis, it suffices to have a straight answer on overall satisfaction 
with life, while multi-item questions add more reliability to the measurement. 
Nowadays several world standard surveys such World value survey and European 
barometer survey provide us with information on individual well-being for 
various countries.  
 However, unlike other questionnaires on well-being that regard objective 
conditions, the self-reported satisfaction questionnaires are criticized for 
additional issues: for instance, the individual responses may depend on the order 
of questions, type of explanations, the mood of the respondent, social and cultural 
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norms etc. (Frey and Stuzter 2002a). Moreover, one‟s satisfaction is also relative 
and depends on achievements of reference groups (Easterlin 1974, 1995, 2001) 
and these characteristics all together might undermine the reliability and validity 
of the measures of subjective well-being. In relation to these issues, the concept of 
subjective well-being relies on two essential assumptions, namely ordinal 
comparability and cardinal utility (van Praag 1991). On the first, the scores of 
satisfaction are assumed directly comparable which means that individuals who 
respond similarly also enjoy similar levels of satisfaction. On the latter, the 
assumption of cardinal utility refers to the equal distance between the satisfaction 
scores. This, in practice, means that for instance the distance between those 
largely satisfied and satisfied is no different from the distance between those 
unsatisfied and largely unsatisfied. 
 In sum, there has been a criticism on the way subjective well-being is 
defined and measured, mostly in economics, but also in other social sciences 
which rely on the dominant positivist ideology. Still, as Kahneman (1999) argues, 
many of these issues are resolvable because they are less of a problem at the 
practical than theoretical level. Indeed, most of these concerns have been clarified 
and explained by previous research and are treatable with adequate research 
design and econometric approach (Frey and Stuzter 2002a). Finally, there are 
various empirical confirmations that satisfaction measures are adequate 
representatives of individual utility and as such can be used instead of the 
objective measures of well-being (Diener 1984; Van Praag, Frijters and Ferrero-i-
Carbonell 2003; Senik 2005). 
As previously mentioned, the questions on subjective well-being may refer 
to one principal dimension or several dimensions. For example, single item 
questionnaire might be suitable for overall life satisfaction or some specific 
domain of satisfaction. But subjective well-being is rarely one dimensional and 
can be decomposed in many dimensions which are mostly treated with multi-item 
questionnaire. As Van Praag et all. (2003) suggest „satisfaction with life as a 
whole can be seen as an aggregate concept, which can be unfolded into its domain 
components‟. These dimensions can be related to labour market, family or health 
and so on or can be simply regrouped into personal and public domain. This 
thesis, for the reasons already explained in the previous chapter, relies on the 
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financial aspect of satisfaction and uses a question that directly uncovers this 
dimension. 
The first standard question for happiness was applied by the University of 
Michigan‟s survey research centre (Frey and Stutzer 2002b:26). The question 
asked to the respondents was the following: 
‘Taken all together, how would you say things are these days-would you 
say that you are very happy, pretty happy and not too happy?’ 
Individuals could respond how happy they are in one of the three 
modalities. Similarly, the question, which operationalizes the concept of well-
being in this thesis, is not far from the first formulation of Michigen‟s survey 
center. The ECHP uses the following formulation to reveal one‟s individual 
financial satisfaction: 
’ How satisfied are you with your present financial situation? 1. Not at all 
satisfied; 2.Largely unsatisfied; 3.Mildly unsatisfied; 4.Mildly satisfied; 5. 
Largely satisfied; 6. Fully satisfied’. 
 Unlike the ECHP, the wording of questions and number of modalities is 
different in the British part of the ECHP. The relevant question in British sample 
is: 
‘How well would you say you yourself are managing financially these 
days? Would you say you are: 1. Living comfortably; 2. Doing alright; 3. Just 
about getting by; 4. Finding it quite difficult; 5. Finding it very difficult; 6. Don’t 
know’ with the five categories. 
To sum up, the questions on subjective well-being from the ECHP and 
BHPS (for the British sample) form the base for operationalization of the financial 
subjective well-being in this study. In addition, for the sake of various analyses, 
the modalities of these questions are further regrouped so that the question is often 
treated as binary. We refer to previous studies for the further explanation of 
potential disadvantages and advantages of the concept and chosen 
operationalization (Easterlin 1974; Frey and Stutzer 2002a, 2002b). Finally, the 
term financial satisfaction is interchangeable used with the term subjective 
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economic well-being and subjective financial well-being. 
2.2.   Data  
2.2.1.   Why longitudinal data? 
 
       Some of the problems that arise from the use of subjective data are 
resolvable through better data collection and well-thought questionnaires. This is 
essential when measurement errors are correlated with the individual 
characteristics like, for instance, in case of distorted responses of satisfaction due 
to age of the respondent (Frey and Stutzer 2002a). Also, certain theoretical issues 
with subjective data disappear at the practical level, especially with regards to 
random errors due to wording and order of questions. But, when it comes to 
unobserved individual characteristics, they are a source of systematic bias in 
subjective data (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001), and need to be treated with the 
use of longitudinal framework. As Frey and Stutzer (2002a) explain, a 
longitudinal analysis allows for a baseline well-being for each person and helps 
mitigate the effect of spurious relationships. 
 
Thus, to study woman‟s subjective economic well-being, in this thesis, we 
use the data at the individual level with repeated observations on the same 
individuals, or better, longitudinal data. These data are also known as panel data, 
repeated measures or cross-sectional time series data (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 
2008:179). There are different types of panel data, such as cohort surveys and 
retrospective data, but here we apply household panel survey where the 
respondents are interviewed each year for several years with the same questions. 
The use of longitudinal data here is important to give a dynamic view of woman‟s 
economic well-being and help understand the effect and process of change. 
Indeed, unlike cross-sectional data that provide a snapshot of events in one 
particular moment in time, longitudinal frameworks show their timing and order. 
This characteristic makes longitudinal data, although observational, similar to the 
experimental data and, accompanied with the adequate techniques, they might be 
used for making causal inferences.  
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Related to the causal inference, the advantage of having longitudinal data 
is also in partially treating endogeneity of variables by controlling for the omitted 
individual characteristics. Endogenous variables are dependent on the previous 
processes, preferences and choices, and might influence the real picture of a 
studied phenomenon, in this case, woman‟s financial satisfaction. So, longitudinal 
data, with adequate econometric models, model unobserved characteristics as 
individual random effects and add them to the linear predictor, this way avoiding 
the misleading results. 
2.2.2.   Cross country comparison 
 
     In the longitudinal settings, the differences observed in people are 
smaller given that the same people are followed in several occasions. And if the 
longitudinal data is international, some of the differences between people may 
also be result of the institutional differences between countries. With a cross 
country comparison, it is possible to distinguish these institutional differences. 
Patterns across countries differ for cultural, economic and broader 
historical reasons, and as we saw in the previous sections, these different 
influences are reflected also through the country welfare regimes. In this study, 
the modified welfare regime typology (Esping-Andersen 1990, 1999; Lessenich 
1995; Ferrara 1996) will be used. Accordingly, countries are classified into four 
groups: Countries with conservative welfare state regimes, Southern European 
countries with familialistic regime, countries with liberal welfare regimes and 
countries with socio-democratic regimes. Here we select several countries due to 
their belonging to specific welfare regimes: Italy for the Mediterranean model, 
Denmark for Socio-Democratic model, UK and Ireland for liberal model and 
France for conservative model. In other words, even though our sample of 
countries is selected, there is enough of regime variation for the purpose of 
comparison. Therefore, we compare individuals from four welfare regimes in the 
period of seven to eight years.  
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2.2.3.   The ECHP 
 
     The thesis uses longitudinal micro-data that are drawn from the eight 
waves of the European Community Household panel (ECHP), from 1994-2001. 
The ECHP is one of the first panel surveys to represent EU-15 which is why it is 
often seen as „golden age for comparative analysis‟ (Berthoud and Iacovou 
2004:11). It includes more than 73000 households and 153 000 individuals across 
Europe that annually participated in the questionnaire. All the questions in the 
questionnaires are direct as they do not contain retroactive information on 
individuals. 
The dataset was chosen due to its multi-dimensional approach as it 
contains substantive information about income, employment status and relations, 
education, poverty measures, subjective indicators of well-being such as 
satisfaction with finances, housing, work and leisure, etc. In addition, the ECHP is 
especially advantageous with respect to income data since missing information is 
minimal and it was also imputed by the EUROSTAT, so that the survey found its 
wide use in economic research. Also, statistical office of the European community 
(EUROSTAT) coordinated the data collection and guaranteed the homogeneity of 
questionnaires adopting an „input oriented‟ approach (ECHP 1994). As a result, 
the data were collected in individual and household questionnaires with minimal 
country differences, which is essential for the sake of our comparisons. 
Still, there are some differences in the questionnaire among countries 
chosen for this analysis.  The survey is standard for four out of five countries: 
Denmark, Italy, France and Ireland whereas the UK version differs because the 
ECHP was carried out in the UK for three years from 1994-1996, but then the rest 
of the data for the following years were derived from the British household panel 
and later dated to 1994, resulting in two data-sources in the UK sample. 
Consequently, this caused some problems in the data availability for the British 
section of the ECHP as well as with the interpretation of differently formulated 
questions. Among indicators that face different formulation is also the question on 
financial satisfaction, which has been already explained in the section 
„Operationalization of the financial satisfaction‟. For the British data in this study, 
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we rely on the British sample derived from British household panel for it covers 
without interruptions the whole period of eight years  
In sum, this data set is attractive for our research questions and hypotheses 
for two main reasons: first, because it allows us to study the dynamic relationship 
between characteristics of women and financial satisfaction. In other words, it 
provides detailed information on micro relations within family and their change in 
time, which was unavailable in this form in any other panel questionnaire.  
Second, the survey questions and structure enable straightforward comparison of 
social statistics between selected five European countries. And this direct 
comparability adds more precision to the conclusions on the role of welfare 
regimes for economic well-being of married women. 
2.2.4.   Characteristics of the sample 
 
We restricted the sample only to the individuals from Italy, Denmark, Uk, 
France and Ireland, who at the moment of the interview were cohabitating (either 
as divorced, widowed or never married) or were married. We drop from the 
sample multi-generation households as well as the same sex couples given that 
our interest is a nuclear heterosexual union. We restrict the age for women from 
18 to 50 years whereas the age for men is 18 and above. This age selection was 
made for several reasons: first, the minimum age is set at the age of 18, as the 
legal entrance to adulthood; second, the upper age limit for women was made  to 
exclude the women in retirement age in all the countries of interest as the 
European retirement policies are characterized by the different age limits; third,  
we also choose a time span in which the most of the woman‟s productive life 
takes place which is relevant to study the effect of woman‟s income, work choices 
and type of union for woman‟s economic well-being; fourth, the upper age limit 
was not defined for men as the married and cohabiting women are central unit of 
analysis and the interest for men‟s characteristics is of a limited character. 
The panel is unbalanced and the real sample size varies in the analysis 
depending on the primary topic of interest. Each empirical chapter provides more 
detail on this. The maximum sample size totals 53776 observations on couples 
with the largest subsample of Italian data with 17582 observations. Other 
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countries are represented in the following order: France (13567), UK (10407), 
Ireland (6345) and Denmark (5875). The minimum sample size totals 37087 
observations on couples and it ranges from 4197 observations for Denmark, 4623 
for Ireland, 5715 for UK, 9334 for France and 13218 for Italy. 
We use information on individual financial satisfaction, income and 
employment data, socio-demographic characteristics of men and women and 
household characteristics (the number of children, household income etc). 
However, the relevant variables and the motivation for choosing them will be 
elaborated in more detail in each empirical chapter. 
2.3.   Techniques 
We use longitudinal models, which contain random term, as well as fixed 
effects models to explain the factors influencing financial satisfaction of married 
women. The models with random term are known as random effects models in 
econometrics, and multilevel and mixed models in statistics. Alternatively, they 
are also called conditional models because individual responses are conditional on 
the random term, which represents modelled unobserved features. In the fixed 
effect models, unobserved features are treated as fixed parameters that can be 
either estimated or eliminated from the model. Indeed, the treatment of the 
unobserved parameters as fixed gives the name to the model.  
We use several variations of random effect and fixed effect models in this 
study. The choice of model depends on the character of the dependent variable, 
which can be here either binary or ordinal. The variable financial satisfaction is 
turned into binary for reasons of parsimony in the first two empirical chapters, but 
we treat it as ordinal in the third empirical chapter for giving more precision to the 
results. Consequently, the three models in use are: fixed effect logit models, 
logistic random intercept model and random intercept proportional odds model. 
2.3.1.   Fixed effect (or conditional) logit 
 
The important reason for choosing fixed effect models was to control for 
the unmeasured woman‟s and men‟s characteristics which can create bias in the 
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effect of other variables on woman‟s financial satisfaction. In the fixed effect 
models, individuals are their own control because only within individual variation 
is observed in time and averaged across persons. Thus, these models enabled us to 
use causal inference in our dataset and minimize problems such as endogeneity of 
the variables.  
The following table taken from Hesketh and Skrondal (2008:124) 
summarizes the differences between random intercept and fixed effect models for 
the linear case. 
Tab. 2.1: Overview of features of fixed effect and random effect approaches 
 
Answers
Questions: Fixed effects Random effects
Inference for population 
of clusters?
No Yes
Minimum number of 
clusters required?
Any number
For estimating ψ, at least 10 
or 20
What assumptions are 
required?
None for distribution of 
fixed intercepts α¡
Random intercepts Ϛ¡ normal, 
constant variance ψ, 
exogenous covariates,etc.
Can estimate effects of 
cluster -level covariates?
No. Because cluster level 
covariates are replaced 
with dummies.
Yes.
Inference for clusters in 
particular sample?
Yes.
No, not for βs. Yes, for Ϛ¡ by 
using EB
Minimum cluster size 
required?
Any sizes if many >=2, but 
large for est. α¡
Any sizes if many >=2
Is the model 
parsimonious?
No, j parameters α¡ but 
can eliminate α¡
Yes, one variance parameter  
ψ for all J cluster
Can estimate within-
cluster effects of 
covariates?
Yes.
Yes, by including cluster 
means.
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When the dependent variable is categorical, fixed effect models are in the 
form of logistic fixed effect regression models. When the scores on financial 
satisfaction have either value 1 or 0, fixed effect logit model estimates the 
probability that financial satisfaction is 1. The specification of the model is the 
following: 
Pr (Yij=1) = F (α0+ziα+xijβ+Ϛi) where F (.) is the logistic function, zi are 
time invariant characteristics, xij are time-varying covariates and Ϛi is unobserved 
individual effect. 
 Similarly to the linear models, fixed effect logit model works on the 
following principle: 
It calculates the differences in time varying characteristics of the persons 
and disregards all the individuals whose responses (dependent variable) do not 
change over time. So, information on individuals who show no changes in 
responses is sacrificed.  
But, its difference to the linear model is that fixed effect logit uses instead 
conditional maximum likelihood estimation which is why it is often called 
conditional logistic regression. Another term for it is Chamberlain fixed effect 
logit (1980). 
On the relation to random intercept (random effects) logit, the main 
advantage of conditional logit is in more robustness to model specification, 
because it does not depend on stable individual characteristics, and thus we do not 
have to assume anything about the unobserved traits. On the other hand, the major 
disadvantages of the fixed model logit is that we cannot estimate the time 
invariant coefficients so we need to be careful when making inferences to the 
wider population: the results refer only to the subjects present in the analysis. 
In sum, the decision to choose one method over another mostly depends on 
the weight that we give to control of individual unmeasured characteristics over 
the estimate of the measurable stable characteristics (Allison, P. 2005:5). For this 
reason, in this study we employ parallelly fixed effect and random effect methods. 
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The fixed effect logit models have been estimated using the stata 
command xtlogit, fe. 
2.3.2.   Logistic random intercept model 
 
Longitudinal data are regarded a type of multilevel data, or more 
specifically, two level data where occasions represent the first level, and subjects 
are the second level. However, unlike other clustered frameworks, the special 
feature of longitudinal data is that the first level units are occasions which are 
ordered in time and as such cannot be exchanged. As we already mentioned in the 
previous explanations, given the clustered nature of longitudinal data, the models 
used to treat them are known in statistics as multilevel models and they also 
measure within unit, in this case, within subject dependences. In this thesis we 
accept the statistical terminology and call the models in use random intercept 
models instead of random effects. 
Multilevel generalized linear models derive from multilevel linear models 
and encompass a series of specifications, among others random intercept logit 
model and random intercept proportional odds model. The distinct feature of 
multilevel generalized linear models is that the distribution of outcomes given the 
random effect is extended from normal to the exponential: binomial, multinomial, 
gamma, etc. They also differ from the linear multilevel models for the link 
function that can be log, logit, probit, defining the type of multilevel model 
(Rodrigez 2007:341,342)  
If we denote occasions i for level 1 and subjects j for level -2, we build the 
following simplified logit model
6
 for dichotomous responses formulated as 
generalized multilevel linear model: 
Logit {Pr (Yij=1| Xij, Ϛj)} =β1 + β2x2j+ β3x3ij+ β4x2jX3ij+ Ϛj 
                                                          
6
 In this simplified specification, we include a time varying and a time invariant variable and their 
interaction term. 
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 where random intercept is Ϛj | Xij ~ N (0, ψ), and independent among 
couples. Xij are time varying characteristics, Xj are time invariant characteristics 
(Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008:247). 
The random intercept logit model was chosen for several reasons: First, to 
control and model unobserved heterogeneity in our data. For instance, the model 
gives us also intra-class correlation which is a percentage of the variance of the 
dependent variable that is due to individual unobserved characteristics. Second, it 
allows for subject specific interpretations and inferences. However, as already 
mentioned, we are aware that this model is sensitive to possible subject level 
confounding causing inconsistent estimates.  
Different approaches are used to estimate multilevel generalized linear 
models. For the random intercept logit, we use the stata command gllamm, which 
relies on adaptive quadrature procedure. 
2.3.3.   Random intercept proportional odds model 
 
When the dependent variable is ordinal, we apply cumulative models for 
ordinal responses. These models have multinomial conditional distribution of 
outcomes and use a cumulative logistic link function. Basically, here we have a 
cumulative probability that a response is in higher category from the previous one 
instead of expectation or mean of the response. 
To specify this model, we use a simplified generalized linear model 
formulation
7
 from Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2008:303). : 
Logit {Pr (Yij>s| Xij, Ϛ1j)} = β2x2ij+ β3x3j+ β4x2jX3ij+ Ϛ1j-ks 
where the random intercept of the cumulative logits is Ϛ1j | Xij ~ N (0, ψ) 
and is independent across subjects. S are ordinal response categories, ks 
represents thresholds, xij are time varying and xj time invariant characteristics. 
                                                          
7
 In this simplified specification, we include a time varying and a time invariant variable and their 
interaction term. 
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These models have the property of proportional odds, which means that 
odds ratios are the same whatever category on the ordinal scale is considered and 
compared to. This gives the name to the random intercept proportional odds 
modes. 
We use the stata command gllamm to estimate the random intercept 
proportional odds model. 
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Chapter 3: The colour of money: How income shapes economic well-
being of married (and cohabiting) women. 
 
3.1.   Introduction 
 
The women‟s shift from homemaking to the labour markets has certainly 
influenced the percentage of income that women contribute to the household 
finances. The higher woman‟s income contributions might also result from more 
equality in the wages between men and women or specifically targeted welfare 
measures that help woman‟s financial position. In this first chapter, we attempt to 
understand the link between woman‟s economic independence and her economic 
well-being. We ask the old economic question, that is, if woman‟s bargaining 
power is influenced by the individual financial resources she owns, but we try to 
analyse it in a modern way, employing the subjective measures of economic well-
being. That is our first interest. Another one is to test the role of institutions in 
bargaining between partners and family equilibrium. From a sociological point of 
view, institutions matter because they influence individual behaviour and we 
would like to place them in the context of our main research question. We choose 
to apply a welfare regimes typology to study the effect of institutions on micro 
behaviour. The economic well-being of women is also in relation to the position 
of their family in the income distribution. An interesting question is whether the 
control of household resources and equal income sharing are any different at 
different household income levels. And if so, who does better or share more, the 
„poor‟ or the „rich‟ women? 
In the effort to answer the above research questions, this chapter is 
organized as follows: the first section reviews the theory on economic bargaining, 
the second part deals with the empirical contributions, the operationalization of 
bargaining power and the choice of individual welfare measures. In the third 
section, we present our hypotheses, empirical framework and discuss the results. 
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3.2.   Intra-household bargaining from an economic perspective 
3.2.1.   Models of household dynamics 
 
Since the early 1960‟s economists have been trying to explain the 
distribution in marriage; From Samuelson and Becker (Samuelson 1956; Becker, 
1981) we learned how in a relationship of love and altruism such as marriage, 
resources are equally shared in a way that individual ownership of material 
resources does not change the distribution of benefits in the family. This interest 
has been reflected also in the work of sociologists, for instance Talcott Parsons 
(1956) who similarly believed in the sex role aggregation for the interest of the 
whole family. Thus, in a unitary economic model of household, the interest and 
preferences of all the family members are reflected in a common utility function 
and their well-being depends only on collective family income; so, who brings the 
income is of no importance. Family life also takes the form of specialization: 
women often specialize in home and men in paid work as an outcome of their 
mutual decision to benefit the utility of family. 
 However, since the mid 1980‟s the divorce became more common, 
possibly because more women participated in the labour market and perhaps 
because people started to expect a „higher standard of human happiness‟ 
(Hochschild 1989:167) from a marriage. As a result, new developments in 
economic theory of family followed. Indeed, the economic theory attempts to 
model the changes in life and what was neglected by the unitary model of 
household-the resources and power of each family member, became central in the 
bargaining theory (Manser and Brown 1980; McElroy and Horney 1981). The 
bargaining approach to the family behaviour argued that control can be transferred 
among family members and that the external factors which alter individual 
opportunities outside of the family, change the individual negotiating power 
within it. In this context, even the unitary model of Gary Becker could be seen in 
a bargaining perspective- as „a two-stage bargaining in which the altruist moves 
first and confronts other family members with take-it-or-leave-it choices‟ (Pollak 
1994).  
The bargaining approach proposed several new models of distribution 
between a husband and a wife: cooperative models (McElroy 1990; Lundberg and 
56 
 
Pollak 1993), which are based on Nash bargaining framework and efficiency, 
non- cooperative models (Kanbur and Haddad 1994; Browning and Lechene 
2001; Lundberg and Pollak 2003), which allow for either efficient or inefficient 
outcomes and collective models (Chiappori 1988, 1992) which rely on Pareto 
efficient sharing rule. For instance, in the cooperative models the negotiation 
power is highly dependent on the position of individual in so called „threat point‟ 
that is reached when members have difficulty in finding an agreement. So, the 
threat point as a point of disagreement is often determined externally and as such 
mostly related to divorce of partners; the group of models with this specification 
is known as divorce threat bargaining models (Manser and Brown 1980; McElroy 
and Horney 1981). But the threat point may also be internal to the marriage and 
determined by a simple non-cooperative union. In this case, when the threat point 
is reached each member may contribute to the household public good by personal 
choice leading to the low-functioning marriage with separate spheres. Lundberg 
and Pollak (1993) defined this scenario as separate sphere model and argued that 
it represents better the reality of everyday intra-family interactions: the threat of 
divorce is not realistic each time the spouses have an argument. To sum up, if 
there are opportunities that would lift woman‟s position in case of divorce or offer 
her a protection for setting up her own self-enforced agreements in case of harsh 
intra-family disagreements, she will be more likely to negotiate her way up and 
influence the allocation of resources. Empirically the determinants of the threat 
point are related to the control over financial resources such as unearned income, 
earnings, wage rate or household production. 
The second group of economic bargaining models- the non-cooperative 
models, question the efficiency of the family behaviour and Pareto optimality. In 
these models, family agreements are based on self-interest of the family members 
and do not necessarily lead to the efficient family outcomes. The presence of 
inefficiency in family encourages the research on factors and conditions that lead 
to efficiency, including the analysis of the social factors such as gender and social 
norms, or culture. These factors shape the individual power within and outside of 
the family and might alter the way individuals interact. Indeed, this framework 
allows „power‟ to be defined more broadly as it is treated in sociology and 
political science, bringing economics closer to both of the disciplines. However, 
this is also regarded the main weakness of the framework: there are too many 
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alternatives to study and model the complexity of human interactions which 
complicates the practical implementation of the approach. In these models, the 
individual bargaining power is reflected in one‟s ability to influence the partner‟s 
self-enforced agreement and his/her supply of shared goods. Bargaining power is 
also operationalized through individual resources such as various forms of 
income. 
Advances in economic bargaining research include also the development 
of collective models which unlike other bargaining approaches leave space for 
more than one outcome in negotiation, although always efficient; thus, common 
preference models and cooperative framework are also some possible outcomes. 
These models work on the bases of a “sharing rule” which is a proportion of the 
household expenditure attributed to different household members. The “sharing 
rule” will be determined by different distributional factors through which the 
negotiating power is exercised. For instance, income is one distributional factor. 
However, due to the lack of any formal guidance in modelling, the determinants 
of „sharing rule‟ are not a clear cut and largely depend on modeling preference. 
An extensive empirical literature constantly adds to the current theory of 
collective models (Bourguignon, Browning, Chiappori and Lechene 1993; 
Browning and Chiappori 1998; Pezzin, Pollak and Schone 2004).  
3.2.2.   Bargaining power in empirical research 
 
Bargaining models require operationalization of the concept of „bargaining 
power‟ in order for them to be empirically tested and compared with one another. 
The empirical measures of bargaining power vary from total income (Phipps and 
Burton 1998), income share (Attanasio and Lechene 2002; Bonke and Browning 
2009a, 2009b), earnings (Browning 1995), non-labour income (Thomas 1990; 
Schultz 1990), assets (Doss 1996) and social transfers (Lundberg, Pollak and 
Wales 1997; Attanasio and Lechene 2002), to household production and wage 
rates.  Measures can also be human capital-labour participation (Zamora 2008) 
and education (Konrad and Lommerud 2000; Thomas 1994). Lately the tests of 
the bargaining theory are also provided using macro variables, just like legislation 
(Oreffice 2007), tax benefit systems (Orsini and Spadaro 2005) and so on. In 
practice, the empirical test of bargaining is performed through a tricky procedure 
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of testing against the unified model of household behaviour and income pooling. 
Therefore, the significant influence of the above reviewed individual resources on 
the distribution of welfare means that income is not pooled, or better, it is not 
equally controlled by husband and wife. The bargaining power is exercised either 
through the effect on the threat point (cooperative models), self-enforced 
agreements (non-cooperative model) or the sharing rule (collective model). 
Still the empirical specification of bargaining power has many challenges; 
The most common measure of bargaining power is income, but lately it has been 
suggested that ambiguity of income can be a problem for the research because not 
all of the sources of income are exogenous. For instance, the income related to 
work is thought to represent well bargaining power because partners mentally link 
individual consumption to the current contributions. However, actual earnings 
may reflect the individual preferences for work over leisure, and may also depend 
on a broader setting in which the decisions are taken (e.g. the welfare system, the 
incentives for women to work, and etc.). As such, they may actually be 
endogenous. Thus, the results are disputable when income pooling hypothesis is 
rejected only on the base of this measure, because the effect of bargaining power 
may be confounded with the change in relative prices and opportunity costs of 
woman‟s time. In addition, income that contains earnings is misleading also 
because it reflects the current allocation of labour in the family that might be very 
different if the conditions change. For instance, in the cooperative models 
„earnings at the observed cooperative equilibrium are a poor proxy for earnings at 
the unobserved non-cooperative equilibrium‟ (Pollak 2005:20).The same applies 
to the case of divorce. This is especially problematic for homemakers who might 
decide to work after the marriage dissolves. On the other hand, woman‟s choice of 
homemaking instead of work may also indicate certain bargaining power and 
better starting position in decision making, which gives the woman the option not 
to work. The reasons could be good opportunities in the marriage market, good 
looks, attractiveness, intelligence or social skills (Hakim 2010). If this is the 
scenario, when testing the pooling hypothesis, we face a selection problem by 
considering only the bargaining power of women who were “disadvantaged” from 
the beginning of their married life. 
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In response to the measurement problems related to earnings, different 
authors suggest various solutions; the use of exogenous unearned income is one 
popular option: for instance, Schulzt (1990) tests the relevance of the source of 
non-earned income for the woman‟s labour supply and finds significantly 
different outcome when non-earned income belongs to the male partner. The 
allocation of resources and spending on children is found to vary depending on 
the ownership of child benefits in the analysis of UK couples (Lundberg, Pollak 
and Wales 1997). Similar conclusions are reached by Attanasio and Lechene 
(2002), using the data from Mexico. Still, unearned income is often only a small 
part of overall income and may be in relation to the previous achievements in the 
labour market
8
. So, the wage rates, which are based on the real value of human 
capital (Pollak 2005) or other (from the economic point of view) exogenous 
factors from the macro setting are lately employed as a more advanced proxy of 
bargaining power. Importantly, the new measures do not disqualify the old ones 
that are still being implemented, only with more caution and acknowledgement of 
the potential measurement issues. Indeed, much empirical research still relies on 
total income to measure bargaining power. 
3.2.3.   Noneconomic factors in economic bargaining 
 
The topic that is relatively neglected in the bargaining theory is the role of 
institutions, culture, societal norms, gender norms and attitudes in determining the 
individual bargaining power. Economists often assume that bargaining takes place 
in the household, leaving all the institutional factors such as labour and marriage 
markets aside as exogenous. But what if the economic models do not represent the 
real game because „the "real action" is elsewhere: in the game before the game‟ 
(Pollak 1994)? Indeed, a growing number of economists and social scientists 
(Pollak 1994; Sen 1990; England and Kilbourne 1990) acknowledge the 
endogenous character of institutions and norms from a societal perspective. In 
other words, individual preferences and human behaviour might be already 
shaped by external factors, leaving only a little space for a real bargaining 
outcome modeled in economics.  When it comes to women, the opportunity costs 
                                                          
8
 This does not apply if the unearned income originates from a purely exogenous source such as lottery 
or unexpected social transfer from one partner to another.  
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of their choices and acceptable behaviour are innate to the gender socialization 
and national institutions. 
To conclude, the social science critique on the definition of power in 
bargaining derives partly from the neglect of noneconomic factors that are 
believed to influence family equilibrium. The challenge for the future bargaining 
research will be to encompass these factors when modelling the complex 
household dynamics. 
3.3.   Individual welfare: from objective to subjective outcomes 
The formal tests of income pooling infer that bargaining in the household 
takes place if the income distribution impacts individual welfare after we control 
for joint income. In the economic empirical research the individual welfare is 
mostly measured through consumption of goods and leisure time or labour supply 
due to its connection to leisure. In socio-economic research, housework is also 
one of the popular outcomes of individual welfare. Lately, the concepts of well-
being receive much attention as they tend to be broader than before and 
encompass more than one dimension of what is known as individual welfare. 
Consequently, the research in economic bargaining recently followed up with the 
inclusion of outcomes such as subjective well-being to counteract the previously 
dominant objective indicators. 
Earlier research on intra-household behaviour analysed the impact of 
income distribution on private assignable goods. Each household member is 
assumed to be an exclusive user of certain goods while he/she shares the public 
goods with other family members. For instance, clothes items, tobacco and 
alcohol can all be assignable to one member which is not the case for aggregate 
food expenditures. Men‟s and women‟s clothing, girls‟ and boys‟ clothing are 
used in various studies as outcomes of welfare: Lundberg, Pollak and Wales 
(1997) find evidence of a shift of expenditures towards woman‟s and children‟s 
clothing when child  allowance in the UK was transferred to wives. Attanasio and 
Lechene (2002) show that higher proportion of wife‟s income is associated with 
higher expenditure on children‟s clothes and lower expenditure on food items on 
the case of Mexico rural areas. Similarly, Phipps and Burton (1998) analyse the 
childcare expenditures. Other examples include the expenditure approach in the 
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context of collective models: Bourguignon et al. (1993), Browning and Chiappori 
(1998) and so on. 
Leisure time is another attractive option for private goods if we assume 
that person‟s leisure is independent of the leisure of the partner in the broader 
sense of the word. Chiappori (1992) is one of the first to propose labour time to 
calculate leisure time of individuals within family but he neglects the presence of 
household production (housework). To avoid the misunderstanding in defining the 
leisure time, Couprie (2007) obtains pure leisure time by subtracting the time 
spent on housework and market work from the total amount of one‟s time. Others 
(Lundberg 1988; Shultz 1990; Chiappori et al. 2002; Oreffice 2007) focus on pure 
labour supply due to its link to the consumption of leisure.  
Ultimately, the  bargaining research is directed towards more explicit 
outcomes in order to understand the intra-household situation, so outcome 
variables are often the direct questions of who is charge of the household decision 
process (Attanio and Lechene 2002) and how the expenditures are assigned to 
each member (Bonke and Browning 2006).  
Moreover, there has been a growing interest in subjective outcomes of 
welfare in both microeconomics and sociology (McBride 2001; Senik 2004; 
Bonke and Browning 2009b). Easterlin (1974) introduced the concept of 
satisfaction to measure individual well-being challenging the dominant notion in 
traditional economic research that implied the exclusive relationship of individual 
welfare with goods. He argued that focus on pure goods conceals the complex set 
of psychological, social and economic conditions which may influence human 
welfare. The concept of subjective well-being, which has its origins in 
philosophical distinction between the needs and wants (Allardt 1993), is taken 
from psychology and  allows the self-evaluation of one‟s own life and one‟s own 
assessment of objective conditions. Therefore, despite some measurement 
problems, subjective questions on satisfaction more often present well-being in 
economic and social research, for their capacity to reveal the real individual 
conditions. Even though, the concept itself was initially criticized for its 
ambiguity, today it is utilized, also because many empirical studies find its high 
correlation to utility (Frey and Stutzer 2002b; Van Praag, Frijters and Ferrero-i-
Carbonell 2003; Senik 2005). This is even more so when specific aspects of well-
being are considered, e.g. Financial satisfaction, satisfaction with leisure time, job 
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satisfaction, health satisfaction and so on. Another feature of the concept that 
made it more popular in economic welfare research is its direct assignability to the 
individual in question. 
3.4.   Income distribution and financial satisfaction: Hypotheses 
As we saw, the effect of income distribution on individual bargaining 
power is analysed in the economic literature on various outcomes of welfare. In 
this chapter, we employ subjective economic well-being in the form of individual 
financial satisfaction as a measure of welfare. Previous research on the link 
between woman‟s financial resources and her financial satisfaction as an outcome 
variable, has generally found that unified model of household behaviour is not 
supported. In other words, the woman will be more financially satisfied the more 
income she brings to the household after controlling for family income. Bonke 
and Browning (2009b) test the effect of wife‟s income share on her financial 
satisfaction in Denmark rejecting the hypothesis of income pooling. Newman et 
al. (2008) also find the evidence of intra-household bargaining in the study on 
Irish data while Alessie, Crossley and Hildebrand (2006) demonstrate that sharing 
rule changes in favour of the woman the more she contributes to the household 
finances.  
In this chapter we primarily analyse the following question: Does the 
individual income influence and change the bargaining power and financial 
position of a woman in a family? In other words, how is the family equilibrium 
influenced by woman‟s financial contributions to the family finances? Following 
the review of theory and empirical evidence, we hypothesize: 
H1: The higher the woman‟s financial contributions to the household 
finances, the higher her financial satisfaction, net of the household income. 
However, literature suggests that there are various factors, which might 
influence the level of sharing in the household. One possible factor is also the 
absolute level of household resources: there might be a relation between the 
position of household in income distribution with the level of intra-household 
inequality. This question is important because there are some members of non-
poor families who are actually poor because they get only a part of financial 
resources. On the other hand, there might be family members in poor families 
who are actually not poor because they control most of the financial resources 
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(Phipps and Burton 1996). Doss (1996) finds that woman‟s income contributions 
matter in the lower expenditure quartiles, but she finds no impact of woman‟s 
income in better off households. This might imply higher intra-household 
inequality of poorer households. Kanbur and Haddad (1994) suggest that 
inequality in the households first increases and then decreases with higher 
household resources. However, there are also authors which instead show that 
members in the low income households share better (Pahl 1983). 
In this chapter we also investigate if the woman‟s income share is equally 
important at all household income levels. As we saw, the empirical evidence on 
this is mixed and we test the view that: 
H2: Wife‟s income contributions in high-income families matter less than 
in low-income families. 
Social context in which family bargaining takes place is increasingly 
considered influential for family equilibrium. Countries differ in terms of their 
culture, institutional framework, labour and marriage markets equilibrium so it 
could be that there are also cross-country differences in the relationship between 
woman‟s income share and her financial satisfaction. In this chapter we apply the 
modified welfare regime typology (Esping-Andersen 1990, 1999; Lessenich 1995; 
Ferrara 1996) as we regard it relevant for the impact on woman‟s employment, 
and consequently, the share of woman‟s income in total household finances. We 
compare five countries Italy, Denmark, Ireland, France and Uk which belong to 
Mediterranean, Socio-Democratic, Conservative and Liberal welfare regime. To 
our knowledge, there is only one study which empirically tests the unified model 
in different welfare regimes using the data on financial satisfaction. Bonke (2008) 
compares liberal, conservative and socio-democratic regimes using individual 
financial satisfaction data and he concludes that in countries that are more 
egalitarian and where women contribute substantially to the household income, 
female income share is less of a bargaining instrument because it is seen as threat 
for dual earner model. On the other hand, he finds that in Southern Europe, which 
is characterized by a breadwinner model, female income is more of a 
straightforward bargaining instrument. Having in mind the differences in welfare 
regimes in terms of their impact on woman‟s employment9, in this chapter we also 
                                                          
9
 This is elaborated in more detail in the introductory chapters. 
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ask whether they shape differently the behaviour of household members and add 
to the individual choices. We follow the view of Bonke (ibid) and hypothesize: 
H3: The positive impact of woman‟s economic contributions on her 
financial satisfaction will be higher in Conservative and Mediterranean than in 
Liberal and Socio-Democratic welfare regime. 
3.5.   Data and design 
3.5.1.   Data 
 
The data employed in this study are taken from the European community 
household survey from 1994-2001. This data set is attractive to answer the 
research questions for several reasons: first, it provides useful information on 
micro relations within family and their change in time, and second, the survey 
questions and structure enable comparison among a number of European 
countries. The analysis is restricted to heterosexual couples (married and 
cohabiting) where women are 18-50 years old and men 18 years old and above. 
The final sample of couples contains 53776 observations with the largest 
subsample of Italian data (17582) and other countries represented in the following 
order: France (13567), UK (10407), Ireland (6345) and Denmark (5875). The 
actual sample may vary due to the particularities of the techniques in use. 
Our analysis includes one main dependent variable: woman‟s individual 
financial satisfaction which answers the question:‟ How satisfied are you with 
your present financial situation?‟ The variable is coded into binary: 1 is satisfied 
with financial situation and 0 is unsatisfied with individual financial situation. We 
assume comparability of scores of financial satisfaction across individuals and 
countries. Relative woman‟s share is the percentage of woman‟s contribution to 
the family finances (woman‟s income/10xfamily income). Because investigation 
of the link between woman‟s income share and individual financial satisfaction 
requires controls for a number of demographic characteristics and fertility, our 
analysis include the following additional variables: Education levels of partners 
based on ISCED classification
10
, joint family income
11
, birth cohorts for women
12
, 
                                                          
10
 The variable education is based on the Isced classification: Isced 0-2- lower secondary education and 
below, Isced 3-upper secondary education, 5/7–post-secondary (non tertiary) and tertiary education.  
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the variable of financial hardship
13
, the age of partners
14
, the civil status (marriage 
versus cohabitation)
15
, the number of children and wave dummies to control for 
the period effects. To analyse the role of income quartiles on the patterns of 
income sharing, we divide households in four groups based on per capita income 
adjusted by the modified OECD scale (Hagenaars and Zaidi 1994) to take into 
account the economics of scale in consumption. This classification assigns the 
value of 1 to the household head, an additional value of 0.5 goes to the partner 
and 0.3 to each child.                                                   
3.5.2.   Techniques 
 
A number of factors may be correlated with the woman‟s financial 
satisfaction and relative income contributions, and we should choose these factors 
well in order to extract the impact of bargaining power; Any omission of 
important variables can create bias in results. But, there are also motivation, 
preferences, expectations and other individual traits we cannot observe in the data 
at all. Thus, our main concern here is to control for the unobserved heterogeneity 
and employ techniques that provide maximum reliability of results. For this 
reason, we test the impact of woman‟s income share on her financial satisfaction 
in a longitudinal framework with fixed effects and random intercept models. The 
first technique fully controls for time invariant characteristics by examining the 
within individual differences and measures only the effect of time variant 
characteristics. It also enables us to detect potential causalities due to its similarity 
to the experimental design. On the other hand, random intercept models are more 
parsimonious because they model unobserved differences as random variable. 
Unlike fixed effect models they allow for the estimates of the individual effect 
                                                                                                                                                               
11
 Household income is a sum of all entrances including earnings, state benefits, non-private incomes 
and collective entrances. The incomes are logged and matched to refer to the current year as the ECHP 
gives information on the income obtained in the previous year.  
 
12
 There are five birth cohorts: 1.women born from 1944-1955, 2. women born from 1956- 1965, 3. 
women from 1966-1976 and 4. Women born from 1977-1983. 
13
 Financial hardship is a binary variable that shows difficulty to make ends meet and it is 1 when 
family feels financial hardship and 0 when family does not feel financial hardship. 
14
Age is a continuous variable. 
15
 Marital status shows individual civil status in the moment of interview. It is a dichotomous variable 
coded 1 when woman is married and 0 when a woman is cohabiting. 
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which is also important for our analysis. To diminish the trade off-s of each 
technique we analyse the estimates obtained from both of them.
16
 
3.6.   Results 
The analysis is divided into three parts: the first part deals with the 
descriptive statistics of the main dependent and independent variable, the second 
part explains links between women‟s income share and financial satisfaction in 
the pooled sample with all the countries and for each country independently, the 
third part introduces the household income quartiles in the analysis. The relation 
between woman‟s income share and her financial satisfaction is analysed in four 
household income quartiles. 
3.6.1.   Descriptive statistics 
 
The table 3.1 shows the income distribution in couples in five studied countries. 
We observe unequal income contributions of partners in all the five countries, 
although there are significant country differences: Italian women contribute only a 
quarter of the household income as well as Irish women, whereas French and 
British women contribute around one third of the household income. The most 
equal distribution is present in Denmark where women contribute on average 45% 
of income. In terms of welfare regimes, the socio-democratic regimes is the most 
equal when it comes to household income distribution, followed by liberal and 
conservative regimes, and finally, the Mediterranean block. However, Ireland is 
here an outlier: despite being a part of liberal welfare regime, it is the most similar 
to Italy. The table also shows that there is not great variation by age groups. 
                                                          
16
 The main issue of fixed model is their efficiency; they take the differences within individuals and 
average them over sample. If there is little variation for each individual, the standard errors are large 
and estimates lose precision. The problem of random intercept model is bias; The model assumes that 
error term is not correlated with the explanatory variables, which is questionable due to unobserved 
heterogeneity. So, the random intercept models give us more efficiency but could lead to more biased 
results.  
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The table 3.2 shows the difference in average woman‟s financial satisfaction 
across countries. On average the highest proportion of financially satisfied women 
is in Denmark (80%), followed by the Uk (70%), France and Ireland (58%) and 
Italy (45%). Again the Mediterranean model is on the bottom of the classification. 
 
  
Table 3.1: Woman's relative income share by country (by age groups)
Average(s.d) Age
18-30 31-40 41-50 N
Denmark 44,86 (12,94) 44,25 (12,45) 45,96 (12,02) 43,99 (14,29) 5901
France 32,18 (20,19) 35,72 (19,09) 32,10 (19,80) 30,02 (20,98) 14080
Ireland 25,11 (21,48) 31,13 (19,90) 25,89 (21,17) 21,62 (21,82) 6423
Italy 23,84 (26,36) 23,19 (26,74) 24,41 (26,40) 23,52 (26,11) 17947
UK 35,10 (18,74) 37,06 (17,32)  34,59 (19,37) 33,90 (19,05) 10577
Table 3.2: Individual financial satisfaction (married/cohabiting women) by country (by age groups)
Average (s.d) Age
18-30 31-40 41-50 N
Denmark 0,81 (0,39) 0,72 (0,44) 0,81 (0,39) 0,87 (0,33) 5901
France 0,58 (0,49) 0,59 (0,49) 0,58 (0.49) 0,58 (0,49) 14080
Ireland 0,57 (0,49) 0,57 (0,49) 0,56 (0,50)   0,60 (0,49) 6423
Italy 0,45 (0,50) 0,41 (0,49) 0,46 (0,50) 0,46 (0,50) 17947
UK 0,69 (0,46) 0,71 (0,45) 0,68 (0,46) 0,69 (0,46) 10577
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3.6.2.   Does woman’s income share affect her perceived economic well-
being? 
 
We examine estimates from two specifications that in a different way 
control for the unobserved heterogeneity in order to test for the existence of the 
unified model of the household behaviour. The odds ratios and the standard errors 
for the fixed and random intercept model are presented in the table 3.3. 
 
 
Table 3.3: The effect of woman's income share on her financial satisfaction: 
Estimated odds ratios from logistic fixed effect and random intercept models (pooled regression)
Model 1 Model 2
Fixed effects Random intercept Fixed effects Random intercept
Woman's income share 1.045*** 1.032*** 1.112** 1.136***
(0.013) (0.008) (0.055) (0.042)
Family income 1.598*** 2.472*** 1.608*** 2.478***
(0.074) (0.087) (0.074) (0.088)
Age( f) 1.031*** 1.014* 1.030*** 1.013*
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Financial hardship 0.203*** 0.095*** 0.202*** 0.095***
(0.007) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003)
Tertiary education (f) 1.183 1.249*** 1.179 1.255***
(0.129) (0.067) (0.128) (0.068)
Secondary education (f) 0.950 1.175*** 0.951 1.175***
(0.069) (0.049) (0.069) (0.049)
Tertiary education (m) 1.215 1.163*** 1.222 1.162***
(0.148) (0.062) (0.149) (0.062)
Secondary education (m) 1.100 1.147*** 1.100 1.148***
(0.077) (0.047) (0.077) (0.047)
children 0.989 0.933*** 0.989 0.930***
(0.031) (0.016) (0.031) (0.016)
married (re.cohab.) 1.085 1.364*** 1.085 1.359***
(0.117) (0.077) (0.117) (0.077)
Ukxshare (ref. Denmark) 0.970 0.915**
(0.058) (0.039)
Francexshare 0.926 0.880***
(0.052) (0.036)
Irxshare 0.949 0.873***
(0.058) (0.037)
Itxshare 0.927 0.921**
(0.049) (0.036)
Age (m) 0.992* 0.992*
(0.004) (0.004)
Coh_f1 (1944-1955) 0.820 0.822
(0.111) (0.111)
Coh_f2 (1956-1965) 0.874* 0.877*
(0.069) (0.069)
Coh_f4 (1977-1983) 0.728* 0.727*
(0.123) (0.123)
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Table 3.3: continued 
 
The pooled model without any country dummies interacted with income 
share provides evidence that the woman‟s income share affects woman‟s 
economic well-being. The coefficient is small but statistically significant. For the 
entire sample, the more the woman contributes to the family finances, the higher 
the odds that she will be satisfied with her financial situation. This contradicts the 
unified model and points to the percentage of household income share as a 
measure of woman‟s bargaining power. Thus, our first hypothesis is confirmed in 
the data. 
The model includes various controls such as age and education of partners, 
financial hardship, the number of children and civil status. For instance, we would 
expect that the presence of children lowers woman‟s financial satisfaction due to 
financial hardship and this is exactly what we observe in the random intercept 
model. However, the coefficient in the fixed model is not significant, perhaps due 
to small within individual variation. In addition, the link between financial 
satisfaction and financial hardship is straightforward. The odds that women are 
wave2 0.960 0.961
(0.041) (0.041)
wave3 0.800*** 0.803***
(0.036) (0.036)
wave4 0.822*** 0.821***
(0.040) (0.040)
wave5 0.960 0.960
(0.050) (0.050)
wave6 0.961 0.961
(0.054) (0.054)
wave7 0.897* 0.898*
(0.054) (0.054)
UK 0.635*** 0.952
(0.050) (0.187)
France 0.349*** 0.596***
(0.026) (0.112)
Italy 0.336*** 0.501***
(0.026) (0.093)
Ireland 0.622*** 1.064
(0.053) (0.207)
ψ 1.95 (0.07) 1.95 (0.07)
Log Likelihood 10023.56 -25416.63  -10021.92 -25408.72
N 28822 53776 28822 53776
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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financially satisfied when they face financial hardship are only around 10-20 % as 
large as the odds for those women that do not face financial hardship. Explanatory 
variables that do not vary over time are excluded from the fixed effect model but 
are included in the random intercept model: cohort effects, period effects and 
country dummies.  In this first stage, we observe a significant country effect in the 
sample: the odds that a married/cohabiting woman is financially satisfied is 
several times higher in  Denmark than in other present countries, though Italy and 
France show different pattern from the Uk and Ireland. 
Our third hypothesis on welfare regime differences suggests that positive 
impact of woman‟s economic contributions on her financial satisfaction will be 
higher in Conservative and Mediterranean than in Liberal and Socio-Democratic 
welfare regime. In the next step, we estimate a model with the country dummies 
interacted with woman‟s income share and expect them to be significant. 
However, the estimates of the interactions show quite mixed evidence: They are 
significant in the random intercept model but not in the fixed effect model, 
although of the similar magnitude. In the random effect pooled model, with every 
10% of increase in the woman‟s financial contributions within the family, the 
odds of financial satisfaction increase around 13% in Denmark, 4% in the UK, 5% 
in Italy while the odds ratio for Ireland and France is around 1.  
To see whether the effect of income distribution on woman‟s financial 
satisfaction remains the same in a single country study, we also run a separate 
fixed effect and random effect regression for each country and compare them with 
the pooled regression. Here in the table 3.4, we see a similar pattern to the results 
obtained in the pooled regression although, this time, the estimates from fixed 
effects and random intercept model converge. The models reveal positive and 
significant coefficient of woman‟s income share in Denmark, Uk and Italy, and 
insignificant coefficients for France and Ireland, confirming as well the previous 
results. One interesting result is obtained for the UK sample: in the fixed models, 
the effect of woman‟s income is strengthened in comparison to the random 
regression. The common expectation would be that unobserved characteristics 
such as motivation or preferences would push the results in a positive direction 
but this is not the case. In other words, the bias due to unobserved heterogeneity 
in random intercept models for UK is downward. 
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Finally, these results also point to the conclusion that our hypothesis on the 
role of welfare regimes is not confirmed, as countries do not group together as 
expected. We hypothesized that the effect of woman‟s income would be stronger 
in Italy and France, than in the UK, Ireland and Denmark. Instead, we observe 
that there is no effect of woman‟s income in France at all, and the effect of 
woman‟s income share is the strongest in Denmark. 
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Table 3.4: The effect of woman's income share on her financial satisfaction: 
Estimated odds ratios from logistic fixed effect and random intercept models, by country
Denmark Italy UK France Ireland
Fixed effects Random intercept Fixed effects Random intercept Fixed effects Random intercept Fixed effects Random intercept Fixed effects Random intercept
Woman's income share 1.113** 1.135*** 1.031* 1.052*** 1.167*** 1.079*** 1.039 1.007 1.058 1.002
(0.056) (0.044) (0.018) (0.011) (0.052) (0.028) (0.029) (0.018) (0.038) (0.022)
Family income 1.701** 3.110*** 1.262*** 2.078*** 4.812*** 3.916*** 1.786*** 2.590*** 1.846*** 3.054***
(0.387) (0.544) (0.071) (0.100) (0.874) (0.443) (0.210) (0.219) (0.265) (0.309)
Age( f) 1.023 1.069*** 1.038*** 1.024* 0.961 0.946*** 1.008 1.001 1.016 1.031
(0.032) (0.027) (0.013) (0.014) (0.030) (0.020) (0.019) (0.016) (0.026) (0.023)
Financial hardship (yes=1) 0.213*** 0.109*** 0.361*** 0.171*** 0.038*** 0.014*** 0.177*** 0.075*** 0.436*** 0.221***
(0.028) (0.012) (0.020) (0.009) (0.004) (0.001) (0.014) (0.005) (0.045) (0.019)
Tertiary education (f) 1.386 1.572*** 1.457 1.343** 0.940 0.957 0.811 1.002 1.004 1.204
(0.433) (0.266) (0.511) (0.171) (0.202) (0.111) (0.255) (0.114) (0.368) (0.205)
Secondary education (f) 0.792 1.390** 1.125 1.355*** 0.954 1.151 0.848 0.939 0.921 1.315**
(0.217) (0.205) (0.158) (0.092) (0.203) (0.161) (0.111) (0.079) (0.212) (0.143)
Tertiary education (m) 1.063 0.835 1.712 1.574*** 1.455 0.991 1.623 1.044 0.927 1.395**
(0.376) (0.147) (0.999) (0.192) (0.355) (0.113) (0.670) (0.121) (0.416) (0.224)
Secondary education (m) 1.261 1.083 1.216 1.371*** 1.317 1.164 1.044 1.058 0.853 1.044
(0.393) (0.166) (0.155) (0.089) (0.335) (0.175) (0.127) (0.087) (0.169) (0.110)
children 0.826* 0.894* 1.086 1.010 0.732*** 0.783*** 1.245*** 0.988 0.855** 0.868***
(0.085) (0.052) (0.058) (0.032) (0.070) (0.038) (0.078) (0.035) (0.064) (0.031)
married (ref.cohab.) 0.802 1.343** 2.028 1.110 1.181 1.390** 1.426* 1.464*** 1.170 1.085
(0.173) (0.179) -1.104 (0.231) (0.290) (0.182) (0.287) (0.144) (0.609) (0.257)
Age (m) 1.014 0.991 1.009 0.982** 0.993
(0.014) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.013)
Coh_f1 (1944-1955) 0.484* 0.779 1.792 0.843 0.668
(0.213) (0.171) (0.708) (0.236) (0.246)
Coh_f2 (1956-1965) 0.693 0.815 1.553** 0.790 0.834
(0.174) (0.105) (0.344) (0.130) (0.185)
Coh_f4 (1977-1983) 1.115 0.578 0.801 0.591 1.179
(0.431) (0.229) (0.278) (0.222) -1.122
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Table 3.4: continued 
 
wave2 0.738** 1.032 1.196 0.829** 0.994
(0.110) (0.073) (0.153) (0.070) (0.106)
wave3 0.652*** 0.755*** 1.024 0.842* 0.828
(0.104) (0.057) (0.136) (0.075) (0.095)
wave4 0.846 0.623*** 1.141 0.939 0.947
(0.145) (0.050) (0.164) (0.091) (0.119)
wave5 0.604*** 0.947 1.413** 0.944 0.800
(0.107) (0.079) (0.219) (0.100) (0.112)
wave6 0.526*** 0.966 1.373* 0.912 0.729**
(0.099) (0.087) (0.228) (0.106) (0.116)
wave7 0.415*** 0.926 1.020 0.982 0.656**
(0.083) (0.091) (0.183) (0.122) (0.116)
ψ 1.79 (0.23) 1.80 (0.11) 2.71 (0.23) 2.15 (0.15) 1.89 (0.19)
Log Likelihood -806.87 -2205.04 -3863.59 -9283.61 -1149.48 -3471.75 -2534.76 -6465.94 -1361.50 -3438.42
N 2359 5875 10346 17582 5203 10407 7334 13567 3580 6345
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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3.6.3.   Is the effect of woman’s income share the same at all income 
levels? 
 
Our second hypothesis was that the effect of individual woman‟s resources 
on woman‟s financial satisfaction would vary across income quartiles: we expect 
that wife‟s income contributions in high income families matter less than in low 
income families. We divided the each country sample in four (per capita) 
household income quartiles in order to take into account the various living 
standards in Europe. To obtain per capita income, the modified OECD 
equivalence scale was used. 
The figure 3.1 shows the mean scores of woman‟s income share by income 
quartile for each country. 
Figure 3.1: Woman’s income share by quartile, by country 
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Figure 3.1: continued 
 
 
 
The largest is the difference in trend between Denmark and all the other 
countries: the mean percentage of woman‟s income share in Denmark becomes 
(slightly) lower with each next quartile, while in the other four countries, the 
pattern is clearly different: the highest is the woman‟s income share in the top two 
quartiles.  This might mean that the families in the bottom of income distribution 
are often one-earner families except from Denmark. In addition, the lowest mean 
income shares in general and especially in the bottom two quartiles, are in Italy 
and Ireland, reflecting among other factors, a very low level of female labour 
force participation. 
The separate country regressions present a good way of estimating the role 
that income quartiles play in different country contexts. Again, in the table 3.5 we 
compare the fixed effects and random intercept models for more precision. 
Overall, the results offer evidence that there is no a different path in income 
sharing in various income quartiles because the interactions are not significant. 
The only exceptions are Uk and France where, on the contrary to our hypothesis, 
we observe that women seem to share better at lower income levels. In other 
words, woman‟s individual income plays a more important role in higher income 
quartiles than in lower income quartiles in these two countries. Comparing the 
fixed effect and random intercept estimates points to the same conclusion. Here, 
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in both France and UK, we also identify unobserved individual characteristics that 
decrease the likelihood of financial satisfaction: the estimates of woman‟s income 
share are lower in magnitude in the random intercept models. 
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Table 3.5: The effect of woman's income share on her financial satisfaction: 
Estimated odds ratios from logistic fixed effect and random intercept models for four income quartiles, by country
Denmark Italy UK France Ireland
Fixed effects Random intercept Fixed effects Random intercept Fixed effects Random intercept Fixed effects Random intercept Fixed effects Random effects
Woman's income share 1.128* 1.204** 1.061** 1.059** 1.327*** 1.167*** 1.197*** 1.074* 1.063 0.947
(0.070) (0.105) (0.029) (0.027) (0.086) (0.070) (0.053) (0.042) (0.059) (0.044)
Family income 1.829* 2.697*** 1.204*** 1.394*** 3.633*** 2.293*** 1.339** 1.393*** 1.577*** 1.550***
(0.590) (0.781) (0.073) (0.093) (0.792) (0.407) (0.169) (0.161) (0.254) (0.262)
Age( f) 1.026 1.069*** 1.039*** 1.022 0.951 0.947*** 1.004 0.998 1.024 1.032
(0.032) (0.027) (0.013) (0.014) (0.030) (0.020) (0.019) (0.016) (0.027) (0.024)
Financial hardship (yes=1) 0.214*** 0.109*** 0.361*** 0.176*** 0.038*** 0.014*** 0.181*** 0.079*** 0.427*** 0.222***
(0.028) (0.012) (0.020) (0.009) (0.004) (0.001) (0.014) (0.005) (0.044) (0.019)
Tertiary education (f) 1.401 1.565*** 1.454 1.250* 0.930 0.935 0.804 0.883 0.943 1.203
(0.438) (0.266) (0.511) (0.159) (0.201) (0.108) (0.254) (0.101) (0.346) (0.208)
Secondary education (f) 0.794 1.389** 1.122 1.295*** 0.948 1.151 0.832 0.894 0.905 1.259**
(0.217) (0.205) (0.158) (0.089) (0.202) (0.162) (0.109) (0.075) (0.208) (0.138)
Tertiary education (m) 1.042 0.819 1.752 1.507*** 1.504* 0.965 1.634 1.017 0.945 1.321*
(0.369) (0.145) -1.026 (0.184) (0.370) (0.111) (0.675) (0.120) (0.424) (0.215)
Secondary education (m) 1.245 1.074 1.210 1.335*** 1.374 1.180 1.073 1.058 0.863 1.027
(0.388) (0.165) (0.154) (0.087) (0.353) (0.178) (0.131) (0.088) (0.171) (0.109)
children 0.818* 0.923 1.091 1.082** 0.767*** 0.860*** 1.316*** 1.100** 0.877* 0.951
(0.090) (0.066) (0.059) (0.036) (0.076) (0.046) (0.084) (0.042) (0.066) (0.040)
married (ref.cohab.) 0.793 1.341** 2.003 1.140 1.190 1.405*** 1.420* 1.469*** 1.194 1.083
(0.172) (0.179) -1.089 (0.237) (0.294) (0.185) (0.287) (0.145) (0.618) (0.257)
quart1xshareq 0.996 0.932 0.941* 0.960 0.836*** 0.868** 0.803*** 0.888** 0.910 1.015
(0.062) (0.092) (0.030) (0.029) (0.057) (0.060) (0.037) (0.042) (0.059) (0.059)
quart2xshareq 0.969 0.976 0.982 0.974 0.871** 0.948 0.915** 0.884** 1.056 1.106*
(0.049) (0.118) (0.026) (0.030) (0.047) (0.067) (0.034) (0.043) (0.052) (0.061)
quart3xshareq 0.946 0.872 1.004 1.014 0.895** 0.894 0.953* 1.001 1.054 1.019
(0.042) (0.105) (0.021) (0.031) (0.040) (0.065) (0.028) (0.048) (0.041) (0.054)
Age (m) 1.014 0.995 1.010 0.984* 0.996
(0.014) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.013)
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Table 3.5: continued 
 
Coh_f1 (1944-1955) 0.488 0.808 1.847 0.864 0.659
(0.215) (0.177) (0.730) (0.242) (0.244)
Coh_f2 (1956-1965) 0.689 0.818 1.549** 0.775 0.811
(0.173) (0.105) (0.343) (0.128) (0.180)
Coh_f4 (1977-1983) 1.109 0.564 0.874 0.631 1.174
(0.430) (0.223) (0.304) (0.237) -1.122
quartileq1 1.087 0.426*** 0.589 0.441*** 0.292***
(0.540) (0.065) (0.202) (0.100) (0.088)
quartileq2 0.855 0.668*** 0.536** 0.790 0.463***
(0.483) (0.085) (0.166) (0.166) (0.109)
quartileq3 1.497 0.751** 0.875 0.630** 0.773
(0.816) (0.094) (0.262) (0.124) (0.161)
wave2 0.735** 1.048 1.207 0.826** 0.986
(0.109) (0.075) (0.154) (0.070) (0.106)
wave3 0.648*** 0.756*** 1.034 0.823** 0.823*
(0.104) (0.057) (0.138) (0.074) (0.096)
wave4 0.845 0.619*** 1.113 0.915 0.927
(0.145) (0.050) (0.160) (0.089) (0.117)
wave5 0.599*** 0.939 1.388** 0.923 0.778*
(0.106) (0.079) (0.215) (0.098) (0.109)
wave6 0.519*** 0.949 1.324* 0.869 0.703**
(0.098) (0.086) (0.221) (0.101) (0.113)
wave7 0.408*** 0.910 0.942 0.933 0.637**
(0.082) (0.089) (0.170) (0.116) (0.113)
ψ 1.80 (0.23) 1.78 (0.11) 2.70 (0.23) 2.15 (0.15) 1.90 (0.19)
Log Likelihood -805.46 -2203.37 -3860.73 -9252.63 -1145.46 -3459.33 -2521.35 -6431.34  -1354.35  -3423.26
N 2359 5875 10346 17582 5203 10407 7334 13567 3580 6345
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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To sum up, our analysis suggests the importance of the woman‟s income 
for her economic well-being. The relationship between the two is found overall 
positive which confirms our first hypothesis and is in line with all the bargaining 
frameworks. We also test whether the positive impact of woman‟s economic 
contributions on her financial satisfaction is higher in Conservative and 
Mediterranean than in Liberal and Socio-Democratic welfare regime. The results 
indicate the cross-country variation as the coefficient of woman‟s income share is 
stronger and significant in some countries - Denmark, Italy and UK, than in 
others- Ireland and France. However, our hypothesis is not confirmed. We 
observe that there is no effect of woman‟s income in France at all, and the effect 
of woman‟s income share is the strongest in Denmark, contrary to our 
expectations. Finally, one might expect that belonging to different income 
quartiles leads to a different relationship between woman‟s income contributions 
and financial satisfaction. Our analysis shows that there are no different paths in 
sharing across income quartiles, with the exception of UK and France. Contrary to 
what we expected, in these two countries, the lower income levels seem to 
provide more basis for equal control over financial resources than higher income 
quartiles. We need to keep in mind the problem of the unobserved heterogeneity 
which renders conclusions more difficult and less straightforward.   
3.7.   Conclusions 
This chapter analysed how economic well-being of women changes with 
the presence of their personal income. This question is of great importance given 
that more women participate in the labour markets and contribute to the household 
finances. Economics suggests various theories that explain the way family 
performs its functions and determines the well-being of its members. The theory 
of Gary Becker idealizes family seeing it as a rational unit where both wife and 
husband aim at the maximization of family resources. On the other hand, the 
bargaining perspective highlights that the households‟ behaviour depends largely 
on family dynamics and bargain between partners. The development of this 
approach led to cooperative, non-cooperative and collective bargaining models 
that explain better the reality of interactions within household.  
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There is large empirical evidence against unitary models of household 
behaviour and this chapter presents another contribution to the empirics. The 
novelty of our approach lies in the concept of individual welfare, which is 
presented through the subjective economic well-being- individual financial 
satisfaction. In most of the economic research, when testing against unitary 
models, objective outcome of well-being have been considered, such as 
expenditures, consumption or leisure time. However, the focus on pure goods for 
individual welfare conceals the complex set of psychological, social and 
economic conditions which may influence human well-being. Indeed, the reason 
why subjective well-being is increasingly used to represent well-being in 
economic and social research is its capacity to reveal the real individual 
conditions. This was also our motivation for including it as an indicator of well-
being. We also add to the current literature for the inclusion of social context in 
explaining bargaining between partners-the topic largely discussed by sociologists 
and anthropologists, but rarely present in economics. Five European countries: 
Denmark, Italy, Uk, France and Ireland which belong to Socio-Democratic, 
Liberal, Mediterranean and conservative welfare regime, are analysed and 
compared.  
In this chapter, we find the evidence that economic independence is 
positive for married and cohabiting women leading to their higher level of 
economic well-being. The impact of individual resources on economic well-being 
is performed through the change in intra-household bargaining power. In 
examining the link between ownership of resources and financial satisfaction, we 
also find that country context matter and that the strength of the association 
changes from country to country. However, the country differences do not show a 
clear pattern and with this analysis we were not able to derive further conclusions 
on the way in which different welfare regimes alter the relation between income 
and woman‟s well-being. Among the questions we analysed is also whether the 
woman‟s income is equally important at all income levels. Some may suggest that 
women living in rich households are less in need of financial resources and their 
own income. Contrary to this common belief, our findings point that there are no 
different paths in income sharing across income quartiles, although the results 
might differ in particular cases. In the Uk and France, the income for women is 
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even more important in higher income quartiles as the households in the low 
bottom of income distribution may actually be closer to the unitary model of 
behaviour. 
The next chapter will investigate in more detail the role of woman‟s 
economic dependency for her well-being by incorporating woman‟s employment 
path and career prospects. In addition, the inclusion of woman‟s employment in 
the analysis may provide more insight into the differences between countries 
(welfare regimes) that we found in our data without being able to explain them in 
more detail. 
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Chapter 4: European women: the link between money, career and 
economic well-being 
 
4.1.   Introduction 
As we saw in the previous chapter, economists have been continuously 
testing whether and how woman‟s financial independence plays a role for her 
economic well-being; the impact of individual resources on woman‟s economic 
well-being is led by the change of her intra-household bargaining power (Manser 
and Brown 1980; McElroy and Horney 1981). In addition, a large body of the 
sociological literature deals with the same topic. In a classic study of Blood and 
Wolfe (1960), it is shown that exchange of power in marriage draws on the 
individual financial contributions of spouses and that women who have access to 
their own economic resources have higher well-being.  Blumstein and Schwartz 
(1984) confirm this conclusion when analyzing the role of wife‟s income 
contributions for the balance of power between spouses. Also, Sorensen and 
McLanahan (1987) suggest that the level of married woman‟s economic 
dependency alters the power structure of the family with concrete implications for 
woman‟s well-being. 
However, the sociological theory also suggests that bargaining power of 
partners does not depend only on financial reasoning. It is more likely that the 
intra-household relations and woman‟s economic well-being within family can be 
further explained by a range of woman‟s intellectual capabilities and 
achievements (Gerson 1985, 1993; Hochschild, 1989), physical and affective 
characteristics (Safilios-Rothschild 1976; Hakim 2010) and even by macro factors 
such as the characteristics of the system in which women and men exercise their 
right to work (Vogler 1998). The latter is important because unequal pay between 
men and women and gender occupational segregation are also translated on the 
family dynamics and individual economic well-being of the family members. An 
important theoretical sub-stance in this literature is that woman‟s career prospects 
and work trajectories matter above money for the process of negotiation in the 
family and woman‟s well-being (Gerson 1985, 1993; Hochschild, 1989; Hakim 
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1991, 1996, 2000). For instance, Gerson (1985, 1993) proposes that modern 
women are free to choose between various options, from domestic to non-
domestic careers, but also implies that good working career prospects are 
beneficial for woman‟s economic well-being more than the other choices (Gerson 
1993). Hochschild (1989) distinguishes between the impact of a fulfilling career 
and pure jobs for woman‟s well-being. Also, Hakim (2000) considers three 
possible careers for women, e.g. homemaking, working career and work without 
career intentions, but, instead, she regards them equal in their effect on woman‟s 
economic well-being. Furthermore, Hakim focuses in more detail on various 
forms of labour market participation, such as part-time work, continuous part-time 
work, low-paid non-career full time jobs, career jobs etc. (Hakim 1991, 1996; 
Hakim and Blossfeld 1997).  
The impact of personal income on woman‟s well-being has been 
empirically studied substantially over the last century. However, the role of 
various employment options for women has not attracted the equal attention. 
There has been empirical research on the association between woman‟s career 
path and well-being (Gerson 1993, 2009; Damaske 2011), on whether full- time 
and part- time employment affect differently woman‟s influence over 
expenditures and sharing (Vogler and Pahl 1993; Stier and Lewin-Epstein 2000) 
and on the linkage between woman‟s working hours and her welfare (Boye 2009). 
Furthermore, some of the authors (Boye 2009) also incorporated the institutional 
context into the analysis of the effect of woman‟s employment because of its 
important role in altering both the opportunity costs of woman‟s choices and the 
view of acceptable woman‟s careers. However, there has not been a study, which 
systematically captures woman‟s employment in all its complexity as, for 
instance, found in the mentioned classifications of Hakim (Hakim 1991, 1996, 
2000), and Gerson (1985, 2009). 
This chapter contributes to the relevant empirics for several reasons. First, 
we study how a range of diverse work choices and career prospects influence 
woman‟s financial well-being within the family. Second, we study how the 
potential associations differ in UK, Ireland, Denmark, France and Italy following 
the „modified‟ welfare regime classification (Esping-Andersen 1990, 1999; 
Lessenich 1995; Ferrara 1996). Third, we apply a subjective measure of woman‟s 
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economic well-being in the form of financial satisfaction because it captures 
economic well-being directly and accounts for a range of economic but also non-
economic factors, which could influence an individual. The chapter starts with an 
overview of previous research on the topic; it elaborates more on the chosen 
concept of well-being and introduces the comparative perspective. Next, our main 
hypotheses are discussed followed by the description of data and methods in use. 
The final section explains the results and brings forward the conclusions. 
4.2.   Money versus work and career: theory and empirical evidence 
That money is the most basic measure of command of resources and 
economic welfare we were taught by economic bargaining theories but as 
Amartya Sen often underlines- money is also important not as “an end in itself but 
rather a means to an end, allowing freedom to function and participate” (Nolan 
and Whelen 1996:198). A close look into the economic literature shows us that the 
relevant economic research translates woman‟s employment participation in her 
personal income (earnings, wages or other work and non-work related income 
contributions), which has the potential to change the allocation of resources within 
family, influence her so-called bargaining position and consequently her well-
being (Lundberg and Pollack 1996). Still, the complex process of human 
interactions, and especially gender relations, might not always be understood well 
in terms of income, as income on its own may be a relatively poor proxy for one‟s 
behaviour (Goldthorpe 2009). Thus, family dynamics and woman‟s welfare may 
be studied with more precision by broadening the view of how female labour 
participation is defined. 
As we saw, there is a theoretical stance in the sociological literature that 
enriches the economic vision of how the individual income contribution translates 
into higher well-being with the inclusion of employment patterns, future career 
prospects and commitment to personal occupation (Gerson 1993; Hakim 2000). In 
this perspective, there are factors which matter for women beyond money. The 
source of the money is important (Zelizer 1997), the amount of working hours 
matters (Boye 2009), future career prospects change the meaning of income 
(Gerson 1993) and also the choice of part time or full time work makes a 
difference for woman‟s position within family and her welfare (Vogler and Pahl 
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1993). Also, a woman‟s long term commitment to work is thought to add to the 
pure material achievements (Hakim 1991).  
Two more complete sociological explanations arose within this approach.  
Gerson (1985) was first to define woman‟s preferences for the type of life style, 
dividing women into domestic with focus on homemaking, children and possibly 
female non-career professions and nondomestic who are oriented towards career 
and full-time employment. The two groups further comprise working mothers, 
childless working women, fully career committed women and so on. Later this 
classification has been revised to include self-reliant, egalitarian and neo-
traditional women (Gerson 2009)
17
. Similarly, Hakim (2000) distinguishes 
between the three groups of women that she classifies as: home-centered 
(homemakers), adaptive (work but not career oriented) and career- oriented. In her 
view, women today have a choice between various „careers‟ from a „marriage‟ 
career to a working career with their equal impact on personal material well-
being. She also further enriches this classification attaching, for instance, part time 
work and discontinuous employment to adaptive women (Hakim 1991). These 
work options are often characterized by lower work attachment: the first one due 
to the spells out of the labour market and return to the labour force various times 
in the life cycle and the latter, due to the lower job quality and less job 
responsibility in comparison to full-time work (Blossfeld and Hakim 1997). On 
the other hand, the choice of high-level occupations is associated with career-
oriented women as these occupations mean a better status and appreciation as well 
as a higher stability of career (Hakim 1996).  
Empirical evidence on the effect of woman‟s employment choices on her 
well-being goes in various directions. For instance, Gerson (1993) in a study of 
American couples, using in depth interview and life histories, finds that equality 
of sharing within family, from income to parental duties, takes place more often 
when woman‟s potential in terms of work and career is outstanding. She argues 
that higher husband‟s earnings do not necessarily change negatively the family 
dynamics, because woman‟s career matters beyond income for woman‟s well-
                                                          
17
 Self-reliant are work- oriented women, egalitarian are women who choose to balance private and 
professional life while neo-traditional women are oriented domestically. The groups also correspond to 
the classification of women suggested by Hakim (2000). 
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being: „Even when earnings of women do not outpace her husbands, her long term 
career prospects might‟ (Gerson 1993:232). Similarly, the earlier study of 
Hochschild (1989) points to the reality of 1980‟s in The United States, where 
women were already looking for a fulfilling career rather than pure jobs. She also 
adds the distinction between „wives in jobs‟ and „career wives‟ and compares how 
much this difference affects control over spending and housework. Other authors 
study particular dimensions of woman‟s employment. In an interesting study of 
Damaske (2011) it is suggested that what matters is how women have worked 
during their lives rather than whether currently they work or not. She also shows 
and explains the association of class with employment: working class women are 
more likely to experience interrupted career patterns and spells of unemployment, 
while middle class women often stay for a long time in full-time employment. 
Vogler and Pahl (1993) and Stier and Lewin-Epstein (2000) instead look at 
whether control over expenditures and household financial management depend 
on woman‟s full time employment comparing it with the part-time work. They 
conclude that part-time work is not equally beneficial for woman‟s financial 
equality as it does not offer them the equal rights in the family. Stier and Lewin-
Epstein (ibid.) further explain that part-time does not have the same impact on 
egalitarian arrangement perhaps also because it implies lower rewards and lower 
career prospects. Boye (2009) analyses the association between paid working 
hours and woman‟s well-being in 18 European countries. She finds various patters 
in this association depending on the welfare regimes: the most positive association 
characterizes traditional welfare regimes whereas the lowest association is found 
in market oriented regimes. She interprets the results in the context of work-
family balance which is influenced by the welfare regime. Here, however, 
woman‟s career opportunities are not considered.  
In addition, there is a large amount of literature, which studies the general 
effects of employment and unemployment on well-being (Winkelmann and 
Winkelmann 1998; Vendrik and Woltjer 2006; Frey and Stutzer 2002a), without 
directly focusing on women.  
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4.3.   Explaining (the economic) well-being 
As we saw, in measuring human welfare, standard socio-economic 
research largely relies on objective and observable outcomes. Thus, human well-
being is often represented by measures that objectively capture individual 
conditions such as individual income and consumption, leisure time and 
housework. But, individual preferences and real human well-being may diverge 
from each other (Easterlin 1974) so that material achievements and income are not 
necessarily the best reflections of human well-being. If we define the well- being 
as „individual‟s personal assessment of their own well-being according to their 
own opinion‟, McBride (2001:253), we get closer to the real well-being of the 
person (Frey and Stuzter 2002a) and broaden our perspective as the concept of 
subjective well-being encompasses both economic and non-economic dimensions 
of person‟s life.  
There are many empirical studies, which confirm the correlation of 
subjective well-being to utility in the economic sense of the word (Frey and 
Stutzer 2002b; Van Praag, Frijters and Ferrero-i-Carbonell 2003; Senik 2004). 
Consequently, subjective measures are lately often used in relation to the 
objective conditions such as income and work (McBride 2001; Bonke and 
Browning 2009b, Newman, Delaney and Nolan 2008). However, subjective well-
being is a rather broad concept and it often incorporates more than one dimension: 
it might refer to well-being concerning finances, health conditions, housing 
conditions, family life etc. Economic dimensions of well-being are important 
because they reflect a complexity of material conditions including consumption 
and are also one of the main determinants of overall satisfaction and human well-
being (van Praag et al. 2003). In addition, financial considerations are of great 
significance for a married woman, which all together narrows our interest towards 
the concept of subjective economic well-being, that is, financial satisfaction. 
As we already mentioned, several recent studies used the concept of 
financial satisfaction to explain the economic well-being and mostly in relation to 
the individual income and (un)employment (Alessie, Crossley and Hildebrand 
2006; Bonke and Browning 2009b; Bonke 2008). For instance, Bonke and 
Browning (2009b) test the effects of household income, personal income share 
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and employment status on financial satisfaction in Denmark. Newman et al. 
(2008) also test the role of current income, income expectations, income time-
paths and income share on individual financial satisfaction using the data from 
Ireland. Bonke (2008) examines the consequences of income distribution for 
individual financial satisfaction in various welfare regimes. These studies, 
however, do not systematically confront financial satisfaction with employment, 
but rather touch upon it, studying primarily the effects of income and income 
distribution. 
4.4.   Cross-national perspective 
A combination of different institutional factors which reflect history, 
policy and culture of the countries often influence woman‟s decision to work, 
woman‟s employment patterns as well as her bargaining position in the household 
(Sainsbury 1996; Bonke 2008; Boye 2009). In the literature countries are often 
grouped in various categories for the similarity of their institutions and one of the 
most common classifications is welfare regime typology (Esping-Andersen 1990, 
1999). The countries are divided according to the prevalence of state, market or 
family in the combination of individual welfare inputs. The original classification 
includes: Social-Democratic regimes, Liberal and the Conservative regimes, 
although it was later expanded to include the Mediterranean countries as a 
separate block within the conservative countries (Lessenich 1995; Ferrara 1996). 
This typology is relevant for women‟s employment because the policy support for 
their labour market participation varies through welfare regimes. For instance, in 
the Socio-Democratic block of countries, women‟s choice to work is favoured 
both in full time and part-time employment (Esping Andersen 2009), and while 
Liberal regimes do not directly stimulate women to be economically independent, 
they impact the decrease of male breadwinner wage, making woman‟s income 
important for the household. On the other hand, Conservative model favours 
wives‟ economic dependence and the male breadwinner wage, and similarly, the 
Mediterranean model creates negative incentives for women to participate in the 
labour market. In addition, welfare regimes influence woman‟s employment for 
the way they deal with the issues of gender wage gap and occupational 
segregation, which as we saw, might have direct implications on woman‟s 
economic well-being within family. Thus, the transition from breadwinner to the 
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dual earner model of society is closely associated with the dominant model of 
welfare (Blossfeld and Drobnic 2001; Blossfeld and Hofmeister 2008) but welfare 
regimes may also be further grouped according to their orientation towards dual-
earner and breadwinner model. In other words, alternative country welfare 
policies may still serve for the same goal (Blossfeld and Drobnic 2001:40). 
The five countries analysed here, namely Italy, France, Uk, Ireland and 
Denmark are chosen to represent the „modified‟ welfare regime typology: Italy 
belongs to the Mediterranean block of countries, UK and Ireland form a part of 
the Liberal group, France is within conservative category whereas Denmark is an 
example of Socio-Democratic regime. 
4.5.   Research Questions and Hypotheses 
In the previous sections, we saw that the type of woman‟s labour market 
involvement has the potential to change intra-household relations between men 
and women and influences her economic well-being beyond income. But we also 
distinguished between two views on woman‟s employment: Gerson (1993) seems 
to imply that career orientation of women is beneficial for her economic well-
being more than the other options, while Hakim (2000) relies more on equality of 
the choices, without attaching any particular label with regards to intra-household 
sharing and woman‟s economic well-being. 
In this chapter we test the hypothesis that woman‟s working career (labour 
market attachment) improves her financial satisfaction and we also test a 
complementary hypothesis of the negative association between attachment to 
family life and woman‟s financial satisfaction. However, we expect that 
conclusions might vary in various welfare regimes.  
4.5.1.   Labour market attachment 
 
The definition of labour market attachment in the literature is relatively vague and 
we find more than one explanation of what it encompasses (Hakim 1991; 
Blossfeld and Hakim 1997). As we saw, it may refer to either employment 
without interruptions or the full time employment or to the highly valued 
occupations or all, and the choice of the reference might have implications for 
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practical research. Most studies choose to treat only one dimension of labour 
market attachment, yet encompassing more elements could bring more clarity and 
enrich the research questions. Moving away from unilateral solutions, we use 
continuous employment, full time work and woman‟s career prospects to explain 
the labour market attachment. In the work of Gerson (1985, 1993) and Hakim 
(2000), labour market attachment is also labelled as „working career‟. 
Career prospects (as social class) 
The individual position within the social stratification has a strong impact 
on the attachment to work. It determines the individual risks of unemployment 
and chances of re-employment (Goldthorpe 2009; Luchini and Schizzerotto 2010; 
Bukodi and Dex 2009). It is also related to the individual economic security and 
lifetime earning prospects (Goldthorpe 2004, 2009). These characteristics of 
social class can be even more pronounced for women (Stier and Yaish 2008; 
Buchman and Pfeifer 2004) who are more likely to face volatile labour markets. 
In addition, as Esping Andersen puts it „higher occupational classes are also more 
eligible for investment in skills and trainings and bring more chance for personal 
development‟ (Esping Andersen 2002a: 22). Bringing together the different 
perspectives, we conclude that class has the potential to shape one‟s future career 
prospects. Based on the previously elaborated theory and empirical evidence on 
the positive effect of work commitment for woman‟s well-being, we test that: 
H1a:  Woman‟s good career prospects measured through the concept of 
social class have a positive impact on her financial satisfaction beyond her income 
contributions: The higher the woman‟s social class, the higher is the woman‟s 
financial satisfaction.  
Continuous employment (versus interrupted employment) 
Continuous employment assumes a lack of work interruptions and limited 
absences from the labour market. In addition, it is very often connected with the 
“jobs of higher status and earnings” (Hakim 1991:113). As we saw, long-term 
commitment to work in the form of continuous employment is associated with 
positive outcomes for women (Gerson 1993) and here we test its role on woman‟s 
financial well-being.  
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H1b: Women who pursue a continuous working career will be more 
financially satisfied than women who occasionally exit and enter the labour 
markets. 
Part-time work (versus full time work) 
Part-time work is often taken as an example of lower labour force 
attachment (Hakim 1991). The literature suggests several reasons for such 
opinion.  First, it is characterized by lower income and worse career prospects 
(Stier and Lewin-Epstein 2000). Second, part-time work is often regarded 
marginal work (Blossfeld 1997). Third, it is the second most common way to 
combine work and family instead of temporarily leaving the world of work and as 
such it is often chosen by women who have no career aspirations- adaptive 
women (Hakim 2000). Full-time work instead implies commitment and better 
career prospects. Career-oriented women usually choose it (ibid).  
Based on the previous overview, we test the following hypothesis: 
H1c: Women who (continuously) work part time are less financially 
satisfied than women in full-time continuous employment. 
4.5.2.   Attachment to family life 
 
Becker‟s thesis is that women and men work together to sustain their 
family. As the most common scenario, women specialize in doing housework 
while men are the only breadwinners, although the distribution of well-being 
should not be affected by this specialization. The choice of family over work is a 
more radical way to express dedication to family life and although rare it is still a 
valid option for modern women. This group of women is named „neotraditional‟ 
(Gerson 2009) or home-oriented (Hakim 2000). As we saw, some studies imply 
that the choice of working career might be better for woman‟s well-being (Gerson 
1993), and that women have a greater influence at home if they have a regular job 
(England and McCreary 1987). On the contrary, Hakim (2000) sees all woman‟s 
choices equal for woman‟s material well-being, including „marriage career‟. And, 
we hypothesize: 
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H2: Housewives show a lower level of financial satisfaction in comparison 
to working women (both „career oriented‟ and „adaptive‟ women), net of all other 
characteristics. 
4.5.3.    Country (welfare regime) as a stratification variable 
 
As already mentioned, welfare regimes may constrain or free women in 
their choices and thus, intervene in the association between woman‟s financial 
satisfaction and her employment patterns. Given that some regimes are more open 
for woman‟s employment and career (Socio-Democratic and Liberal regimes) in 
comparison to other regimes which impede woman‟s labour market participation 
(Conservative and Mediterranean model), we hypothesize : 
 H3: The positive relation between woman‟s working career (full-
time work, continuous employment and career prospects) and her 
financial satisfaction will be differently accentuated in Liberal and 
Socio-Democratic regimes on one side and Conservative and 
Mediterranean model on the other. 
4.6.   Data and variables 
The data for the analysis come from the eight waves of the European 
Community Household panel (1994-2001). The ECHP was chosen for it contains 
individual data on subjective well-being, information on various forms of income 
and employment, but also because it has the advantage of a longitudinal 
framework for EU-15 countries. Its main disadvantage for this analysis is that it 
does not contain direct information on family dynamics. The unit of analysis is a 
woman living in a heterosexual relationship, married or cohabitating, aged 18-50, 
with the partner aged 18 and above. Thus, the sample contains heterosexual 
married and cohabiting couples from Denmark, Italy, United Kingdom, France 
and Ireland but we exclude multiple couples within households. The age selection 
for women was made to avoid the differences in retirement policy within the 
European Union. The panel is unbalanced and the final sample sizes range from 
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4197 observations for Denmark, 4623 for Ireland, 5715 for UK, 9334 for France 
and 13218 for Italy.
18
  
4.6.1.   Dependent variables 
 
The main dependent variable is financial satisfaction; the following 
question is asked to all respondents:  
„How satisfied are you with your present financial situation? „ with the 
possible responses: 1. not at all satisfied, 2. largely unsatisfied, 3. mildly 
unsatisfied, 4. mildly satisfied, 5. largely satisfied and 6. Fully satisfied. The 
variable is further recoded into binary outcome:1. Satisfied with financial 
situation 2. Unsatisfied with financial situation.  
4.6.2.   Independent variables 
 
The main independent variables are continuity of employment (as time- 
trend work dummies) and career prospects (as social class). 
The categories of work status
19
 are used to create several work related 
dummies. These dummies are further used to build time trend work dummies - all 
exhaustive classification where all women are placed into one of the several 
destinations: remaining employed (continuous employment), remaining 
unemployed (continuous unemployment), remaining inactive (homemakers) and 
transitions to and out of work (interruptions). Another group of time trend 
dummies contains a more detailed classification of individual placement: 
remaining in full time work (continuous full-time), remaining in part time work
20
 
(continuous part-time work), remaining inactive, remaining unemployed, 
                                                          
18
 The actual number of observations in some parts of the analysis might be higher than in the final 
sample. 
19
 The work status categories are based on the ILO classification; The economically active population, 
that is everyone who is between 16-65 is divided into three groups: Employed, inactive and 
unemployed, while the employed are further subdivided into part-time and full time workers. 
20
 The European legislation on part- time work is not coordinated and there is no a clear cut standard on 
the number of hours to define a part time job. The ECHP creates the variable part time by asking 
individuals to declare the type of work that they were doing. This makes responses more comparable 
despite differences in the working hours. 
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transitions from and to full-time work and transitions both ways from part-time to 
full time work. Each destination is based on a combination of a current and last 
year work status of an individual. The reference category for the first group of 
time trend work dummies is transition from and to work.  The reference for the 
second group of time trend work dummies is transition from and to full-time 
work.
21
 
European Socio-economic Classification scheme is used to operationalize 
the social class (Rose and Harrison 2010). ESeC scheme assigns a class position to 
an individual by combining information from employment status and occupation. 
The original classification distinguishes between nine classes
22
 although the 
scheme can be further regrouped to contain three or five categories. As five group 
classification of classes already matches our theoretical framework, we use the 
following five group classification to represent career prospects: managers and 
professionals (ESeC 1), intermediate and lower supervisory (ESeC 2), small 
employers and own account workers (ESeC 3), white collar workers (ESeC 4) and 
blue collar workers (ESeC 5). The currently unemployed are included with their 
most recent employment. Long term unemployed are treated as a separate 
category.
23
 Class position is taken at year zero, or the first year available for an 
individual and it represents a time invariant characteristic. We assume that class 
position is relatively stable over years and that it captures well individual career 
prospects (Goldhorpe 2004). We do not follow a strict vertical order of positions 
but we still link higher social classes with brighter career prospects (ibid). 
4.6.3.   Control variables 
 
The following control variables are used in the analysis: 
Relative woman’s income share (in the household) is the percentage of 
woman‟s contribution to the family finances that varies from 0 to 100 (woman‟s 
                                                          
21 These variables correspond to the theoretical framework outlined in the previous sections. 
22
 The classes are the following: higher salariat occupations, lower salariat occupations, intermediate 
occupations, self-employed and small employers, self-employed and small employers (agriculture), 
lower supervisory/ technician occupations, lower services/sales/ clerical occupations, lower technical 
occupations and routine occupations. 
23
 These are the individuals who never worked or whose employment cannot be traced in the dataset.  
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income/family income). For easier interpretation, the variable is divided by ten. 
Woman‟s income share is one of the most basic indicators of her control over 
financial resources and distribution of well-being.
24
  
Individual and household incomes are sum of all entrances including 
earnings, state benefits or private incomes. The household income also contains 
collective entrances. All incomes are logged and matched to refer to the current 
year as the ECHP gives information on the income obtained in the previous year.  
Educational differences capture couple attitudes towards woman‟s 
employment and sharing labour in the household. They might intervene in the 
association of woman‟s career with her financial satisfaction. Based on the 
combination of the ISCED classifications, three educational dummies are created: 
married down- woman is better educated than her partner, married up- woman is 
less educated than her partner and homogamous couples- the same level of 
education.
25
  
The number of children is a continuous variable and includes both 
biological and adopted children. We control for this variable because more 
children may impede woman‟s labour market attachment and her financial 
satisfaction.  
Woman’s Age is a continuous variable and controls for the role of joint 
investment in the relationship. 
Marital status shows individual civil status in the moment of interview. It 
is a dichotomous variable coded 1 when woman is married and 0 when a woman 
is cohabiting. Marriage and cohabitation might have different impact on financial 
satisfaction because the type of union is often directly related to relationship 
investments, sharing of labour and employment.
26
 
Financial hardship is a binary variable that shows difficulty to make ends 
meet and it is 1 when family feels financial hardship and 0 when family does not 
                                                          
24
 Chapter 3 provides more details on this topic. 
25
 The variable education is based on the Isced classification: Isced 0-2- lower secondary education and 
below, Isced 3-upper secondary education, 5/7–post-secondary (non tertiary) and tertiary education.  
26
 This will be more elaborated in the chapter 5. 
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feel financial hardship. Financial hardship might influence the woman‟s career 
path and also financial satisfaction. 
Wave dummies control for the period effect.  
4.7.   Methods and the specification of the model 
We apply logistic random intercept model- as a special case of multilevel 
generalized linear model (MGLM) (Rodrigez, 2007). The model is a multilevel 
framework applied to the longitudinal data, where occasions as a first level are 
nested within individuals. This model allows us to determine subject specific 
intercepts controlling for the unobserved heterogeneity. In other words, the model 
equation contains fixed part in the form of characteristics for which we control 
and the random part with the features unique for each couple such as motivation, 
preferences, talents etc.  
 Our model of financial satisfaction in the multilevel framework can be specified 
as: 
Logit {Pr (Sij=1| Xij, µ)} =α + β
s
x1j+ β
t
x2ij+ β
i
x3j+ β
vc
x4ij + µj with µj | Xij ~ N (0, 
ψ), where µj is independent among couples 
S is wife‟s financial satisfaction, i and j denote occasions (time) and couples. 
Independent variables in the model are the following:  
1) x1 represents woman‟s career prospects as social class.  
2) depending on a particular regression x2 is either:  
a) a vector of transition (time trend) work dummies. 
b) a vector of transition work dummies including the division on 
part- time and full-time work. 
3) x3 is a vector of individual and couple time invariant characteristics as 
well as the variables controlling for period effects. 
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4) X4 is a vector o of time -variant control variables such as woman‟s 
income share, annual family income, financial hardship, age, the number 
of children. 
Dynamic structure of the model (modelling of previous and current 
employment behaviour) and the presence of specific random term with its 
distribution also serve as a partial solution to the potential endogeneity problem. 
4.8.   Results 
4.8.1.   Countries at a glance 
 
A brief look at our samples shows us a range of differences between 
countries in various aspects (Table 4.1). The first variable that we consider is 
woman‟s relative income contribution. In the countries of our sample, the average 
woman‟s income share is the lowest in Italy at 22,93% and the highest in 
Denmark at the average of 45%. On average, women contribute to the family 
finances less than men in all countries, and even in Denmark, which is often taken 
as an example of gender egalitarian society, the contributions are less than 50 %. 
Some possible reasons for these trends could be the wage gap between men and 
women and also various disincentives for women in the labour markets. The 
descriptive statistics also shows us that in Italy and Ireland women contribute the 
least to the household finances. In other words, even though these two countries 
belong to different welfare regimes, they are similar in the labour market 
involvement of women which is, for the period analysed here, the lowest in 
Ireland and Italy out of five countries.  
The selected EU countries show different patterns in woman‟s 
participation in the labour market. In our sample of women aged 18 to 50, the 
lowest employment participation is in Italy and Ireland and the highest labour 
force participation is in Denmark, almost 84%, then UK, 69% and finally France, 
62%.  These results might reflect the differences in the welfare systems to the 
extent in which they impede woman‟s exit to the labour market. However, some 
part of the explanation may lie elsewhere; here we have Ireland that seems to have 
developed very traditional model of family despite the liberal welfare state, 
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possibly due to the influence of Catholic church. Thus, both Italy and Ireland have 
a large population of women homemakers that goes up to 45%. In Uk and France, 
around 30% of women are inactive while homemaking is the least common choice 
in Denmark where only 11 % of women are homemakers. Our sample statistics on 
female employment are also in line with the ILO country estimates of the female 
labour force participation for the period analysed (Table 4.2). 
Region (Engl. name) Sex 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Denmark Female 73,3 73,3 73,4 73,9 74,8 75,5 75,4 75,2
France Female 59,8 60,5 61,2 60,9 61,4 62,1 62,3 62
Ireland Female 46,3 47 48,7 49,7 52,1 54,4 55,7 56
Italy Female 42,4 42,5 43,2 43,7 44,5 45,5 46,2 47,1
United Kingdom Female 66 65,9 66,4 66,9 66,8 67,4 67,7 67,5
Data sources:
1. Copyright (c) 1996-2010 International Labour Organization. All rights reserved.
Table 4.2:Labour force participation rate by sex (Data unit: Percentage)
Data are by sex (female/male/total) and refer to the working age population (ages 15 to 64). ILO Key Indicators of the Labor Market (KILM)  
Also, the distribution of social class varies among countries. We notice 
relatively high proportion of women professionals in the United Kingdom and 
Denmark (above 30%) in comparison to all the other countries (lower than 20%). 
Other peculiarities are: higher presence of intermediate class in France along with 
the Uk and Denmark, low presence of long term-unemployed women in Ireland, 
Uk and Denmark (less than 1%) and high in Italy (7%), and a relatively low 
proportion of female white collar workers in Italy (4% versus above 18% in other 
countries). 
When it comes to the education gap between the partners, we notice a high 
percentage of homogamous couples: on average in around 64 % of  Italian 
couples, partners are at the same level of education and the same pattern is 
followed in all other countries but in slightly lower proportion (from 50 % to 
60%). Also, great disparities are visible in the choice of couples to marry rather 
than cohabitate. And the pattern is the following: In Italy only 1% of our sample 
cohabitated, in Ireland, 3% of all couples, in France, Uk and Denmark, 15%, 19% 
and 25% respectively. Finally, the medium age of women in the sample goes from 
age 35 to 38, and the average number of children is the lowest in Italy and the Uk 
(1,13 and 1,10) and the highest in France and Ireland. Ireland is, here, a major 
outlier with an average of two children per couple. 
Our next table 4.3 shows average (across waves) yearly proportion of 
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women remaining in “stable” activity for two consecutive years (remaining 
employed, remaining unemployed or remaining inactive) and the proportion of 
women who are instead interrupting their careers (in and out of labour market in 
two consecutive years). The results are presented for all five countries. 
On average each year, in all countries of our sample, around 15% of 
woman is in transition from one form of employment to another, with the 
exception of the Uk, where around 10% women exit and enter the labour market 
per year. The percentage of women who are in two consecutive years inactive is 
the highest in Ireland (38,76%) and Italy (33,5%) and unsurprisingly, lowest in 
Denmark (7,1%). Average proportion of women staying in employment varies 
from 44% in Italy and Ireland to 56% in France, 64% in the UK and 77% in 
Denmark. 
Table 4.3: Average employment transitions by country (women, 18-50)
Remaining Remaining Remaining Transitions 
Country employed unemployed inactive from/to work Number of observations
% % % % N
Italy 44,71 6,08 33,5 15,71 13218
Denmark 77,46 1,76 7,1 13,68 4197
France 56,77 4,03 23,47 15,73 9334
Uk 64,34 0 26,14 9,52 5715
Ireland 44,15 0,97 38,76 16,12 4623  
   
In the table 4.4, the division between full-time work and part-time work is 
included. We see that the proportion of women remaining in part-time work per 
wave goes up to 13,4% in Ireland from as low as 4,27% in Italy. On average 
around 3-5% of women per year changes the type of employment from part-time 
to full time and back in each country. Also, the countries with the predominance 
of full-time employment are UK and Denmark (55% and 61%).  
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Table 4.4: Average employment transitions by country (women, 18-50)
Remaining  in Remaining in Remaining Remaining Transitions Transitions Obs
Country full time part-time unemployed inactive full/part-time to/from full-time 
% % % % % % N
Italy 35,28 4,27 6,08 33,5 5,17 15,71 13218
Denmark 61,83 9,67 1,76 7,1 5,96 13,68 4197
France 44,55 8,11 4,03 23,47 4,11 15,73 9334
Uk 55,28 6,26 0 26,14 2,8 9,52 5715
Ireland 25,42 13,04 0,97 38,76 5,69 16,12 4623  
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Table 4.1: Means and standard deviations of variables by country
Means and S.D of variables Italy Denmark France UK Ireland
%
%  of woman's income share 22,93 (26,13) 45,00 (12,71) 30,67 (20,18) 36,01 (20,15) 24,97 (21,09)
Woman's work status (1=yes)
Employed 0,49 (0,50) 0,84 (0,37) 0,62 (0,48) 0,69 (0,46) 0,52 (0,50)
Unemployed 0,11 (0,31) 0,05 (0,21) 0,08 (0,27) 0 (0) 0,04 (0,19)
Inactive 0,40 (0,49) 0,11 (0,32) 0,30 (0,46) 0,31 (0,46) 0,45 (0,50)
Education gap between partners
married up (1= yes) 0,17 (0,38) 0,20 (0,40) 0,20 (0,40) 0,28 (0,45) 0,21 (0,41)
(woman's edu<man's edu)
married down (1=yes) 0,17 (0,38) 0,21 ((0,41) 0,20 (0,40) 0,18 (0,38) 0,22 (0,42)
woman's edu>man's edu
homogamous (1=yes) 0,64 (0,48) 0,58 (0,49) 0,60 (0,49) 0,54 (0,50) 0,57 (0,50)
(woman's edu=man's edu) 
Woman's marriage status
Married (1=yes) 0,99 (0,10) 0,75 (0,43) 0,85 (0,35) 0,81 (0,39) 0,97 (0,17)
Cohabitating (1=yes) 0,01 (0,11) 0,25 (0,43) 0,14 (0,35) 0,19 (0,39) 0,03 (0,17)
Woman's age 38,17 (6,7) 36,65 (7,4) 37,68 35,73 (7,73) 38,35
Woman's social class
Managers and prof (1=yes) 0,14 (0,35) 0,32 (0,46) 0,18 (0,38) 0,30 (0,46) 0,17 (0,37)
Interm and lower super ( 1=yes) 0,19 (0,39) 0,27 (0,45) 0,29 (0,45) 0,23 (0,42) 0,20 (0,40)
Small employ and ind. work 0,07 (0,27) 0,027 (0,16) 0,05 (0,21) 0,03 (0,18) 0,04 (0,19)
White collar (1=yes) 0,04 (0,22) 0,21 (0,40) 0,18 (0,39) 0,22 (0,41) 0,19 (0,39)
Blue collar (1=yes) 0,18 (0,38) 0,13 (0,34) 0,15 (0,36) 0,13 (0,33) 0,19 (0,39)
Never worked and l. t. unemp. (1=yes) 0,07 (0,26) 0,01 (0,075) 0,02 (0,15) 0 (0) 0,01 (0,09)
Missing 0,31 0,03 0,13 0,09 0,2
The number of children 1,13 (0,93) 1,26 (1,08) 1,38 (1,1) 1,108 (1,15) 1,99 (1,35)
Financial hardship in the family (1=yes) 0,56 (0,49) 0,29 (0,45) 0,43 (0,50) 0,32 (0,47) 0,60 (0,49)
(Difficulty to make ends meet)
Family income in euros 21005 (11900) 44002 (15240) 34243 (25071) 34263 (19555) 30802 (22021)
Number of observations N 13218 4197 9334 5715 4623
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4.8.2.   Testing the hypotheses 
 
We ran regressions independently for each country to obtain coefficient 
estimates for each institutional context. First, we include models only with a full 
set of control variables, which might intervene in the association between 
woman‟s labour market attachment and financial satisfaction. The basic model of 
financial satisfaction without main independent variables includes distribution of 
income and family income, age, marital status, educational differences, the 
measure of financial hardship and controls for waves. The second model is 
enriched with the woman‟s career prospects (social class), while the models that 
follow add the continuity of woman‟s employment (time trend dummies) in order 
to test its importance for woman‟s financial satisfaction independently of her 
income. 
In the first model (table 4.5), we find that the household income 
distribution (woman‟s income share) makes some difference for the woman‟s 
financial satisfaction net of household income but its effect is not equal among 
countries. The coefficient is positive for three countries, namely Denmark, Uk and 
Italy where the results are in line with the bargaining frameworks (and rejection of 
unitary models): the more income women bring into the family, the higher the 
odds that they will be financially satisfied. More concretely, the estimated odds 
that a woman is financially satisfied increase 6,5% in Italy, 13% in Denmark and 
8% in the Uk with every 10% of increase in her financial contributions within the 
family. However, the individual income effect is not observed in France and 
Ireland and the coefficients are statistically insignificant. 
What is interesting here are the country differences in the effect of female 
income share on woman‟s financial satisfaction, which shows no clear pattern. 
The positive effect of woman‟s income share is present in Denmark, Uk, and Italy 
and each of them belongs to a different welfare regime, while the effect, for 
instance, in Irish data is insignificant even though Ireland belongs to the liberal 
welfare regime together with the UK. In the literature, we find that Bonke (2008) 
also compares liberal, conservative and socio-democratic regimes using individual 
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financial satisfaction data and he concludes that in countries that are more 
egalitarian and where women contribute substantially to the household income, 
female income share is less of a bargaining instrument because it is seen as threat 
for dual earner model. On the other hand, he finds that in Southern Europe, which 
is characterized by a breadwinner model, female income is more of a 
straightforward bargaining instrument. Our results, however, are not in line with 
this view. 
Table 4.5: Logistic random intercept regression: estimated odds ratios
Estimates for the model of woman's financial satisfaction
Model 1:  
Fin. Sat. Italy Denmark France UK Ireland
Variables Or (std.error) Or.( Std.Error) Or.( Std.Error) Or.( Std.Error) Or.( Std.Error)
Fixed part
Woman's income share 1,06 (0,01)*** 1,13 (0,04)*** 1,0 (0,02) 1,08 (0,028)*** 1,01 (0,02)
Family income 2,28 (0,11)*** 3,17 (,539)*** 2,62 (0,21)*** 3,90 (0,42)*** 3,43 (0,33)***
Age 1,00 (0,004) 1,05 (0,009)*** 0,98 (0,01)*** 0,98 (0,007)*** 1,00 (0,007)
Financial hardship (1=yes) 0,16 (0,008)*** 0,11 (0,01)*** 0,07 (0,005)*** 0,01 (0,001)*** 0,22 (0,02)***
Number of children 1,02 (0,03) 0,89 (0,05)** 0,97 (0,03) 0,80 (0,04)*** 0,87 (0,03)***
Educational differences ᵃ
Married up 1,3 (0,09)*** 0,94 (0,12) 0,96 (0,08) 1,03 (0,11) 1,13 (0,13)
Married down 1,22 (0,09)*** 1,29 (0,17)* 0,93 (0,08) 0,96 (0,12) 1,15 (0,13)
Married (ref.=coh) 1,2 (0,25) 1,38 (0,18)** 1,45 (0,14)*** 1,42 (0,18)*** 1,12 (0,26)
Wave ᵇ
wave 2 1,06 (0,07) 0,76 (0,11)* 0,83 (0,07)** 1,16 (0,15) 1,01 (0,11)
wave 3 0,77 (0,06)*** 0,69 (0,11)** 0,85 (0,07)* 0,98 (0,13) 0,85 (0,09)
wave4 0,64 (0,05)*** 0,93 (0,15) 0,95 (0,09) 1,06 (0,14) 0,97 (0,11)
wave5 1,00 (0,07) 0,70 (0,11)** 0,96 (0,09) 1,25 (0,17) 0,84 (0,11)
wave6 1,04 (0,08) 0,63 (0,10)*** 0,92 (0,09) 1,18 (0,17) 0,77 (0,11)*
wave7 0,99 (0,08) 0,52 (0,08)*** 1,00 (0,1) 0,87 (0,13) 0,70 (0,10)**
Random part
ψ 1,78 (0,11) 1,83 (0,23) 2,14 (0,15) 2,75 (0,24) 1,89 (0,187)
Rho 0,35 0,36 0,39 0,45 0,36
Log likelihood -9319,11 -2209,71 -6471,56 -3475,68 -3445,21
N. 17582 5875 13567 10407 6345
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
ᵃ Reference category is homogamous couple.
ᵇ Reference category is wave 1  
A set of other socio-economic variables are also included as controls in the 
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model: logged family income,
27
 age, marital status, children, educational gap, 
household financial hardship and wave dummies. For instance, the woman‟s 
economic well-being is negatively affected by each child in three countries, 
Denmark, Uk and Ireland, which is not the case in Italy and France. Each child 
lowers the odds of financial satisfaction on average 10% to 20%. This result 
probably has to do with the financial constraints and temporarily labour market 
withdrawal that women face when having children. It is interesting that results 
differ for Italy and France, and this might be perhaps explained by the role of 
extended family in those countries. The variable of civil status also plays an 
important role for woman‟s financial satisfaction: being married increases 
woman‟s financial satisfaction in comparison to cohabitation in almost all 
countries. This result finds some confirmation in the relevant empirical studies 
which show superiority of marriage over cohabitation for well-being of women 
(Vogler 2005; Vogler, Brockmann, and Wiggins 2006).  The difficulty to make 
ends meet lowers substantially odds that a woman will be financially satisfied in 
all countries: women that face no financial hardship have from 4,5 (Ireland) to 
100 times (UK) higher odds of being financially satisfied. Household income also 
positively affects financial satisfaction. 
After having controlled for the important socio-economic variables, we 
now consider whether there is an improvement in woman‟s financial satisfaction 
with the inclusion of woman‟s career prospects (social class). 
In the table 4.6, we see that the social class coefficients for the first two 
ESeC classes are significant and positive in all countries except from the United 
Kingdom and partly France. As higher social classes are linked to better career 
prospects (Goldhorpe 2004), we conclude that bright career prospects show an 
independent positive effect on woman‟s financial satisfaction net of both family 
income and woman‟s income contributions. Woman‟s income share is still 
significant for all the three countries where its effect is found in the first place; 
however, these results confirm that career prospects might matter beyond money 
for woman‟s financial well-being. 
                                                          
27
 The correlation coefficient between family income and woman‟s contributions is at 0, 20 which is 
acceptable and does not create a problem of collinearity.   
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Table 4.6: Logistic random intercept regression: estimated odds ratios
The regression of career prospects on woman's fiancial satisfaction ( selected variables)
Model 2:  
Fin. Sat. Italy Denmark France UK Ireland
Variables Or (std.error) Or.( Std.Error) Or.( Std.Error) Or.( Std.Error) Or.( Std.Error)
Fixed part
Woman's income share 1,03 (0,01)*** 1,14 (0,04)*** 1,00 (0,02) 1,08 (0,03)*** 0,98 (0,02)
Family income 2,07 (0,1)*** 2,93 (0,52)*** 2,47 (0,21)*** 3,79 (0,44)*** 3,08 (0,31)***
Career prospects ᵃ
Managers&Professionals 1,87 (0,21)*** 1,56 (0,31)** 1,34 (0,19)** 1,19 (0,22) 1,68 (0,31)***
Intermediate 1,65 (0,17)*** 1,63 (0,31)** 1,09 (0,14) 1,10 (0,20) 1,68 (0,28)***
Small employers 1,25 (0,17)* 0,86 (0,33) 0,81 (0,16) 1,29 (0,39) 1,71 (0,49)*
White collar 1,25 (0,19) 1,4 (0,27)* 1,03 (0,14) 1,02 (0,18) 1,37 (0,23)*
Long-term unemployed 0,58 (0,08)*** 0,97 (0,53) 0,61 (0,15)** / 0,48 (0,24)
Random part
ψ 1,8 (0,11) 1,8 (0,23) 2,14 (0,15) 2,74 (0,24) 1,88 (0,19)
Rho 0,35 0,35 0,39 0,45 0,36
Log likelihood -9220,45 -2170,97 -6431,24 -3472,06 -3434,57
N. 17482 5815 13485 10394 6344
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
ᵃ The  reference category is blue collar worker.  
 
Next we assess the role of various working patters (time trend work 
dummies) for woman‟s financial well-being net of absolute family income and 
woman‟s income share (Table 4.7). We follow the relevant literature which 
underlines that work trajectories as social indicators reveal more than activity 
status (Hakim 1991; Sorensen 1990). The model with time trend dummies enables 
us to study the employment dynamics: the effect of 2-year employment path on 
financial satisfaction including the effect of transitions from and to employment 
and unemployment. Thus, as already mentioned, four different combinations 
(dummies) of previous and current work statuses are introduced in addition to 
other independent variables: remaining unemployed, remaining employed, 
remaining inactive and opting in and out of employment. As we link the labour 
market statuses from two consecutive years, we often refer to remaining employed 
and remaining inactive as a type of career. In other words, being employed in two 
consecutive years is taken as a proxy for continuous employment (working career) 
while being inactive in two consecutive years is taken to indicate commitment to 
domestic responsibilities (marriage career). The effect of these two careers on 
woman‟s financial satisfaction along with the continuous unemployment is 
assessed against an „interrupted‟ career (being in and out of the labour market) as 
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a reference category. In the literature that we reviewed in the first sections, we 
find that interrupted working patters are often a characteristic of adaptive women 
(Hakim 2000). 
Table 4.7: Logistic random intercept regression: estimated odds ratios
The regression of career prospects and work commitment on woman's financial satisfaction (selected variables)
Model 3:  
Fin. Sat. Italy Denmark France UK Ireland
Variables Or (std.error) Or.( Std.Error) Or.( Std.Error) Or.( Std.Error) Or.( Std.Error)
Fixed part
Woman's income share 1,02 (0,02) 1,05 (0,05) 0,98 (0,02) 1,01 (0,03) 0,99 (0,03)
Family income 2,05 (0,12)*** 3,48 (0,77)*** 2,23 (0,21)*** 3,6 (0,51)*** 2,98 (0,36)***
Work commitment ᵃ
Remaining employed 1,59 (0,16)*** 1,92 (0,30)*** 1,66 (0,17)*** 1,32 (0,21)* 1,34 (0,19)**
Remaining unemployed 0,60 (0,09)*** 0,39 (0,14)** 0,48 (0,1)*** / 0,70 (0,32)
Remaining inactive 1,54 (0,14)*** 0,84 (0,19) 1,58 (0,19)*** 0,69 (0,12)** 1,34 (0,19)**
Career prospects ᵇ
Managers&Professionals 1,74 (0,23)*** 1,19 (0,27) 1,21 (0,20) 1,06 (0,23) 1,53 (0,33)**
Intermediate 1,51 (0,18)*** 1,35 (0,30) 1,03 (0,15) 0,88 (0,18) 1,70 (0,33)***
Small employers 0,97 (0,15) 0,60 (0,25) 0,68 (0,15)* 1,39 (0,48) 1,84 (0,61)*
White collar 1,25 (0,22) 1,23 (0,27) 0,93 (0,14) 0,91 (0,18) 1,20(0,23)
Long-term unemployed 0,76 (0,13) 1,31 (1,01) 1,07 (0,32) / 0,59 (0,38)
Random part
ψ 2,004 (0,14) 1,67 (0,26) 2,27 (0,18) 2,89 (0,29) 2,047 (0,23)
Rho 0,38 0,34 0,41 0,47 0,38
Log likelihood -6994,1 -1549,89 -4888,47 -2571,29 -2592,32
N. 13507 4253 10299 8027 4774
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
ᵃ Reference is interrupted career.
ᵇ Reference is blue collar worker.  
After having controlled for a range of factors, continuous employment 
proves to be a good predictor of woman‟s financial satisfaction independently of 
the welfare regime; Women remaining employed have from 1,32 (UK) to almost 
twice (Denmark) the odds of being financially satisfied as women who are opting 
in and out of the labour market. This result is in line with our hypothesis on 
positive effect of labour market attachment on woman‟s financial satisfaction. 
However, the results also show that being continuously inactive might increase 
the odds that a woman will be financially satisfied, in some cases, as much as 
being committed to work. More precisely, being a committed housewife in Italy, 
France and Ireland is practically equivalent to being continuously employed in 
 107 
 
terms of impact on individual financial satisfaction. The same association is not 
found in Denmark and Uk, where the odds of being financially satisfied for 
inactive women are either lower or equal to the odds of being financially satisfied 
when temporarily exiting and entering labour market. This implies that our 
hypothesis on negative effect of woman‟s attachment to home on her financial 
satisfaction is not confirmed in the three EU countries where marriage career 
seems to matter, while the hypothesis stands for Uk.  In Denmark, there is no 
difference between home-makers and adaptive women. 
After controlling for the variables of work commitment, the effect of other 
variables such as income share or social class is largely absorbed. As commitment 
is often related to the choice of high-level occupations, one positive effect is 
expected to be partly absorbed by the other (Hakim 1991). The only outliers in 
this are Ireland and Italy, where women managers and professionals as well as 
intermediate class still yield an additional increase in odds of being financially 
satisfied. This might be due to the traditionalist society, in which women have 
difficulty achieving high level positions, but when they do, they may benefit 
largely out of it both in the family and outside of it. Furthermore, the odds ratio of 
income share is reduced substantially and no longer reaches significance in any of 
the countries. This means that continues employment partly mediates the 
relationship between money and financial satisfaction and the effect of income 
share translates into employment. Being continuously unemployed is the worst 
„career‟ for women and lowers their financial satisfaction, which is in line with 
the results of several other studies (Newman, Delaney and Nolan 2008; Bonke 
and Browning 2009b; Winkelmann and Winkelmann 1998).  
The last model (table 4.8) adds the time- trend dummies, which include the 
division on part- time and full -time work.  
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Table 4.8: Logistic random intercept regression: estimated odds ratios
The regression of career prospects and work commitment on woman's financial satisfaction (selected variables)
Model 4:  
Fin. Sat. Italy Denmark France UK Ireland
Variables Or (std.error) Or.( Std.Error) Or.( Std.Error) Or.( Std.Error) Or.( Std.Error)
Fixed part
Woman's income share 1,01 (0,02) 1,04 (0,05) 0,96 (0,02) 1,03 (0,04) 0,99 (0,03)
Family income 2,1 (0,12)*** 3,29 (0,73)*** 2,08 (0,20)*** 3,1 (0,53)*** 3,03 (0,37)***
Work commitment ᵃ
Remain full time(ref. Int) 1,79 (0,19)*** 2,03 (0,34)*** 1,86 (0,22)*** 1,58 (0,36)** 1,25 (0,23)
Remaining part-time 1,26 (0,20) 1,47 (0,35) 1,77 (0,28)*** 1,26 (0,35) 1,46 (0,25)**
Remaining unemployed 0,60 (0,09)*** 0,40 (0,14)** 0,49 (0,1)*** / 0,71 (0,33)
Remaining inactive 1,55 (0,14)*** 0,84 (0,19) 1,6 (0,20)*** 0,76 (0,16) 1,37 (0,19)**
Trans full/part-time 1,59 (0,23)*** 2,09 (0,55)*** 1,63 (0,31)*** 1,92 (0,70)* 1,44 (0,31)*
Career prospects ᵇ
Managers&Professionals 1,61 (0,21)*** 1,19 (0,27) 1,15 (0,19) 1,19 (0,3) 1,45 (0,31)*
Intermediate 1,46 (0,18)*** 1,37 (0,30) 0,99 (0,14) 0,99 (0,24) 1,69 (0,32)***
Small employers 0,93 (0,14) 0,61 (0,26) 0,69 (0,16) 1,56 (0,65) 1,89 (0,63)*
White collar(ref. blue collar) 1,22 (0,21) 1,25 (0,28) 0,91 (0,14) 1,037 (0,25) 1,18 (0,22)
Long-term unemployed 0,77 (0,13) 1,34 (1,02) 1,11 (0,33) / 0,58 (0,38)
Random part
ψ 2,00 (0,14) 1,61 (0,26) 2,26 (0,19) 2,98 (0,37) 1,96 (0,23)
Rho 0,38 0,33 0,41 0,47 0,37
Log likelihood -6854,96 -1538,71 -4481,58 -1792,24 -2522,59
N. 13218 4197 9334 5715 4623
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
ᵃ Reference is interrupted career.
ᵇ Reference is blue collar worker.  
We observe that continuous full-time employment increases woman‟s 
financial satisfaction substantially in all countries except from Ireland but 
remaining in part-time work may also have a positive impact on woman‟s 
financial satisfaction. More precisely, in France and Ireland, continuous part-time 
work is positively associated with woman‟s financial satisfaction in comparison to 
being- in and out of the labour market. We believe that high support for part-time 
employment and its prevalence in some societies might be accounted for this 
trend.
28
 As in previous models, marriage career brings higher financial satisfaction 
in Ireland, France and Italy. In Denmark and UK, the coefficient for being 
inactive has a negative sign, but it is not statistically significant; so, in these 
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 Ireland is an interesting case as a large proportion of women works part-time  (for the period 
analysed). 
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countries, there is no difference between entering and re-entering full-time 
employment and inactivity. Following the model, we conclude that our hypothesis 
on the negative effect of continuous part-time employment is only partly 
supported and it does not apply in France and Ireland. Interesting is also the result 
on the transition from and to part-time work and full-time work as it seems that 
exchanges between the two are not so much different in their effects to remaining 
in the full time employment. Moreover, this is the trend for all the selected 
countries. As in the previous model, the effect of income here practically 
disappears. 
In sum, our analysis points to several conclusions. We find that woman‟s 
labour market attachment has a positive impact on her financial satisfaction as 
expected in our main hypothesis. More concretely, woman‟s career prospects have 
an independent positive effect on woman‟s economic well-being, net of woman‟s 
income share and household income; also, women pursuing a stable working 
career (continuous employment) have higher odds of being financially satisfied 
than women who occasionally exit and re-enter the labour market. The effect of 
work-commitment, when it is added, partly absorbs the impact of career prospects 
due to its relation with them and the effect of woman‟s income share practically 
disappears. In addition, the continuous part time employment increases financial 
satisfaction less than continuous full-time employment (actually continuous part-
time is often equal to the effect of opting in and out of the labour market), 
confirming our hypothesis, although not equally in each country. Finally, the main 
surprise is related to our hypothesis for inactive women as it has not been fully 
supported: Women who are homemakers may be as financially satisfied as work 
career women, net of all other characteristics but the result is found only in certain 
institutional contexts. 
The peculiarity of the results is their international comparison. Indeed, the 
previous conclusions are extracted as trends and here are some clarifications and 
exceptions: First, our hypothesis suggested that Liberal and Socio-Democratic 
regimes should be more similar and have different results from the other two 
regimes. However, the analysis shows that countries group according to some 
other characteristics rather than the welfare regime as Ireland seems to be more 
similar to Italy and France. Second, marriage career seems to be equal to the 
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working career for women in the three countries: Italy, Ireland and France. Also, 
the choice of career oriented professions for women has an independent impact on 
their financial satisfaction in Ireland and Italy even after we control for working 
patterns. In addition, the choice of continuous part time work increases woman‟s 
economic well-being (in comparison to opting in and out of the labour market) in 
France and Ireland where the culture supports the notion of women working part-
time due to the family obligations; thus, work does not necessarily imply full-time 
work. Finally, one conclusion stands still for all countries: Regardless of the 
welfare regime, the choice of continuous employment has the most positive 
impact on woman‟s material well-being over the choice of transition in and out of 
work, independently and as mediator of income contribution.  
4.9.   Summary and Conclusions 
The goal of this chapter was to understand the impact of woman‟s labour 
market attachment on her economic well-being (financial satisfaction). We start 
with reviewing the sociological theory that suggests that bargaining power of 
partners does not depend only on material resources but it can be rather explained 
by a range of other individual characteristics, including   intellectual capabilities 
and achievements. Then we choose our theoretical perspective which focuses on 
the role of woman‟s career prospects and work trajectories for the process of 
negotiation in the family and woman‟s well-being. We outline two dominant 
approaches. First, the perspective of Gerson (1985, 1993) who divides woman‟s 
career on domestic and non-domestic and suggests that good working career 
prospects are superior for woman‟s economic well-being to other choices. Second, 
the perspective of Hakim (2000) who also considers various careers for women, 
from homemaking to working career but attaches them equal value for woman‟s 
well-being. Following on the outlined theoretical framework and relevant 
empirical evidence, we choose to test the Gerson‟s hypothesis of positive 
association between woman‟s labour market attachment and her financial 
satisfaction and the hypothesis of negative association between woman‟s 
attachment to home and her financial satisfaction. We assumed that these 
associations might vary in various welfare regimes and we included in our 
analysis five countries from Socio-Democratic, Conservative, Liberal and 
Mediterranean model. 
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The results of our analysis pointed that woman‟s labour market attachment 
reflected through her career prospects and continuous employment positively 
influence her welfare (financial satisfaction) in all studied countries which is in 
line with our hypotheses. However, our analysis has also demonstrated that 
marriage career may have similar effects on financial satisfaction as woman‟s 
working career; the data confirm that there are three career profiles: home-
making, working career, and interrupted career, where the first two have the 
potential to positively impact the woman‟s well-being, beyond woman‟s income 
contributions. Marriage career is, in its effect, almost equal to working career in 
three EU countries: Italy, Ireland and France. Several explanations are possible 
for these results. Working women may be more financially satisfied also because 
they are able to control better the distribution of household welfare due to success 
at work (also the income effect was absorbed by continuous employment). 
However, the inactive women, whose financial power is limited to their unearned 
income and income transfer from their husbands, may compensate for the lack of 
work by creating a closer personal attachment and relationship within family. This 
is also acknowledged in the literature as “emotional labour” (Hochschild 1983). In 
addition, dedication to family could add one more element to the household- an 
increased stability and joint investment, as woman‟s employment is sometimes 
thought to increase family instability (Esping Andersen 2002a:20). These factors 
together might partly explain the higher material well-being of homemakers. 
Finally, women who are in the literature classified as adaptive, and are 
characterized by less attachment to both work and home, show the lowest level of 
financial satisfaction along with women who are continuously unemployed. In 
other words, trying to balance between the two worlds is the least beneficial for 
woman‟s material well-being and her position in the family. 
We also studied the effect of institutional context, more precisely, welfare 
regimes on the observed relations. As we saw, the institutional context matters as 
it may alter the results in various directions. For instance, even though the positive 
effect of labour market attachment on woman‟s financial satisfaction is observed 
in all countries, we still see institutional variations, especially in terms of the 
effect of part-time and full-time employment. Some countries provide more 
support for part-time work as a way to combine work and family, so that the idea 
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of woman‟s employment in these countries refers rather to part-time employment. 
This is, for instance, the case of Ireland. Also, another interesting feature of these 
results regards the role of homemaking career in various societies. The positive 
impact of homemaking on woman‟s material well-being is visible in the societies 
that belong to three different welfare regimes (Ireland, France and Italy) but are 
still bonded by some common characteristics, probably also by their general 
orientation towards breadwinner instead of dual earner model. As we saw, 
alternative policies may serve for the same goals, and here the welfare regimes 
classification fails to explain the major differences in results, as the countries 
seem to be grouped together also according to some other characteristics. In sum, 
this analysis is an important step to analyse the role of institutions for woman‟s 
well-being, but our results also suggest that the relevant future comparative 
research should perhaps consider applying other institutional classifications or 
even disentangle the institutional components when studying their influence on 
woman‟s choices and their well-being. That would provide scope for further 
clarifications and better understanding of the observed micro-relations. 
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Chapter 5: The type and duration of family union and income sharing: 
the implications for woman’s economic well-being 
 
5.1.   Introduction 
 
As we already mentioned in the introduction of the thesis, another factor 
which reflects the overall change in the role and behaviour of women and her life 
opportunities are new forms of partnerships between men and women. One of 
them is cohabitation. Indeed, cohabitation is, in many countries, quickly replacing 
marriage as „a privileged status signalling adulthood‟ (Thornton, Axinn, and Xie 
2007:308). A rising number of individuals decide to put their relationships on trial 
by living together before marriage while some even opt for a more radical 
arrangement and continue to cohabitate for a long time without changing their 
legal status. Indeed, as different as the patterns of cohabitation may be in different 
geographical settings, the phenomenon has become a symbol of first partnership 
for the young adults (Kiernan 2001). 
These developments have influenced a bulk of research on the relation of 
cohabitation to marriage and the quality differences between the two. While some 
authors point out the superiority of marriage on material, physical and spiritual 
well-being of an individual (Waite 1995), others try to signal personal 
characteristics of cohabitants that account for the gap in quality found between the 
two forms of union (Brown and Booth 1996; Brines and Joyner 1999; Willetts 
2006). Willetts (2006) shows that the legally married and cohabitants are not 
different with respect to a number of measures such as relationship satisfaction or 
perception of equity, although she focuses only on long-term cohabitation that is 
supposed to be the most similar to marriage. Brown and Booth (1996) find lower 
quality in cohabitation even after controlling for demographic characteristics and 
relationship duration but what they discover to predict well the relationship 
quality are marriage plans. Thorton, Axinn and Xie (2007) investigate the reasons 
that motivate a young individual to choose one form of the relationship over the 
other, their origins, characteristics and profile. Thus, the starting point of much of 
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the previous empirical work is to understand whether individual and relationship 
characteristics can explain the observed differences between the unions. If not, the 
legal character of marriage may be the element that brings the change. 
Recently more empirical attention is given to the financial aspects of 
cohabitation as it is one of the dimensions that also distinguishes two forms of 
unions (Winkler 1997; Oropesa, Landale and Kenkre 2003; Heimdal and 
HouseKnecht 2003; Vogler 2005; Vogler, Brockmann and Wiggins 2008; Vogler, 
Lyonette and Wiggins 2008; Lyngstad, Noack and Tufte 2010). Although both are 
believed to enjoy the benefits of the economics of scale (Waite 1995), cohabiting 
couples are thought to be using so called „privatized management system‟ that 
gives more independence to the family members (Vogler 2005) but also offers 
less protection and little income sharing. Accordingly, cohabiting partners majorly 
do not pool financial resources which might have negative implications on the 
economic well-being of the partners, especially when one of them, usually 
woman, earns less (Vogler 2005). The money sharing of cohabiting couples was 
not sufficiently studied in the 1990‟s (Heimdal and HouseKnecht 2003), also 
because cohabitation was still a novelty, whereas interest on income organization 
and sharing in marriage in economics and sociology dates back from as early as 
1960‟s. As research follows reality, and more and more couples choose to cohabit, 
the financial organization of cohabitation becomes central in a comparative view 
with marriage. 
In this chapter, we examine how cohabitation influences woman‟s economic 
well-being and whether it discourages income pooling between family members. 
Rejection of pooling hypothesis for cohabiting couples would be in line with 
bargaining framework and would indirectly imply the use of other than joint 
management system as defined in sociology.
29
 The second goal of this chapter is 
to investigate whether the differences in economic well-being and income pooling 
between married and cohabiting couples come as a result of the joint investments 
in marriage in time or legal protection obtained simply by getting married. The 
question we ask is what matters more- the prospects of long-term investments or 
the actual long-term investments. We compare four welfare regimes, that is, five 
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 More information on the relevant definitions and classifications is given in the first thesis chapter. 
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European countries: Denmark, France, United Kingdom, Italy and Ireland, some 
of which are characterized by higher incidence of cohabitation and the efforts to 
institutionalize it while the others lag behind. Yet, each country has its 
particularities.  
5.2.   Previous findings 
Sociological research on internal organizational structure of married couples 
distinguishes several types of money management systems within the family.
30
 
These systems are lately grouped into systems in which couples behave more as 
single economic units and so called „privatized‟ systems, which assume that each 
partner is a unit on their own, and may decide either to keep finances fully 
separate or contribute partially to the joint account (Vogler 2005). The latter is 
most often found in cohabiting unions. Indeed, one of the main characteristic of 
cohabiting unions is individualism (Brines and Joyner 1999) and as such they tend 
to be based on a more individualistic arrangement of money management. In the 
analysis of British data from ISSP in 1994 and 2002, Vogler, Brockman and 
Wiggins (2006) found that „partial pool‟ where partners contribute one (but equal) 
part of their income to the joint account, is mostly associated with childless 
cohabiting couples. In their other paper (2008), they further analyse how 
management systems differ in various cohabiting unions, concluding that 
cohabiting couples with children are more similar in money management to 
married couples, while keeping money separate or partially separate characterizes 
mostly childless and post-marital cohabiting couples. Others (Brines and Joyner 
1999; Heimdal and Houseknecht 2003; Lyngstad, Noack and Tufte 2010) present 
similar remarks. In some of these studies, „privatized‟ management systems are 
also linked to the lower economic well-being of the partner who earns less 
(Vogler 2005; Vogler, Brockmann, and Wiggins 2006). 
Economic empirical evidence also pointed to the lack of pooling of resources 
among cohabiting couples. Winkler (1997) studies income pooling of American 
cohabiting couples using data from the 1993 Current population survey and 1987 
National survey on families. She concludes that cohabiting couples do not pool 
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 The most basic classification includes female whole wage system, male whole wage system, 
housekeeping allowance system and a joint pooling system, although a growing number of studies add 
another two categories, namely partial pool and independent management. 
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income although she finds exceptions when couples have biological children or 
are in a long-term relationship. What she intends by term „pooling‟ here is, 
however, different from pure joint management of financial resources and it refers 
to spending that is independent of who actually earns income.  
However, in much of the empirical work, the authors do not only consider the 
likelihood of pooling resources but also test the factors that could account for it. 
Once present in the analysis, relevant personal or relationship characteristics may 
provide a broader understanding of what the reasons are for couples not to pool 
their financial resources and whether the legal character of relationship plays an 
important role for sharing. Therefore, the current empirical research includes 
various predictors, from traditional gender ideology and a series of socio-
demographic characteristics (Heimdal and Houseknecht 2003) to the duration of 
relationship and children (Bonke and Uldall-Poulsen 2007; Lyngstad, Noack and 
Tufte 2010). The empirical base for including predictors showing a relationship 
investment comes from Treas (1993) who first investigated how the internal 
organizational structure of marriage may become more efficient, and income 
pooled as a function of joint investment in relationship. She operationalizes 
marriage investment through sunk costs, continuity and metering, all of which are 
representing an investment that has no value in case marriage dissolves. Her 
results showed that marriage investment matters and couples gain on efficiency of 
internal organization with time, that is, they pool their income. The approach that 
she developed was later also applied to cohabiting couples to better understand 
whether and why marriage differs from cohabitation and if the quality differences 
can also be attributed to the joint investments.  
The theoretical stance for the work of Treas (1993) and others is based on the 
theory of Gary Becker, bargaining framework and transaction costs approach. The 
recognition that marriage is a governing structure that may limit the market nature 
of intra-household bargaining is taken from transaction cost theory: similar to the 
firm‟s setting, the marriage related investments such as children, joint property 
and human investments increase certainty, and so the efficiency of internal 
structure by minimizing the transactions costs. Thus, the joint investments add to 
the outcomes of intra-household negotiation by raising the price of marriage and 
the price of the loss in case marriage dissolves. Certainly, this has practical 
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implication on income organization, income sharing and also on the potential 
difference between marriage and cohabitation. 
5.3.   Cohabitation: definition, process and geography 
There is no a single definition of cohabitation and its relationship to marriage. 
Definition-wise it can be regarded as: equivalent to singlehood and a contrast to 
marriage, an equivalent to marriage and a contrast to singlehood, an independent 
alternative to marriage in contrast to being single, a union dependent on the choice 
to marry and a probation, or a first stage in marriage process (Thornton, Axinn 
and Xie 2007:93). First forms of cohabitation took place mostly among formerly 
married and only later it diffused among the young singles. However, the pace of 
diffusion is rather different in various settings, and countries follow separate 
patterns in the evolution of cohabitation. For instance, Kiernan (2001) 
distinguishes four stages in the process of its evolution. In the first stage the 
phenomenon is accepted mostly by the minority. Then in the next stages it is 
regarded a „trial‟- a potential introduction to marriage and an alternative to 
marriage. Finally, in the last stage, the married and the cohabitants are 
„indistinguishable‟ and might have similar legal status, raise children and perform 
other social roles. In this situation, traditional differences in, for instance, age or 
education, religion or traditional values (Nazio 2008) among the married and 
cohabiting couples largely disappear.  
There are societies that are accelerating the diffusion of cohabitation (Nazio 2008; 
Orloff 2002) either through their welfare regime or through other institutional 
features. Here we classify several institutional perspectives on cohabitation for the 
period we analyse: While the United States have high incidence of cohabitation, 
the institutional support is rather scarce. In Europe, „North-South‟ divide (Iacovou 
1998) groups the European forerunners in legalizing cohabitation against the 
followers with poor laws and little progress (Nazio 2008). Others (Kiernan 2001) 
make further distinction within Europe and differentiate between the Nordic 
countries experience (Denmark, Sweden and Finland) and France as leaders in 
cohabitation policies followed by the Uk, Netherlands, Germany and Austria 
where cohabitation is moderate and only partially acknowledged by the law. 
Accordingly, very few cohabiting unions and practically non-existing laws 
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characterize the southern countries and Ireland. Lately, however, rates of 
cohabitation have risen everywhere, and it is possible that countries converge in 
their view and treatment over cohabitation in time.  
 
The evolution of cohabitation in a country may determine family policies, 
change characteristics of cohabitants and influence their behaviour with regards to 
many aspects of personal life. And if countries are more progressive in terms of 
the legislation on cohabiting unions, then the cohabitation in these countries is 
more likely to be similar to marriage than in the others. As previously mentioned, 
out of five countries
31
 in our study, the three of them show progress in legalizing 
cohabitation: Denmark, France and the UK, in such order whereas Ireland and 
Italy are known to be European laggers in the laws on cohabitation.
32
  
5.3.1.   Denmark 
 
The experience of Denmark is intriguing because the law treats cohabiting 
couples equal to married ones when it comes to taxes, social security and 
compensation after the death of the partner (Hamplova 2009) even though there 
are other dimensions of common life such as inheritance or division of property 
after separation that neither Danish law regulates. Denmark has, however, gone 
furthest in giving rights to an individual, regardless if married or cohabiting, 
through the introduction of the „individual principle‟ in 1987 (Lund- Andersen 
1990). 
5.3.2.   France 
 
France has a relatively advanced legislation on cohabitation dating back to the 
19th century, which gives right to the cohabiting partner to even obtain certain 
material protection in case of dissolution of the union. Also, since 1999 unmarried 
couples are encouraged to register their partnerships thanks to the introduction of 
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 The comparison of the five countries relies on the classification of the welfare regimes to which the 
countries belong. However, policy response to cohabitation may also differ within the welfare regime in 
specific national context. 
32
 Another common feature for the two countries in the period analysed is low incidence of 
cohabitation. But, in both Ireland and Italy cohabitation is becoming more prevalent and changes in 
legislation are expected in the upcoming years.  
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the pacte civil de solidarité (PACS). This gives the cohabitants the position in 
welfare rights that are very much equal to those of the marrieds (Nazio 2008:70) 
and also entitles them to similar rights in terms of taxation (Martin and Théry 
2001).
33
 Another feature of the French policy on cohabitation is equal treatment of 
children, independently of whether they live with unmarried or married parents. 
However, as in Denmark neither in France partners have an access to inheritance 
or property if the relationship ends.  
5.3.3.   United Kingdom 
 
United Kingdom does not offer any special status to cohabiting couples and they 
have no rights to maintenance or property after the union ends. Also, cohabiting 
couples pay more tax than married couples. However, they still obtain some rights 
such as in welfare benefits or child support payments and certain protection 
derives from the property principle. 
5.3.4.   Italy 
 
By the Italian law, only the married and the formerly married but separated 
couples are offered protection and defined as „family‟. Thus, cohabitators are 
treated as two single individuals for tax purposes, inheritance, pension rights and 
social security. Still, if there are children in the union, who are recognized by both 
parents, they will enjoy the same rights as children in marriage. Protection to 
cohabiting partners is sometimes granted but on a single case basis. 
5.3.5.   Ireland 
 
In Ireland there is no recognition of the cohabiting unions. Thus, cohabiting 
couples have no property and maintenance rights after the relationship ends. 
Similarly, they do not enjoy tax exceptions which apply to married couples. 
However, the Irish law protects the children of the cohabiting couples, who are 
treated equally in all instances as the children of married parents. If cohabiting 
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 This law was not in place for the whole period we analysed in this study. 
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individuals have a child, they also might be eligible for some social welfare 
benefits.  
5.4.   Hypotheses 
As we saw, cohabitation has characteristics often different from marriage 
either because of the selection of cohabitants into cohabiting unions or due to the 
lack of legal protection of cohabiting couples. Literature suggests (Winkler 1997; 
Oropesa, Landale and Kenkre 2003; Heimdal and HouseKnecht 2003; Vogler 
2005) that one of the aspects in which cohabiting couples differ the most from 
married ones is internal organization of finances and income pooling. This might 
have some (negative) implications for the economic well-being of cohabiting 
partners (Vogler 2005). In this analysis, we expect to find the evidence that 
cohabitation lowers the economic well-being of women in comparison to marriage 
and that cohabiting couples are less likely to pool income than married couples. 
However, here we do not focus directly on the type of financial management 
system that cohabiting couples choose, but rather test whether individual well-
being depends on the proportion of income that one earns, defined often as 
„Beckerian‟ pooling (Bonke and Browning 2009a). Rejection of „Beckerian‟ 
pooling hypothesis would also provide some insight into the potential financial 
organization of the cohabiting couples
34
. Furthermore, we expect to see the same 
trend in all countries analysed here: Denmark, France, the United Kingdom, Italy 
and Ireland but we hypothesize that the trends should be less accentuated in the 
countries where cohabitation is legally closer to marriage. Second, we hypothesize 
that the cohabitants are more likely to experience lower economic well-being and 
are less likely to pool income because their relationship comprises lower level of 
joint investment due to the shorter duration. Thus, we expect to see no difference 
in income pooling and economic well-being between recently marrieds and 
cohabitants, but if they are different, this might imply the role of legal treatment 
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 The term „pooling‟ appears in sociology to mean joint executive control over money, and in 
economics to show that consumption is independent of who actually brings income (Bonke and 
Browning 2009a). Obviously, it is likely that joint control over money equals joint control of 
consumption but as Bonke and Browning argue, the definition can also diverge, since couples can 
jointly manage money while still the higher earner controls the consumption, or alternatively, the 
couples may apply separate management regime but still exercise equal control of consumption. 
However, latest empirical research (Bonke and Uldall-Poulsen 2007; Bonke and Browing 2009a) 
confirms a high correlation between pooling in economics, so called „Beckerian pooling‟ and joint 
pooling system in sociology. In these studies, relative incomes are found to affect the individual control 
over consumption sharing only in the households where joint money management is not a practice.  
 121 
 
of cohabitation. Again, we hypothesize that the difference should be the smallest 
in countries where married and cohabiting couples are more equalized by law, e.g. 
Denmark and France. 
5.5.   Data and variables 
The data for the analysis are drawn from the ECHP (European Community 
Household panel) as a nationally representative panel survey which gathered 
information on a range of socio-economic topics from the 1994-2001. The 
principal advantages of this dataset are a relatively good coverage of the variables 
relevant for the analysis and detailed information on employment and incomes. 
The longitudinal character of the data is important because it enables a partial 
control for subject heterogeneity.  
The analysis is based on heterosexual married and cohabiting couples and is 
limited to women aged 18 to 50, and men aged 18 and above. This choice was 
made to exclude the women in retirement age in all the countries of interest, and 
also choose the time span in which the most of the woman‟s productive and 
reproductive life takes place. The choice of lower age limit was also motivated by 
the presence of cohabitation in relatively young cohorts. 
The total sample after adjustments for the sake of the analysis comprises of 
51609 observations for all five countries, 5285 for Denmark, 12940 for France, 
10322 for the UK, 16817 for Italy and 6245 for Ireland. The sample goes down on 
number in some analysis and the total number of observations may vary by few 
hundreds. 
5.5.1.   Dependent variable 
 
The dependent variable is woman‟s economic well-being. The individual 
well-being can be studied on various individually assignable outcomes, from 
individual income and consumption to leisure time and housework, which are all 
thought to objectively capture individual conditions
35
. However, a growing 
economic and social literature (McBride 2001; Van Praag et al. 2003) recognizes 
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 This is elaborated in more detail in the first thesis chapter. 
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that subjective measures of human well-being may give best judgment of one‟s 
individual conditions (Frey and Stutzer 2002b); consequently, subjective well-
being is more often used as a proxy of the objective situation. Thus, here we focus 
on individual financial satisfaction to measure the woman‟s economic well-being. 
The dependent variable is the probability that a woman will be financially 
satisfied in a given year and it answers the question: „How satisfied are you with 
your financial situation?‟. Scale of responses goes from 1-totally unsatisfied with 
financial situation to 6- totally satisfied with financial situation. The lack of 
(Beckerian) income pooling will be reflected in positive impact of female relative 
income contributions on woman‟s financial satisfaction net of family income.  
5.5.2.   Independent variables 
 
The main independent variables are the following: 
Income share defined as female monetary contributions to the household is a 
ratio of female income and total household income in tenths of percentages. The 
income measure is a sum of work- related and unearned income. 
Cohabitation is a dichotomous variable coded 1 when woman is cohabiting 
and 0 when a woman is married. Marriage is defined as an individual‟s legal 
status in the moment of interview. 
Duration of relationship (marriage) is influential in income allocation 
(Treas 1993). Economic organization of a relationship depends on the length of 
the union as couples bind much more together in time and consequently, simplify 
their financial management (Oropesa, Landale and Kenkre 2003). Unlike long-
term relationships, „short term contracts require frequent negotiation, making it 
risky to accumulate capital (invest)‟ (Pollak 1985: 596). As relationship duration 
is positively correlated with relationship investment and strength, we create a 
variable that takes into account the actual duration of marriage. For the creation of 
this variable, the relationship status was recorded in the first wave in which the 
individual participated. We divide marrieds as 1) recently married, up to one year, 
2) „young‟ marriages, from one up to ten years, 3) „long‟ marriages, from ten 
years and above. The downside of this variable is that it does not account for the 
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duration of cohabiting relationships. In other words, cohabitation is a reference 
category for all the duration related dummies. We have made this choice 
following the empirical evidence which suggests that the major part of 
cohabitations is of a shorter duration (Bumpass and Sweet 1989; Kiernan 2001). 
The interaction terms between income share and cohabitation status as well 
as between income share and marriage duration. 
A range of other variables are expected to account for the differences between 
married and cohabiting couples: 
Household income is a sum of all household entrances including earnings, 
state benefits or private income. The income in euros is logged and lagged to refer 
to the current year given that the ECHP matches current information with the 
income obtained in the previous year.  
Age is included as a continuous variable for both men and women because it 
can affect individual decision to enter one or the other union. There is a 
generational effect in cohabitation as most of the couples that cohabitate in 
Europe are either of a relatively young age or they belong to post-marital 
cohabitation (Kiernan 2001).  
Educational differences: Cohabitation is often seen as a highly egalitarian 
relationship where partners have similar levels of education (Nazio 2008). We 
control for the educational differences by introducing a variable that measures the 
educational gap between the partners. The variable is based on combination of the 
Isced classifications
36
 and includes the following categories: married down- 
woman is better educated than her partner, married up- woman is less educated 
than her partner and homogamous couples, which implies the same level of 
education of the partners. 
Work: Young and emancipated working women are thought to prefer 
cohabiting unions over marriage for the fact that cohabitation implies little 
traditionalism, which is also reflected in a more egalitarian allocation of 
housework (Brines and Joyner 1999). To control for the effect of work on 
                                                          
36
 Isced 0/2- lower secondary education and below, Isced 3-upper secondary education, 5/7–post-
secondary (non -tertiary) and tertiary education. 
 124 
 
relationship choices, here we create several work related dummies: variable 
„working‟ where work is coded 1, a dummy ‟inactive‟, where inactive is coded 1 
whereas the reference category is unemployed. The classification of work statuses 
is based on the ILO classification. 
Children: There is a widespread opinion that children are a strengthening 
component in a relationship. As more cohabiting couples become parents, 
cohabiting unions with children are becoming closer to marriage (Vogler, 
Brockmann and Wiggins 2008; Kiernan 2001). Here we employ a continuous 
variable that measures the number of children in the household irrespective of 
their age or biological relation to the parents. This way we also control for the 
confounding effect of children on the relationship between the cohabitation and 
financial satisfaction. 
Social class of both partners (5 scale ESeC classification) is measured 
according to the five group ESeC
37
 class scheme which includes: managers and 
professionals, intermediate and lower supervisory, small employers and own 
account workers, white collar and blue collar workers
38
. Long-term unemployed
39
 
are treated as a separate category. The class position is a time invariant 
characteristic because it is taken only in the first year available for an individual. 
The variable is chosen because there might be a correlation between cohabitation 
and social class. The link is not a clear cut as some suggest that higher social 
classes are more innovative and as such more open to cohabitation prior to 
marriage (Ermisch and Francesconi 2000), while others claim that cohabitation 
may be a sign of disadvantaged material conditions, so it is more prevalent among 
lower classes (Carlson, McLanahan, and England 2004; Smock, Manning, and 
Porter 2005). Lastly, it is also possible that the diffusion of cohabitation at all 
societal levels might have eliminated some of the initial correlation with class. 
 
Financial hardship is a variable that shows difficulty to make ends meet. It is 
coded 1 when families feel financial hardship and 0 when families do not have 
                                                          
37
 The original ESeC scheme contains 9 classes but for the purpose of our analysis we use a simplified 
version of 5 classes. 
38
 ESeC assigns a class position to an individual by combining information from their employment 
status and occupation. 
39
 Individuals who never worked or whose employment cannot be traced in the dataset 
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problems in making ends meet. It is included because of its potential relation to 
cohabitation as it is suggested that cohabitation can be preferred to marriage also 
for the reasons of material hardship. 
 
Waves control for period effects, e.g current economic conditions 
5.6.   Models 
As we already elaborated, different internal financial organization and 
different paths in income pooling characterize cohabitation and marriage, which is 
why we also expect their diverse effect on individual financial satisfaction 
(economic well-being). The potential difference in financial satisfaction and 
income pooling between the two unions may also be explained by the marriage 
investments reflected in the duration of marriage. 
Multilevel proportional odds model that takes into account the clustered 
nature of the data is used to test the effect of cohabitation and different marriage 
duration on woman‟s financial satisfaction and income pooling. This model gives 
us a cumulative probability that a response is in higher category from the previous 
one that is why is also known as cumulative model for ordinal responses. The 
model has the advantage of correcting for data dependency and heterogeneity by 
clustering responses of the individuals and modelling individual effect. We apply 
episodes as the first level and individual characteristics as the second level. 
In the first stage, we estimate the basic model that includes the variables 
relative income share and the legal (civil) status to determine the impact of both of 
them independently on woman‟s financial satisfaction. The model contains a 
series of control variables such as age of partners, educational difference, social 
class of partners; woman‟s working status, children and family income, financial 
hardship and controls for the waves. Then we enrich the same model with the 
interaction term of legal status by woman‟s monetary contributions, which should 
show the possible differences in pooling behaviour of two types of women. 
As we saw from the previous review, the couples who stay longer together 
are more likely to pool income. Therefore, the effect of marriage on financial 
satisfaction may vary depending on its duration. Thus, we expect to see not only 
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one pattern in the effect of marriage, but also many of them, and we expect that 
some of them would be more similar to the effect of cohabitation. In other words, 
we hypothesize that marriages of various durations do not have the same impact 
on woman‟s financial satisfaction and also have various relations to income share. 
Therefore, our third model attempts to test whether the potential differences 
in pooling income and financial satisfaction between married and cohabiting 
women result from lack of joint investment in cohabitation (potentially due to its 
shorter duration). Therefore, we first add the marriage duration in the model 
followed by several interactions between income share and the marriage duration 
in the next step. 
A separate regression is run for each country to obtain separate predictors for 
all the five institutional contexts.
40
 However, to test the strength of the effects 
among countries, we also run regressions on a pooled sample with dummies for 
each country. These models are not presented here and are available in the 
appendix. 
5.7.   Results 
5.7.1.   Descriptive statistics 
 
Approximately 30% of women in the sample, aged 18-50, cohabitates in 
Denmark, which is around 10-14 % more than in the United Kingdom or France. 
In the Italian sample, only around 1,5% of women cohabitates whereas in the Irish 
data, cohabiting women represent around 4% of all women aged 18-50. These 
figures correspond relatively well to the country ranking and the official OECD 
statistics for the period analysed (table 5.1). 
 
                                                          
40
 Ireland and Uk belong to the liberal welfare regime but they have slightly different legislation on 
cohabitation. 
Table 5.1:Partnerships and prevalence of cohabitation 
All ages from 20 years old Ages 20-34
Country Single living alone Married Cohabiting Other Single living alone Married Cohabiting In parental home Other
Denmark 24.1 40.8 11.5 23.5 33.7 25.4 28.6 7.6 4.8
France 22.8 44.6 14.4 18.2 19.4 21.3 21.8 37.5
Italy 10.8 53.9 2.0 33.2 5.8 30.5 3.0 51.1 9.5
Ireland 10.6 53.4 5.9 30.0 5.5 27.6 13.4 45.2 8.3
UK 14.9 47.3 8.7 29.0 11.4 32.2 22.2 24.7 9.6
Source: OECD Family Database www.oecd.org/els/social/family/database
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Table 5.2 shows the mean and standard deviation of main independent 
variables by type of union for each present country. We ask whether the 
characteristics of married couples are very different from those of cohabiting 
couples and whether the situation varies by countries.  
 
At first look, the figures for Denmark show that respondents who cohabitate 
tend to be younger, with fewer children (or childless), lower educated than 
married couples and with relatively lower incomes. They also slightly differ in 
social position in comparison to married couples who are on average higher up on 
the scale. Surprisingly, in Denmark the picture corresponds to the traditional view 
of marriage in many instances. From the sample data we see that the view of 
marriage as an economic shelter (Vogler 2005) is, to some extent, confirmed. 
However, another possibility as some suggest (Smock, Manning and Porter 2004) 
is that marriage happens when partners think that they have reached certain 
financial and social level. In other words, marriage does not necessarily bring 
economic well-being but economic well-being may be a precondition for marriage 
(Oppenheimer 1988). Interestingly enough, monetary contributions of Danish 
women do not depend on type of union and they are comparatively higher than in 
all other countries. 
The picture for French sample is in some instances similar to the Danish one. 
Still, the difference between the two unions lies in the average monetary 
contributions of cohabiting women that are higher for around 8% than those of 
married women. A higher percentage of cohabiting women in the sample have 
tertiary education while the male respondents show similar education levels with 
their cohabiting peers. As in Denmark, income of married couples is relatively 
higher while married and cohabiting women obtain similar income levels. 
However, here we do not observe significant differences in the social class. The 
French data are peculiar also for more children out of wedlock than in Denmark, 
Uk and Italy and as many as in Ireland. 
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Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics by the type of union and country
Means and S.D of variables Denmark France United Kingdom Italy Ireland
married cohab. married cohab. married cohab. married cohab. married cohab.
% 69,57% 30,43% 82,99% 17,01% 80% 20% 98,45% 1,55% 96,09 % 3,91%
% of woman's income share 44, 87 (13,22) 45,24 (12,44) 30,85 (20,26) 38,21 ( 18,34) 33,66 (18,82) 40,76 (17,31) 23,64 (26,30) 33,56 (28,16) 24,71 (21,52) 35,76 (18,59)
Woman's work status (1=yes)
Employed 0,85 (0,35) 0,74 (0,43) 0,64 (0,48) 0,66 (0,47) 0,75 (0,43) 0,79 (0,41) 0,50 (0,50) 0,63 (0,48) 0,51 (0,50) 0,69 (0,46)
Unemployed 0,05 (0,22) 0,06 (0,25) 0,08 (0,27) 0,12 (0,32) 0 0 0,11 (0,31) 0,10 (0,29) 0,04 (0,19) 0,05 (0,22)
Inactive 0,10 (0,29) 0,19 (0,39) 0,28 (0,45) 0,22 (0,41) 0,24 (0,43) 0,21 (0,41) 0,39 (0,49) 0,27 (0,45) 0,45 (0,50) 0,26 (0,44)
Female income (mean) 18117,92 15379,60 10959,20 11383,33 9649,66 10725,93 5120,45 7249,3 6233,52 8731,69
Female education (1=yes)
Isced 5-7 0,41 (0,49) 0,26 (0,44) 0,24 (0,43) 0,31 (0,46) 0,40 (0,49) 0,54 (0,50) 0,09 (0,28) 0,06 (0,24) 0,15 (0,36) 0,20 (0,40)
Isced 3 0,42 (0,49) 0,54 (0,50) 0,35 (0,48) 0,35 (0,47) 0,14 (0,35) 0,10 (0,30) 0,40 (0,49) 0,44 (0,50) 0,45 (0,50) 0,44 (0,50)
Isced 0-2 0,17 (0,37) 0,20 (0,40) 0,41 (0,49) 0,34 (0,47) 0,45 (0,50) 0,35 (0,48) 0,51 (0,50) 0,5 (0,5) 0,40 (0,49) 0,36 (0,48)
Male Education (1=yes)
Isced 5-7 0,37 (0,48) 0,28 (0,45) 0,23 (0,42) 0,22 (0,42) 0,51 (0,50) 0,54 (0,50) 0,10 (0,30) 0,07 (0,25) 0,18 (0,38) 0,16 (0,37)
Isced 3 0,46 (0,50) 0,53 (0,50) 0,39 (0,49) 0,38 (0,48) 0,13 (0,33) 0,12 (0,33) 0,38 (0,48) 0,41 (0,49) 0,37 (0,48) 0,41 (0,49)
Isced 0-2 0,17 (0,37) 0,19 (0,39) 0,38 (0,48) 0,39 (0,49) 0,36 (0,48) 0,33 (0,47) 0,52 (0,50) 0,52 (0,50) 0,45 (0,50) 0,43 (0,49)
(Selected) Social class-Women (1=yes)
Esec1 0,33 (0,47) 0,24 (0,43) 0,18 (0,39) 0,20 (0,40) 0,28 (0,45) 0,26 (0,44) 0,15 (0,36) 0,19 (0,39) 0,18 (0,38) 0,17 (0,37)
Esec2 0,28 (0,45) 0,24 (0,43) 0,29 (0,45) 0,26 (0,44) 0,23 (0,42) 0,26 (0,44) 0,20 (0,40) 0,17 (0,38) 0,19 (0,39) 0,24 (0,43)
Esec3 0,03 (0,18) 0,01 (0,11) 0,05 (0,23) 0,03 (0,17) 0,04  (0,20) 0,02 (0,14) 0,08 (0,27) 0,08 (0,27) 0,04 (0,19)  0,04 (0,20)
Esec4 0,20 (0,40) 0,26 (0,44) 0,18 (0,38) 0,21 (0,41 ) 0,24  ( 0,43) 0,24 (0,42) 0,05 (0,22) 0,09 (0,28) 0,18 (0,39)  0,21 (0,41)
Esec5 0,13 (0,34) 0,17 (0,38 )  0,15 (0,36 ) 0,15 (0,36 ) 0,13 ( 0,34) 0,11 ( 0,32) 0,18  (0,38) 0,23 (0,42) 0,18 (0,39)  0,22 (0,41)
Missing 0,03 0,08 0,15 0,15 0,08 0,11 0,34 0,24 0,23 0,12
(Selected)Social class-Men (1=yes)
Esec1 0,42 (0,49) 0,30 (0,47) 0,32 (0,46) 0,24 (0,43) 0,38 (0,49) 0,32 (0,47) 0,26 (0,44) 0,30 (0,45) 0,24 (0,42) 0,22 (0,42)
Esec2 0,16 (0,37) 0,20 (0,40) 0,22 (0,41) 0,23 (0,42) 0,16 (0,36) 0,17 (0,37) 0,20 (0,40) 0,1 (0,30) 0,13 (0,34) 0,15 (0,36)
Esec3 0,05 (0,22) 0,04 (0,21) 0,1 (0,29) 0,04 (0,21) 0,14 (0,35) 0,09 (0,29)  0,18 (0,38) 0,21 (0,41) 0,22 (0,42)  0,15 (0,36)
Esec4 0,05 (0,22) 0,08 (0,28) 0,04 (0,19) 0,05 (0,22) 0,04 (0,20)  0,05 (0,22)  0,04 (0,20) 0,03 (0,18) 0,05 (0,21) 0,09 (0,28)
Esec5  0,31 (0,46) 0,34 (0,47) 0,29 (0,46) 0,37 (0,48 ) 0,26 (0,44) 0,29 (0,45)  0,30 (0,46) 0,31 (0,46) 0,34 ( 0,47) 0,34 (0,48)
Missing 0,01 0,04 0,03 0,07 0,02 0,08 0,02 0,05 0,02 0,05
Age-Women 38,31 (6,75) 30,22 (7,13) 38,34 (6,94) 31,95 (7,10) 37,07 (7,20) 29,96 (7,50) 37,84 (7,04) 33,6 (7,06) 38,23 (6,78) 30,21
Age-Men 41,14 (7,47) 32,55 (7,62) 41,12 (7,80) 34,5 (8,08) 39,73 (8,43) 32,47 (8,33) 41,58 (7,84) 38,1 (9,8) 40,67 (7,56) 33,95
Family income 44666 37619,96 34826,73 29057 33561,06 31178,68 20841,3 22762,69 29914,38 27510, 41
Children 1,36 (1,10) 0,77 (0,95) 1,39 (1,11) 1,04 (1,05) 1,29 (1,13) 0,70 (0,98) 1,1 (0,94) 0,69 (0,71) 1,99 (1,38) 1,07 (1,16)
N 3677 1608 10739 2201 8259 2063 16557 260 6001 244
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We turn to the sample of United Kingdom; as in France and Denmark, female 
cohabiting respondents are profiled as relatively younger altogether with their 
partners. They have fewer children and lower household income although their 
personal income exceeds the levels reached by the married women. It is 
interesting that the proportion of highly educated women in the sample of 
cohabitants in the UK and France is higher than in the sample with married 
couples and the tendencies were opposite in Denmark. Similar to France, the 
mean monetary contribution of cohabiting women in the UK sample is higher than 
among married women. 
In the Italian sample, we observe that cohabiting women have higher 
incomes, contribute more to the household finances (almost 10% difference), have 
fewer children and are relatively younger than married women. Still, the female 
age difference between the unions is only four years, whereas in other countries it 
ranges from seven to ten years. This might reflect the structure of cohabitants who 
in Italy enter later into cohabitation (and marriage) and also include a higher 
proportion of separated women in comparison to the women in their first 
relationship. Interestingly, low educated women present almost 50% of married 
women and only 5% of cohabiting women. The relationship between class and 
cohabitation is not very visible as class distribution is relatively similar in both 
unions. The exception is the intermediate and lower supervisory class of men 
which is predominant among the married. Family income is slightly higher among 
cohabiting couples, which is opposite of what we observe in the other countries.  
Finally, in Ireland cohabiting women are younger and with fewer children 
although the average number of children is higher than in the other countries. 
They earn higher income and contribute more to the household than married 
women but they have lower family incomes. As in other reviewed countries, there 
is no a fully clear class pattern in the data. An interesting feature of the Irish and 
Italian sample is inactive women who are comparatively more present in the 
category of married women. 
Parallel comparison of the five countries in terms of socio-economic and 
demographic characteristics of their cohabiting and married couples suggests one 
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common profile for cohabitants rather than five distinct ones. Younger age, fewer 
children, high level of economic independence and lower household income are 
the most dominant common characteristics. In addition, the cohabiting women in 
France and Uk are relatively better educated than married ones. As we saw, 
Danish sample is an exception for the described trends, as married women tend to 
be more educated and earn more. 
5.7.2.   Cohabitation, financial satisfaction and income pooling. 
 
The table 5.3 
41
presents the basic model with the odds ratios in which female 
relative monetary contributions and legal status as major independent variables 
are regressed on financial satisfaction, net of several controls including family 
income. The odds that a woman in Denmark will be more financially satisfied 
versus less, regardless of the cut-points, increase 5% with each 10 % of increase 
in monetary contributions, net of family income. The effect is weak and 
significant at 10% but it still shows that on overall population of women in 
Denmark, the hypothesis of income pooling is rejected which is not the case in 
France, United Kingdom, Italy and Ireland. The odds of being more financially 
satisfied, when woman is cohabiting in Denmark are around 77% as large as the 
odds of married women. Similarly, the odds that a cohabiting woman will be more 
financially satisfied in France and United Kingdom are lower and around 70% as 
large as the odds of married French and British women. Cohabitation seems to be 
closer to marriage in its effect on financial satisfaction in Ireland and Italy, but the 
coefficients are insignificant, either because of the relatively small number of 
cohabiting women, or because there is no difference in the effect. We report the 
coefficients even though we are not able to give explanations that are more 
precise. In addition, our model also contains residual intra class correlation that 
varies from 0,36 to 0,41, which means that still around 40% of unexplained 
variation of financial satisfaction is due to unobserved individual characteristics. 
Therefore, the results are interpreted with caution. 
                                                          
41
 The model presents only selected variables. Full models are given in the appendix. 
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This model shows that marriage is positively related to woman‟s financial 
satisfaction in all countries
42
, that is, it renders higher economic well-being than 
cohabitation. However, testing the strength of the effects among countries
43
, in a 
pooled sample, the negative effect of cohabitation seems to be strongest in 
Denmark with respect to all other countries, which is opposite to what we 
expected according to the similarity of legal status for the two groups. To answer 
the question we posed in the introduction of this chapter, our results suggest that 
the type of union that is the most beneficial for woman‟s financial satisfaction is 
marriage. In the terminology of the organization theory (Williams 1981), the 
marriage seems to be a more efficient governing structure. 
The second model (table 5.4)
44
 tests if cohabiting women pool their income. 
We include the interaction of income share by cohabitation which only slightly 
                                                          
42
 The coefficients for Italy and Ireland show the same trend although less accentuated but the 
coefficients are insignificant. 
43
 The pooled sample includes only Denmark, Uk and France. 
44
 The model shows only selected variables. The full model is presented in the appendix. 
Table 5.3:Random intercept proportional odds model (selected variables)
The regression of cohabitation and income share on financial satisfaction: model 1
Dependent variable Denmark France United Kingdom Italy Ireland
Financial satisfaction Est(95%CI) Est(95%CI) Est(95%CI) Est(95%CI) Est(95%CI)
Fixed part: odds ratios
% of income share 1,05 (0,99, 1,12)* 0,99 (0,97, 1,03) 1,01 (0,97, 1,05) 1,01 (0,99, 1,03) 1,00 (0,96, 1,05)
Family income 2,55 (1,96, 3,31)*** 2,35 (2,05, 2,68)***   3,07 (2,62, 3,58)*** 1,68 (1,57, 1,79)*** 2,29 (1,95, 2,69)***
Children 0,87 (0,80, 0,94)*** 0,95 (0,90, 0 ,99)**   0,80 (0,74, 0,85)*** 0,96 (0,91, 1,01) 0,86 (0,81, 0,92)***
Employment status ᵃ
Working 2,82 (2,13, 3, 76)*** 2,92 (2,48, 3,44)***   1,54 (1,31,  1,80)*** 2,12 (1,82, 2,46)*** 2,15 (1,58, 2,94)***
Inactive 1,72 (1,25, 2,36)***  2,99 (2,53, 3,54)***  ref. 1,86 (1,64, 2,11)*** 2,15 (1,59, 2,90)***
Civil status ᵇ
Cohabitation 0,77 (0,63, 0,93)*** 0,72 (0,62, 0,84)***   0,70 (0,58, 0,82)*** 0 ,89 (0,62, 1,28) 0,90 (0,61, 1,32)
Fixed part: Thresholds
k1: 6,13 3,86 3,20ᶜ 1,45 5,19
k2: 7,56 5,13 5,28 3,20 6,56
k3: 9,14 7,29 8,66 5,20 8,12
k4: 11,19 9,63 12,27 7,55 10,02
k5: 13,89 13,55 10,24 11,84
Random part:
ψ 1,92 (0,16) 1,87 (0,10) 2,26 (0,13) 1,98 (0,09) 2,24 (0.15)
rho 0,37 0,36 0,41 0,37 0,4
Log likelihood - 6841, 47 -16507,085 - 9597, 13 -22864,826 -9314,35
N 5285 12940 10322 16817 6245
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
ᵃ Reference is unemployed in all countries except from the United Kingdom. British data contain only employed and inactive, with the latter as a reference category.
ᵇ Reference is marriage
ᶜ Variable 'Financial satisfaction' has five response categories in the British data
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improves the model. In three countries, Denmark, UK and France, the interaction 
is positive and significant, thus showing that cohabiting women do not pool 
income, while the path for married women is opposite. The interaction term in the 
models for Italy and Ireland is insignificant. Looking into more details, we 
identify four groups of women:  
a. Cohabiting women that possess income 
b. Cohabiting women with no income 
c. Married women with income  
d. And married women with no income.  
 
The odds that a cohabiting woman will be more financially satisfied are 
multiplied by 1.23 for each ten per cent of income share in Denmark. The same 
odds are 1.10 times higher with every 10 % of income share in France and 1.09 
times in the United Kingdom. In this model formulation, net of other effects, the 
pooling hypothesis is not rejected for married women in none of the countries. As 
the results point out, the behaviour of cohabiting women falls well into bargaining 
framework, or in other words, most of the association between income share and 
financial satisfaction is found among cohabiting women. In sum, income share is 
a better predictor of financial satisfaction of cohabiting women than married 
women, which might imply that cohabiting couples actually use other than joint 
management system.
45
 Of course, with this approach we are not able to say which 
internal management structure are implemented by cohabiting couples, but we 
understand that there is a high association between joint pooling and joint control 
over resources. As Bonke and Browning (2009a) suggest, it is more likely that 
relative incomes affect the individual control over consumption sharing in the 
households where joint money management is not a practice. The interactions in 
the pooled model are not significant and there is no difference in the strength of 
pooling among countries. 
 
 
                                                          
45
 See Bonke and Browning (2009a) for more explanations and links between income pooling and 
financial management. 
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In addition, we observe in the model that married inactive women are far 
better off financially. The odds that a cohabiting woman with no income will be 
more financially satisfied are much lower than the same odds for married inactive 
woman. More concretely, predicted odds of financial satisfaction are from two 
(France, Uk) to almost four times (Denmark) higher for married inactive women 
in comparison to cohabiting women when they do not earn any income. This 
result is in line with the literature according to which marriage is a shelter for non-
working women and a source of their status and security (England 2000). In other 
words, cohabitation does not seem to offer equal protection to non-working 
women (Vogler 2005). 
As we saw, both marriage and cohabitation are based on teamwork and 
economics of scale. Still, our first analysis implies that one relationship- marriage 
is more beneficial for women. Why is this so? To test whether higher financial 
satisfaction comes from greater relationship investments as a function of time we 
Table 5.4:Random intercept proportional odds model (selected variables)
The regression of cohabitation and income share on financial satisfaction with the interaction term (cohabitation with income share):model 2
Dependent variable Denmark France United Kingdom Italy Ireland
Financial satisfaction Est(95%CI) Est(95%CI) Est(95%CI) Est(95%CI) Est(95%CI)
Fixed part: odds ratios
% of income share 0,97 (0,91, 1,04) 0,98 (0,95, 1,01) 0,99 ( 0,95, 1,04) 1,01 (0,99, 1,03) 1,00 (0,96, 1,05) 
Family income 2,54 ( 1,96, 3,31)***    2,33 (2,04, 2,66)***   3,07 (2,63, 3,59)*** 1,68 (1,57, 1,79)*** 2,29 (1,95, 2,68)***
Children 0,87 ( 0,80 ,0,94)***   0,95 (0,90, 0,99)**   0,80 (0,75 ,0,84)*** 0,96 (0,91, 1,01) 0,86 (0,81, 0,92)***
Employment status ᵃ
Working 2,81 (2,12, 3,74)***   2,92 (2,48, 3,44)***    1,54 (1,31, 1,81)*** 2,12 (1,83, 2,46)*** 2,16 (1,58, 2,94)***
Inactive 1,72 (1,26, 2,37)***   2,96 (2,50, 3,50)***   ref. 1,86 (1,64, 2,12)*** 2,15 (1,59, 2,91)***
Civil status ᵇ
Cohabitation 0,26 (0,15, 0 ,45)***   0,45 (0,33, 0,60)***   0,48 (0,34, 0,69)*** 0,70 (0,42, 1,19) 0,78 (0,36, 1,68)
Cohabxincomeshare 1,27 (1,13,  1,42)***  1,13 (1,06, 1,21)***  1,10 (1,01, 1,19)** 1,08 (0,96, 1,21) 1,04 (0,87, 1,25)
Fixed part: thresholds
k1: 5,66 3,70 3,17ᶜ 1,45 5,18
k2: 7,09 4,97 5,25 3,2 6,55
k3: 8,67 7,14 8,62 5,20 8,11
k4: 10,72 9,47 12,23 7,55 10,01
k5: 13,42 13,40 10,23 11,83
Random part:
ψ 1,88 (0,15) 1,87 (0,10) 2,25 (0,13) 1,98 (0,09) 2,24 (0,15)
rho 0,36 0,36 0,41 0,37 0,40
Log likelihood -6832,84 -16500,341 -9594,43 -22864,08  -9314,26
N 5285 12940 10322 16817  6245
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
ᵃ Reference is unemployed in all countries except from the United Kingdom. British data contain only employed and inactive, with the latter as a reference category.
ᵇ Reference is marriage
ᶜ Variable 'Financial satisfaction' has five response categories in the British data
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add variables for the married up to 1 year, those married less than 10 and above 
ten years (table 5.5). 
 
Almost hierarchically, the longer the marriage, the higher is the increment on 
financial satisfaction. Thus, it seems that the variation between cohabitation and 
marriage is likely to come from the joint investments in marriage. Still, the 
positive effect of one-year long marriage is present in all countries.
46
 However, in 
Denmark the effect of one-year marriage, although positive, is statistically 
insignificant which could imply the role of legal treatment, which equalizes 
married and cohabiting couples. Thus, the difference between the unions here is 
less visible. As we observe, in other countries legal contract in the form of 
marriage matters from the start, which might have to do also with the stricter 
regulation on cohabiting unions. But, the one year contract brings higher financial 
satisfaction in the UK than in France- second forerunner in cohabitation after 
                                                          
46
 All the relevant coefficients for Italy and Ireland are insignificant and do not show a clear pattern. For 
this reason, we are not able to give more insight into the direction and meaning of the results for these 
two countries. 
Table 5.5:Random intercept proportional odds model (selected variables)
The regression of marriage duration and income share on financial satisfaction :model 3
Dependent variable Denmark France United Kingdom Italy Ireland
Financial satisfaction Est(95%CI) Est(95%CI) Est(95%CI) Est(95%CI) Est(95%CI)
Fixed part: odds ratios
% of income share 1,05 (0,99, 1,12)* 1,00 (0,97, 1,04) 1,01 (0 ,97, 1,05) 1,01 (0,99, 1,03) 1,00 (0,96, 1,05)
Family income 2,56 (1,96, 3,33)***   2,17 (1,86, 2,53)***   3,18 (2,7, 3,74)*** 1,68 (1,57, 1,80)*** 2,30 (1,96, 2,70)***
Children 0,87 (0,80, 0 ,94)***   0,93 (0,88, 0,99) **  0,81 (0,76, 0,87)*** 0,96 (0,91, 1,01) 0,86 (0,81, 0,92)***
Employment status ᵃ
Working 2,79 (2,10, 3,72)***   3,01 (2,48, 3,64)***   1,57 (1,33, 1,85)*** 2,12 (1,82, 2,47)*** 2,15 (1,58, 2,93)***
Inactive 1,66 (1,21, 2,29)***   3,30 (2,70,  4,02)***   ref. 1,87 (1,64, 2,13)*** 2,15 (1,59, 2,91)***
Relationship duration ᵇ
married(1 year) 1,21 (0,95, 1,53) 1,28 (1,02, 1,61)**   1,41 (1,14, 1,75)*** 1,15 (0,78, 1,71) 1,06 (0,68, 1,64)
married(1-10) 1,41 (1,09, 1,82)***   1,37 (1,12, 1,69)*** 1,54 (1,22, 1,96)*** 1,09 (0,76, 1,58) 1,18 (0,77, 1,79)
married(10+) 1,57 (1,14, 2,17)***   1,68 (1,34, 2,10)***   1,49 (1,12, 1,96)*** 1,15 (0,78, 1,70) 1,03 (0,64, 1,66)
Fixed part: thresholds
k1: 6,26 3,34 3,76ᶜ 1,51  5,45
k2: 7,70 4,61 5,87 3,26 6,83
k3: 9,28 6,73 9,25 5,27 8,39
k4: 11,30 9,03 12,89 7,62 10,28
k5: 13,98 12,85 10,33 12,11
Random part:
ψ 1,86 (0,16) 1,79 (0,11) 2,34 (0,14) 2,00 (0,09) 2,25 (0,15)
rho 0,36 0,35 0,41 0,38 0,41
Log likelihood  - 6721, 85 -11925,68 -8989,29 -22437.62 -9285.81
N 5174 9129 9708 16526 6225
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
ᵃ Reference is unemployed in all countries except from the United Kingdom. British data contain only employed and inactive, with the latter as a reference category.
ᵇ Reference is cohabitation.
ᶜ Variable 'Financial satisfaction' has five response categories in the British data
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Denmark. Surprisingly, after testing the relationship in a pooled sample, we get 
that the positive effect of marriage duration is still the strongest in Denmark.
47
  
The results of the interaction between the income share and various marriage 
durations in the final model show that the likelihood of pooling of resources 
increases over time with higher marriage investments in Denmark, France and UK 
(Table 5.6). In other words, as time passes, it is difficult to distinguish between 
the individual and collective contributions and relying more on personal income 
only lowers the odds of higher financial satisfaction. 
 
Again the positive coefficient for monetary contributions of cohabiting 
women suggests that cohabiting women do not pool income. Rejection of pooling 
is also observed for the recently married women in Denmark (the odds ratio is 
1,07). It emerges that these two groups of women in Denmark are after all not that 
different and the real difference comes with the time. The reason for the little 
                                                          
47
 The model with interactions is presented in the appendix. 
Table 5.6:Random intercept proportional odds model (selected variables)
The regression of marriage duration and income share on financial satisfaction with the interaction term (marriage duration with income share): model 4
Dependent variable Denmark France United Kingdom Italy Ireland
Financial satisfaction Est(95%CI) Est(95%CI) Est(95%CI) Est(95%CI) Est(95%CI)
Fixed part: odds ratios
% of income share 1,25 (1,14, 1,38)***   1,11 (1,04, 1,19)***   1,10 (1,02, 1,18)** 1,08 (0,97, 1,22) 1,04 (0,87, 1,25)
Family income 2,56 (1,97, 3,34)***    2,14 (1,83, 2,49)***   3,18 (2,7, 3,74)***  1,68 (1,57, 1,80) *** 2,29 (1,95, 2,70)***
Children 0,86 (0,80, 0,94)***   0,94 (0,89, 0,99)**   0,81 (0,76, 0,87)***  0 ,96 (0,91, 1,01) 0,86 (0,81, 0,92)***
Employment status ᵃ
Working 2,78 (2,09, 3,70)***   3,03 (2,50, 3,67)***    1,57 (1,33, 1,86)***  2,12 (1,82, 2,47)*** 2,16 (1,59, 2,95)***
Inactive 1,67 (1,21, 2,29)***   3,25 (2,66, 3,97)***   ref. 1,87 (1,64, 2,13)*** 2,16 (1,60, 2,92)***
Relationship duration ᵇ
married(1 year) 2,35 (1,08, 5,13)**   1,72 (1,06, 2,81)**   1,55 (0,97, 2,50)*  1,55 (0,87, 2,74) 0,94 (0,38, 2,31) 
married(1-10) 4,05 (1,95, 8,41)***   2,29 (1,57, 3,33)***   2,65 (1,71, 4,12)***  1,36 (0,80, 2,31) 1,43 (0,64, 3,17)
(married(10+) 6,93 (3,44, 13,99)***   2,97 (2,08, 4,24)***   2,19 (1,40, 3,43)***  1,49 (0,86, 2,57) 1,19 (0,52, 2,71)
married(1 year)xinshare 0,86 (0,73, 1,02)*   0,93 (0,83, 1,04)  0,98 (0,88, 1,10)  0 ,91 (0,80, 1,04) 1,03 (0,83, 1,28)
married(1-10)xinshare 0,80 (0,68, 0,92)***   0,88 (0,80, 0,95)***   0,86 (0,78, 0,95)***  0,94 (0,83, 1,06) 0,94 (0,78, 1,14)
married(10+)xinshare 0,72 (0,63, 0,83)***   0,86 (0,80, 0,92)***   0,90 (0,82, 0,99)**  0 ,92 (0,82, 1,04) 0,96 (0,80, 1,16)
Fixed part: thresholds
k1: 6,93 3,64 4,10ᶜ 1,75 5,60
k2: 8,37 4,91 6,22 3,50 6,70
k3: 9,95 7,03 9,60 5,51 8,53
k4: 11,97 9,34 13,24 7,86 10,43
k5: 14,64 13,16 10,57 12,25
Random part:
ψ 1,81 (0,15) 1,80 (0,11) 2,32 (0,14) 2,00 (0,09) 2,24 (0,15)
rho 0,35 0,35 0,41 0,38 0,4
Log likelihood -6710,52 -11917,23 -8984,19 -22436,325  -9285,01
N 5174 9129 9708 16526 6225
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
ᵃ Reference is unemployed in all countries except from the United Kingdom. British data contain only employed and inactive, with the latter as a reference category.
ᵇ Reference is cohabitation.
ᶜ Variable 'Financial satisfaction' has five response categories in the British data
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observed difference between young marriage and cohabitation could be a good 
legal treatment of cohabitation in Denmark that is again consistent with our 
expectations. In other countries, the marriage itself, even if in place for a short 
time, possibly affects the internal organizational structure and income pooling. 
Again, the most interesting result comes when we compare the predicted odds 
of financial satisfaction of non-working women, married for one or more years, 
with the odds of non- working cohabiting women. In Denmark, the ratio of the 
odds between the two groups varies from 2.35 to 6.93 in favour of married women 
although in other countries the range is more moderate. Thus, the longer the 
marriage is, the more secure non-working women are and their financial situation 
is far better than the position of similar non-working cohabiting women. For one 
possible explanation of this phenomenon, we can also recall Becker‟s hypothesis 
of specialization in marriage as a form of investment that is much less common in 
cohabitation (Brines and Joyner 1999). Cohabiting relationships tend to be more 
egalitarian but also provide less protection, because relationship investment is 
lower. 
5.7.3.   Limitations of the data 
 
This analysis is useful to explain the role of marriage for woman‟s economic 
well-being and income pooling. It also directs us to understand the importance of 
legal regulation that regulates cohabitation. However, this research is not without 
its limitations. 
The main disadvantage of the dataset is the lack of data on the length of 
cohabiting unions. Following the research on the duration of cohabiting unions 
(Ermish and Francesconi 1998; Kiernan 2001) that highlights the temporary 
character of cohabitation and its short duration, we take all cohabitants as one 
group assuming that the major part cohabitates for a short time. Some further 
analysis should investigate this dimension better. 
The advantage of the models is the presence of children as a control variable 
due to importance of children for pooled money management. Unfortunately, here 
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we lack information on biological children and potentially the age of children for 
further detailed investigation. 
The third limitation of this work is the lack of data on financial management 
and income mechanisms. We study the problem indirectly through the effect of 
income contributions (income reorganization) on financial satisfaction of 
cohabiting and married women. Our results are suggestive about control of money 
but not conclusive in terms of what the exact (practical) financial arrangement of 
cohabiting couples is. 
5.8.   Discussion and conclusions 
At the start of this chapter, three questions were raised, first, whether 
cohabitation means lower woman‟s economic well-being with respect to marriage 
and if this is so, whether it can be explained by lack of income pooling of 
cohabiting couples. In addition, we ask whether the potential differences between 
the unions are due to the lower investments in cohabitation or legal contract that 
binds married people. We compared European countries, which belong to four 
different welfare regimes; they have different incidence of cohabitation and share 
various legal views of it. We also assumed that the relative resources of partners 
are more likely to matter in the relationship characterized by lower investments 
and low collective values, which is reflected in its length. Therefore, we expected 
that marriage as a contract does not bring any additional value and that the major 
influence on economic well-being comes from the long term investment in the 
relationship. 
Our analysis gave us several indications. As hypothesized, we discovered that 
marriage is more likely to bring higher economic well-being than cohabiting 
union and that cohabitants are more likely to rely on market based exchanges and 
bargaining for control of resources. Therefore, the income in cohabiting unions is 
not pooled but the character of our data did not permit us to look into specific 
income management systems and suggest what really happens with the income 
organization in the household. 
Furthermore, we show that the differences in the effect on woman‟s economic 
well-being between cohabiting and married couples mostly result from the time 
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component and joint investments. But, we also observe that legal contract raises 
the cost of the relationship as well, and influence income pooling especially in the 
countries where legal status of cohabitants is more unequal. For instance, in 
Denmark the differences in economic well-being between cohabitation and recent 
marriage are hardly observable and in France, they are lower than in the UK. 
However, the results for Denmark are also surprising in their own way as they 
show that the major positive effect of marriage comes with duration, increasing 
significantly the gap between the unions, which is relatively small or inexistent 
when marriage is „young‟. Indeed, the duration effect of marriage is the strongest 
in Denmark with respect to all other countries in the analysis.  
Another important implication of these results relates to the position of non-
working women in cohabiting unions. The cohabitants and the married have often 
different perception of what equality is and whether it means equal contributions 
or equal access to financial resources: the literature on internal financial 
organization of cohabiting couples reports the use of privatized systems of money 
management in cohabitation, which are based on 50%-50% contributions by the 
partners. And this system functions fairly well if contributing equally is not a 
burden for any of the members. In addition, cohabiting unions tend to be even 
more beneficial for women in the sense that the woman is more independent in 
her decisions and her expenditures. But as Vogler  (2005:18) argues in her study, 
in privatized systems „when one partner earns more than the other, the higher 
earner (usually the male partner), tended (tends) to have more control over money 
as well as greater access to the money for their own use‟. In other words, if a 
woman earns no or low income, the principle of independent finances means that 
she cannot rely on her partner as much, so she will be worse off financially in 
comparison to the married women. This is the situation when the cohabitation 
becomes less beneficial for a woman. Moreover, marriage as a legal concept 
traditionally relies on specialization and trading (Brines and Joyner 1999), while 
cohabiting unions are seen as new equal partnerships. In such context, it is more 
likely that being out of the labour market is less of a disadvantage for a married 
woman who may specialize in domestic work than for a woman who cohabitates. 
Our models certainly support this theoretical view in more than one geographic 
context. 
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To sum up, this chapter showed us that the legal character of marriage as 
an „initial investment‟ is more important in the countries where legal burden of 
marriage is high. In addition, independently of geographical setting, the marriage 
contract matters for non-working women for it offers them better economic 
security. As of the rest, the principle component that explains negative impact of 
cohabiting unions on woman‟s economic well-being and income pooling, as our 
analysis suggests, is not the idea of long-term investment in the form of contract 
but the investment itself. 
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Chapter 6: Concluding remarks 
In this work we have analysed the relation of woman‟s economic 
independence and her choice of partnership with economic well-being. The 
economic independence is reflected in the ownership of personal income and 
employment patterns while the choice of partnerships refers to the two forms of 
unions: marriage and cohabitation. We regard these three conditions (women‟s 
earning capacity, woman‟s employment and new ways of partnering) an outcome 
of overall change in the role and behaviour of women outside of the family, and as 
such, important for women‟s behaviour within family, in terms of bargaining 
power, decision making and their welfare. In studying the topic, we have applied 
the perspective of unified social science, trying to overcome the traditional 
divisions between the relevant economic and sociological theory. 
We started by introducing the theoretical framework for the topic: several 
approaches in the rational choice economic theory and sociological literature were 
outlined in order to understand how the effects of income, work and unions on 
economic well-being of women have been studied in the past. We explained that 
first models of family behaviour (Parsons, Becker) considered the economic well-
being of women always equal to their partners‟ economic well-being; in this view, 
the intra-household distribution of well-being is independent of individual 
contributions. We also considered critiques to the first outlined approach moving 
to the second important group of theories within resource bargaining perspective. 
The second theoretical perspective largely considers woman‟s personal 
achievements and individual characteristics when explaining the woman‟s 
economic well-being. Indeed, a large part of our work relied on this view, on both 
the economic bargaining theories, and their sociological equivalent. However, we 
argued that only individual factors are not able to fully explain woman‟s 
economic well-being; thus, we incorporated in our theoretical framework another 
important stance, namely, the transaction costs approach, which highlights the 
role of union for woman‟s economic well-being. In other words, the individual 
characteristics of a woman are accompanied by a set of collective features in 
explaining her economic well-being. These factors were also considered in our 
work. Finally, we argued that micro-processes are not independent of the context 
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in which they take place suggesting that institutional characteristics intervene also 
in the association between women‟s individual and collective features and their 
economic well-being.  After having elaborated on the different criteria which are 
used to group countries of various institutional characteristics, we have chosen a 
welfare regime typology to present our institutional context. 
Our next step was to choose the adequate definition of well-being that 
would be used throughout our work. We reviewed the most popular concepts of 
well-being in socio-economic research starting from those which rely on revealed 
behaviour and moving towards subjective measures of human well-being. We 
have also discussed the advantages and disadvantages of some of the measures 
which we found the most influential in the applied research. Finally, we chose to 
focus on a concept of subjective well-being, which reflects individual financial 
satisfaction, because it captures a complex set of socio-economic conditions 
behind woman‟s economic well-being. 
Then we summarized the relevant empirical literature to finally define our 
main research hypotheses. We started with the hypotheses which were derived 
from economic bargaining theories, then we enriched them with the sociological 
perspective on the role of woman‟s employment and career prospects, while the 
last set of hypotheses considered also the role of union, eg. marriage on woman‟s 
economic well-being. We also incorporated an institutional perspective by 
including the hypotheses which tested for the difference between welfare regimes. 
However, these general hypotheses were followed with a set of narrow hypotheses 
specific to the each empirical chapter. In sum, in this work we hypothesized that: 
H1:The financial satisfaction of a married woman is positively related to 
her economic contributions to the family.  
H2:The positive impact of woman‟s economic contributions on her 
financial satisfaction will vary by the welfare regime. 
H3:Woman‟s financial satisfaction is positively related to her work 
commitment and bright career prospects. 
 142 
 
H4:We expect that the positive relation between woman‟s career and her 
financial satisfaction will differ among countries that belong to various 
welfare regimes. 
H5:Cohabitation is negatively related to the woman‟s financial 
satisfaction. 
H6:There is a differential impact of cohabitation on woman‟s financial 
satisfaction based on the country context and welfare regime. 
H7:Cohabiting women are less likely to pool the money within the 
household. 
H8:Lack of money pooling within household among cohabiting couples 
will vary with the country context and welfare regime. 
Once we defined our conceptual framework, we moved to the 
operationalization of our research questions. The operational measures that refer 
to the financial satisfaction were presented, as well as the methodological 
framework for the analysis. This work relied on the longitudinal data (of  
European Community Household Panel), which helped us control some of the 
problems to which subjective measures are especially sensitive, such as systematic 
bias due to unobserved individual characteristics. The character of data also 
allowed us to apply dynamic modeling in order to partially treat endogeneity 
issues relevant for our research. We applied two types of models within multilevel 
technique namely logistic random intercept model and proportional odds model. 
Finally, we also selected countries for our comparative analysis including Italy, 
Ireland, Uk, Denmark, France to represent Mediterranean, Liberal, Socio-
Democratic and Conservative welfare regimes. 
Our work pointed to several important conclusions.  In the analysis of the 
effect of woman‟s income ownership on her economic well-being we found that 
our first main hypothesis was confirmed: the economic independence reflected in 
material resources is positive for married and cohabiting women and leads to their 
higher level of economic well-being. This conclusion was also in line with the 
economic bargaining theories which were our starting point. Our second 
hypothesis, however, regarded the role of welfare regimes in the relationship 
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between ownership of resources and financial satisfaction. We asked if money is 
more likely to influence woman‟s financial satisfaction in some welfare regimes 
rather than in the others. More specifically, we assumed that in more egalitarian 
welfare regimes (Liberal and Socio-Democratic regime) income is less important 
as a bargaining instrument than in conservative and familialistic model. The 
results of our analysis confirmed that welfare regimes have the potential to change 
the strength of the relationship between personal money and well-being, but 
probably not in our expected direction. Indeed, countries were grouped according 
to the criteria that go beyond the typology of the welfare regimes. Thus, we 
concluded that country context does matter but we needed a more detailed 
analysis of female working patterns and employment in order to understand the 
direction of the welfare regime‟s impact. This was one of the reasons why in the 
next chapter we widened our theoretical perspective analyzing not only woman‟s 
achievements in the forms of income, but rather a complex set of employment 
relations in which they are involved. Our view was that not only income matters 
for woman‟s well-being but also other non-income related factors, which 
potentially influence woman‟s position in the household. Our theoretical 
perspective derived from the theories of Gerson (1985, 1993) and Hakim (2000) 
and we expected that the effect of welfare regimes would be easier to track when 
taking into account also the form of female employment. Therefore, we looked for 
the confirmation of our third hypothesis on the role of work commitment and 
career prospects for woman‟s financial satisfaction.  
In our analysis, we showed that woman‟s labour market attachment 
reflected through her career prospects and continuous employment positively 
influences her welfare (financial satisfaction) confirming, thus, our initial view. 
However, the results also gave us some surprises especially in terms of the effect 
of some career choices on women. For instance, „marriage‟ career emerges as a 
powerful predictor of woman‟s financial satisfaction as well. Another surprise 
came from our comparative analysis: while we studied the effect of institutional 
context we also had certain expectations of how particular welfare regimes should 
affect micro-relations, based on their influence on woman‟s employment. 
However, even though institutional context in the form of welfare regimes turned 
important, the variation in results was not easy to explain also because it seemed 
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that the countries might have been grouped together according to some other 
criteria rather than welfare regime.  In all the analyses we found that, for instance, 
Ireland is more similar to Italy than to the Uk, even though it belongs to the liberal 
welfare regime. Thus, we concluded that it is important to analyse the role of 
institutions for intra-household relations and individual welfare but we suggested 
that there might be some other typologies that better cover the observed relations.  
 Finally, in the last chapter, we moved from the analysis of the 
effect of woman‟s individual achievements towards our hypotheses on the role of 
union for woman‟s well-being. We parted by outlining the approaches which 
suggest the superiority of marriage over cohabitation for woman‟s well- being 
(Waite 1995; Vogler 2005) and we also investigated the reasons for such prevalent 
view. We found that one of the reasons for this view was also the differences in 
income sharing between married and cohabiting couples, which were found to be 
substantial.  The results of our analysis were the following: we discovered that 
marriage is more likely to bring higher economic well-being than cohabiting 
union and that cohabitants are more likely to rely on market based exchanges and 
bargaining for control of resources. In other words, individual financial resources 
are of greater importance for the well-being of cohabiting than married women. 
The results were further elaborated by inclusion of other potentially important 
variables, such as duration of marriage, as we attempted to test whether the 
differences we observed were due to the lower relationship investment. In this, we 
relied on the premises of transaction cost approach. Similarly to the previous 
results, we also found the role of institutions in the observed relations. Each 
country was studied in the context of current legislation on cohabitation, which is 
not only specific to the welfare regime but also to each country.  
To conclude, in our analysis of the effect of income, work and union on 
woman‟s financial satisfaction we discovered that our theoretical frameworks 
relatively well explained the observed relations. Most of our hypotheses were 
confirmed, both general and specific. Still, a weakness in our theoretical 
framework might have been the choice of the welfare regime typology as we 
thought that it was not able to fully explain the observed differences. And, even 
when the welfare regime typology offered the sufficient information for 
explanations, the complexity of institutional factors did not allow us to understand 
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which policies or components influenced the most the associations we studied. 
Therefore, we suggest that this study was important to provide a first insight into 
the international differences of the link between income, work and union with 
financial satisfaction (for women), but the next analyses would be richer if they 
either apply a more adequate country typology or analyse the separate effect of 
each relevant institutional component on the micro relations. 
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48
 The appendix includes the tables that were not reported in the main text as well as the complete 
version of the models presented only with selected variables. 
Table A1:Logistic random intercept regression: estimated odds ratios
The regression of career prospects on woman's financial satisfaction (the table refers to the table 4.6)
Model 2:  
Fin. Sat. Italy Denmark France UK Ireland
Variables OR (std.error) Or.( Std.Error) Or.( Std.Error) Or.( Std.Error) Or.( Std.Error)
Fixed part
Woman's income share 1,03 (0,01)*** 1,14 (0,04)*** 1,00 (0,02) 1,08 (0,03)*** 0,98 (0,02)
Family income 2,07 (0,1)*** 2,93 (0,52)*** 2,47 (0,21)*** 3,79 (0,44)*** 3,08 (0,31)***
Managers&Professionals 1,87 (0,21)*** 1,56 (0,31)** 1,34 (0,19)** 1,19 (0,22) 1,68 (0,31)***
Intermediate 1,65 (0,17)*** 1,63 (0,31)** 1,09 (0,14) 1,10 (0,20) 1,68 (0,28)***
Small employers 1,25 (0,17)* 0,86 (0,33) 0,81 (0,16) 1,29 (0,39) 1,71 (0,49)*
White collar (ref. blue collar) 1,25 (0,19) 1,4 (0,27)* 1,03 (0,14) 1,02 (0,18) 1,37 (0,23)*
Long-term unemployed 0,58 (0,08)*** 0,97 (0,53) 0,61 (0,15)** / 0,48 (0,24)
Missing cat. 1,12 (0,11) 0,75 (0,24) 1,25 (0,18) 1,13 (0,26) 1,08 (0,18)
Age 0,99 (0,004) 1,04 (0,01)*** 0,98 (0,005)*** 0,98 (0,01)*** 1,00 (0,01)
Number of children 1,00 (0,03) 0,90 (0,05)** 0,97 (0,03) 0,80 (0,04)*** 0,87 (0,03)***
Married up (ref.=hom) 1,32 (0,1)*** 1,01 (0,14) 0,97 (0,08) 1,03 (0,11) 1,15 (0,13)
Married down 1,13 (0,09) 1,21 (0,16) 0,90 (0,08) 0,95 (0,12) 1,09 (0,12)
Married (ref.=coh) 1,22 (0,26) 1,38 (0,18)** 1,44 (0,14)*** 1,42 (0,18)*** 1,09 (0,25)
Financial hardship (1=yes) 0,17 (0,01)*** 0,11 (0,01)*** 0,07 (0,004)*** 0,01 (0,001)*** 0,22 (0,02)***
Wave 2 (ref.=wave1) 1,05 (0,07) 0,77 (0,11)* 0,83 (0,07)** 1,17 (0,15) 1,01 (0,11)
Wave 3 0,79 (0,06)*** 0,69 (0,11)** 0,85 (0,07)* 0,98 (0,13) 0,85 (0,09)
Wave4 0,67 (0,05)*** 0,95 (0,16) 0,95 (0,09) 1,07 (0,15) 1,00 (0,12)
Wave5 1,04 (0,08) 0,73 (0,12)** 0,96 (0,09) 1,26 (0,17)* 0,87 (0,11)
Wave6 1,08 (0,08) 0,62 (0,10)*** 0,92 (0,09) 1,20 (0,17) 0,80 (0,11)
Wave7 1,04 (0,08) 0,53 (0,09)*** 1,02 (0,1) 0,88 (0,13) 0,74 (0,11)**
Random part
ψ 1,8 (0,11) 1,8 (0,23) 2,14 (0,15) 2,74 (0,24) 1,88 (0,19)
Log likelihood -9220,45 -2170,97 -6431,24 -3472,06 -3434,57
N. 17482 5815 13485 10394 6344
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
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Table A2: Logistic random intercept regression: estimated odds ratios
The regression of career prospects and work commitment on woman's financial satisfaction(the table refers to the table 4.7)
Model 4:  
Fin. Sat. Italy Denmark France UK Ireland
Variables OR (std.error) Or.( Std.Error) Or.( Std.Error) Or.( Std.Error) Or.( Std.Error)
Fixed part
Woman's income share 1,02 (0,02) 1,05 (0,05) 0,98 (0,02) 1,01 (0,03) 0,99 (0,03)
Family income 2,05 (0,12)*** 3,48 (0,77)*** 2,23 (0,21)*** 3,6 (0,51)*** 2,98 (0,36)***
Remaining employed (ref. Int) 1,59 (0,16)*** 1,92 (0,30)*** 1,66 (0,17)*** 1,32 (0,21)* 1,34 (0,19)**
Remaining unemployed 0,60 (0,09)*** 0,39 (0,14)** 0,48 (0,1)*** / 0,70 (0,32)
Remaining inactive 1,54 (0,14)*** 0,84 (0,19) 1,58 (0,19)*** 0,69 (0,12)** 1,34 (0,19)**
Managers&Professionals 1,74 (0,23)*** 1,19 (0,27) 1,21 (0,20) 1,06 (0,23) 1,53 (0,33)**
Intermediate 1,51 (0,18)*** 1,35 (0,30) 1,03 (0,15) 0,88 (0,18) 1,70 (0,33)***
Small employers 0,97 (0,15) 0,60 (0,25) 0,68 (0,15)* 1,39 (0,48) 1,84 (0,61)*
White collar (ref. blue collar) 1,25 (0,22) 1,23 (0,27) 0,93 (0,14) 0,91 (0,18) 1,20 (0,23)
Long-term unemployed 0,76 (0,13) 1,31 (1,01) 1,07 (0,32) / 0,59 (0,38)
Missing cat. 1,02 (0,12) 0,85 (0,32) 1,15 (0,20) 1,5 (0,41) 1,00 (0,19)
Age 0,99 (0,01)** 1,03 (0,01)*** 0,97 (0,01)*** 0,98 (0,01)*** 1,00 (0,01)
Number of children 1,00 (0,04) 0,9 (0,06)* 0,96 (0,04) 0,82 (0,04)*** 0,85 (0,04)***
Married up (ref.=hom) 1,36 (0,11)*** 1,19 (0,19) 0,97 (0,1) 1,13 (0,14) 1,19 (0,16)
Married down 1,15 (0,10) 1,14 (0,17) 0,875 (0,09) 0,97 (0,14) 1,09 (0,14)
Married (ref.=coh) 1,49 (0,43) 1,33 (0,21)* 1,33 (0,15)** 1,29 (0,21) 1,02 (0,32)
Financial hardship (1=yes) 0,15 (0,01)*** 0,11 (0,01)*** 0,07 (0,01)*** 0,01 (0,001)*** 0,22 (0,02)***
Wave 2 (ref.=wave7) 1,06 (0,09) 1,64 (0,29)*** 0,80 (0,08)** 1,26 (0,21) 1,29 (0,21)
Wave 3 0,79 (0,07)*** 1,68 (0,30)*** 0,81 (0,08)** 1,04 (0,17) 1,11 (0,17)
Wave4 0,67 (0,06)*** 2,04 (0,38)*** 0,90 (0,09) 1,19 (0,19) 1,31 (0,20)*
Wave5 1,04 (0,09) 1,34 (0,24)* 0,92 (0,1) 1,4 (0,22)** 1,15 (0,18)
Wave6 1,11 (0,09) 1,26 (0,22) 0,89 (0,1) 1,3 (0,20)* 1,10 (0,18)
Random part
ψ 2,004 (0,14) 1,67 (0,26) 2,27 (0,18) 2,89 (0,29) 2,047 (0,23)
Log likelihood -6994,1 -1549,89 -4888,47 -2571,29 -2592,32
N. 13507 4253 10299 8027 4774
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
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Table A3: Logistic random intercept regression: estimated odds ratios
The regression of career prospects and work commitment on woman's financial satisfaction (the table refers to the table 4.8)
Model 5:  
Fin. Sat. Italy Denmark France UK Ireland
Variables OR (std.error) Or.( Std.Error) Or.( Std.Error) Or.( Std.Error) Or.( Std.Error)
Fixed part
Woman's income share 1,01 (0,02) 1,04 (0,05) 0,96 (0,02) 1,03 (0,04) 0,99 (0,03)
Family income 2,1 (0,12)*** 3,29 (0,73)*** 2,08 (0,20)*** 3,1 (0,53)*** 3,03 (0,37)***
Remain full time (ref. Int) 1,79 (0,19)*** 2,03 (0,34)*** 1,86 (0,22)*** 1,58 (0,36)** 1,25 (0,23)
Remaining part-time 1,26 (0,20) 1,47 (0,35) 1,77 (0,28)*** 1,26 (0,35) 1,46 (0,25)**
Remaining unemployed 0,60 (0,09)*** 0,40 (0,14)** 0,49 (0,1)*** / 0,71 (0,33)
Remaining inactive 1,55 (0,14)*** 0,84 (0,19) 1,6 (0,20)*** 0,76 (0,16) 1,37 (0,19)**
Trans full/part-time 1,59 (0,23)*** 2,09 (0,55)*** 1,63 (0,31)*** 1,92 (0,70)* 1,44 (0,31)*
Managers&Professionals 1,61 (0,21)*** 1,19 (0,27) 1,15 (0,19) 1,19 (0,3) 1,45 (0,31)*
Intermediate 1,46 (0,18)*** 1,37 (0,30) 0,99 (0,14) 0,99 (0,24) 1,69 (0,32)***
Small employers 0,93 (0,14) 0,61 (0,26) 0,69 (0,16) 1,56 (0,65) 1,89 (0,63)*
White collar (ref. blue collar) 1,22 (0,21) 1,25 (0,28) 0,91 (0,14) 1,037 (0,25) 1,18 (0,22)
Long-term unemployed 0,77 (0,13) 1,34 (1,02) 1,11 (0,33) / 0,58 (0,38)
Missing cat. 1,02 (0,12) 0,87 (0,32) 1,11 (0,19) 1,68 (0,50)* 1,00 (0,19)
Age 0,99 (0,01)** 1,03 (0,01)*** 0,97 (0,01)*** 0,97 (0,01)*** 1,00 (0,01)
Number of children 1,00 (0,04) 0,90 (0,06)* 0,98 (0,04) 0,85 (0,06)** 0,85 (0,04)*
Married up (ref.=hom) 1,36 (0,12)*** 1,21 (0,19) 0,95 (0,1) 1,02 (0,15) 1,20 (0,16)
Married down 1,18 (0,10)* 1,11 (0,17) 0,90 (0,1) 0,85 (0,14) 1,12 (0,14)
Married (ref.=coh) 1,45 (0,43) 1,31 (0,21)* 1,33 (0,16)** 1,33 (0,25) 1,01 (0,31)
Financial hardship (1=yes) 0,15 (0,01)*** 0,12 (0,01)*** 0,07 (0,01)*** 0,009 (0,001)*** 0,22 (0,02)*
Wave 2 (ref.=wave7) 1,07 (0,09) 1,65 (0,29)*** 0,80 (0,09)** 1,22 (0,24) 1,32 (0,21)*
Wave 3 0,79 (0,07)*** 1,70 (0,31)*** 0,80 (0,09)* 0,95 (0,19) 1,11 (0,18)
Wave4 0,68 (0,06)*** 2,05 (0,39)*** 0,89 (0,10) 1,04 (0,20) 1,3 (0,20)
Wave5 1,05 (0,09) 1,39 (0,25)* 0,87 (0,10) 1,32 (0,25) 1,13 (0,18)
Wave6 1,11 (0,1) 1,3 (0,23) 0,88 (0,10) 1,35 (0,25) 1,09 (0,18)
Random part
ψ 2,00 (0,14) 1,61 (0,26) 2,26 (0,19) 2,98 (0,37) 1,96 (0,23)
Log likelihood -6854,96 -1538,71 -4481,58 -1792,24 -2522,59
N. 13218 4197 9334 5715 4623
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
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Table A4:Random intercept proportional odds model (coefficients)
The regression of cohabitation (marriage duration) and income share on financial satisfaction:  France
 (The table refers to the tables 5.3 to 5.6)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Financial satisfaction
Woman's Income share -0.000 -0.022 0.001 0.108***
(0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.032)
Working 1.071*** 1.072*** 1.102*** 1.107***
(0.084) (0.084) (0.098) (0.098)
Inactive 1.096*** 1.085*** 1.193*** 1.178***
(0.086) (0.086) (0.102) (0.102)
age_f -0.001 -0.002 -0.004 -0.006
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Household income 0.853*** 0.846*** 0.773*** 0.761***
(0.069) (0.069) (0.078) (0.078)
Financial hardship -2.103*** -2.104*** -2.246*** -2.247***
(0.052) (0.052) (0.062) (0.062)
Number of children -0.054** -0.052** -0.070** -0.062**
(0.026) (0.026) (0.029) (0.030)
Married up -0.025 -0.025 0.043 0.039
(0.069) (0.069) (0.082) (0.082)
Married down -0.041 -0.042 0.009 0.005
(0.071) (0.071) (0.085) (0.085)
Cohabitation -0.328*** -0.803***
(0.078) (0.151)
Long term unemployed_f -0.338 -0.334 -0.486** -0.488**
(0.208) (0.208) (0.224) (0.224)
ESeC 1_f 0.137 0.138 0.110 0.114
(0.121) (0.122) (0.130) (0.130)
ESeC 2_f 0.049 0.047 0.065 0.065
(0.106) (0.106) (0.111) (0.111)
ESeC3_f -0.258 -0.255 -0.227 -0.232
(0.171) (0.171) (0.180) (0.180)
ESeC4_f -0.036 -0.037 0.005 0.004
(0.112) (0.112) (0.117) (0.117)
Missing 0.099 0.083 0.119 0.084
(0.124) (0.124) (0.132) (0.133)
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Long-term unemployed_m -0.505*** -0.517*** -0.407** -0.436**
(0.151) (0.151) (0.191) (0.192)
ESeC 1_m 0.228*** 0.226*** 0.274*** 0.267***
(0.078) (0.078) (0.089) (0.089)
ESeC 2_m 0.019 0.019 0.036 0.036
(0.067) (0.067) (0.078) (0.078)
ESeC3_m 0.254** 0.247** 0.145 0.135
(0.109) (0.109) (0.123) (0.123)
ESeC4_m -0.029 -0.022 0.028 0.035
(0.137) (0.137) (0.156) (0.157)
Missing 0.018 0.013 0.142 0.125
(0.128) (0.128) (0.158) (0.158)
Age_m -0.022*** -0.021*** -0.024*** -0.022***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
wave2 -0.256*** -0.254*** -0.253*** -0.251***
(0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059)
wave3 -0.294*** -0.291*** -0.285*** -0.282***
(0.061) (0.061) (0.062) (0.062)
wave4 -0.176*** -0.172*** -0.168** -0.164**
(0.064) (0.064) (0.066) (0.066)
wave5 -0.180*** -0.174*** -0.028 0.016
(0.067) (0.067) (0.147) (0.147)
wave6 -0.077 -0.070 -0.079 -0.047
(0.067) (0.067) (0.125) (0.125)
wave7 -0.020 -0.012 0.113 0.145
(0.069) (0.069) (0.129) (0.130)
cohabshare 0.124***
(0.034)
married (1year) 0.247** 0.545**
(0.117) (0.248)
married(1-10year) 0.316*** 0.829***
(0.105) (0.192)
married( 10+) 0.519*** 1.088***
(0.114) (0.182)
married (1year)xshare -0.072
(0.059)
married(1-10year)xshare -0.132***
(0.043)
married( 10+)share -0.152***
(0.038)
Observations 12940 12940 9129 9129
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table A5:Random intercept proportional odds model (coefficients)
The regression of cohabitation (marriage duration) and income share on financial satisfaction:  Ireland
(The table refers to the tables 5.3 to 5.6)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Financial satisfaction
Woman's Income share 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.043
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.092)
Working 0.768*** 0.769*** 0.766*** 0.772***
(0.158) (0.158) (0.158) (0.158)
Inactive 0.764*** 0.766*** 0.766*** 0.770***
(0.154) (0.154) (0.154) (0.154)
age_f 0.009 0.009 0.011 0.011
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015)
Household income 0.828*** 0.827*** 0.831*** 0.831***
(0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082)
Financial hardship -1.365*** -1.364*** -1.354*** -1.354***
(0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068)
Number of children -0.145*** -0.145*** -0.146*** -0.145***
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032)
Married up 0.066 0.066 0.059 0.058
(0.098) (0.098) (0.098) (0.098)
Married down 0.074 0.076 0.071 0.068
(0.092) (0.092) (0.092) (0.092)
Cohabitation -0.108 -0.250
(0.196) (0.393)
Long term unemployed_f -0.348 -0.354 -0.317 -0.304
(0.483) (0.483) (0.484) (0.484)
ESeC 1_f 0.216 0.218 0.210 0.213
(0.171) (0.171) (0.171) (0.171)
ESeC 2_f 0.261* 0.262* 0.258 0.258
(0.158) (0.158) (0.158) (0.158)
ESeC3_f 0.116 0.117 0.118 0.117
(0.264) (0.264) (0.265) (0.264)
ESeC4_f 0.161 0.161 0.159 0.162
(0.157) (0.157) (0.158) (0.157)
Missing 0.055 0.054 0.075 0.080
(0.159) (0.159) (0.160) (0.161)
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Long-term unemployed_m -1.008*** -1.009*** -1.008*** -1.012***
(0.196) (0.196) (0.196) (0.196)
ESeC 1_m 0.509*** 0.510*** 0.513*** 0.513***
(0.113) (0.113) (0.113) (0.113)
ESeC 2_m 0.247** 0.249** 0.248** 0.248**
(0.113) (0.113) (0.113) (0.113)
ESeC3_m 0.333*** 0.333*** 0.332*** 0.333***
(0.112) (0.112) (0.112) (0.112)
ESeC4_m -0.027 -0.027 -0.065 -0.065
(0.177) (0.177) (0.178) (0.178)
Missing -0.515** -0.515** -0.522** -0.519**
(0.234) (0.234) (0.234) (0.234)
Age_m -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
wave2 0.056 0.056 0.054 0.054
(0.079) (0.079) (0.080) (0.080)
wave3 -0.181** -0.180** -0.183** -0.182**
(0.084) (0.084) (0.085) (0.085)
wave4 -0.008 -0.007 -0.013 -0.013
(0.088) (0.088) (0.090) (0.090)
wave5 -0.026 -0.025 -0.037 -0.039
(0.095) (0.095) (0.098) (0.099)
wave6 -0.131 -0.130 -0.143 -0.141
(0.105) (0.105) (0.111) (0.111)
wave7 -0.114 -0.112 -0.134 -0.130
(0.115) (0.115) (0.122) (0.122)
cohabshare 0.039
(0.092)
married (1year) 0.058 -0.064
(0.223) (0.460)
married(1-10year) 0.162 0.356
(0.213) (0.407)
married( 10+) 0.028 0.175
(0.245) (0.420)
married (1year)xshare 0.033
(0.109)
married(1-10year)xshare -0.056
(0.096)
married( 10+)share -0.039
(0.095)
Observations 6245 6245 6225 6225
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table A6:Random intercept proportional odds model (coefficients)
The regression of cohabitation (marriage duration) and income share on financial satisfaction:  Italy
(The table refers to the tables 5.3 to 5.6)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Financial Satisfaction
Woman's Income share 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.081
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.059)
Working 0.751*** 0.752*** 0.753*** 0.754***
(0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077)
Inactive 0.621*** 0.622*** 0.626*** 0.626***
(0.065) (0.065) (0.066) (0.066)
age_f -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Household income 0.517*** 0.517*** 0.518*** 0.518***
(0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035)
Financial hardship -1.484*** -1.484*** -1.485*** -1.485***
(0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.043)
Number of children -0.041 -0.041 -0.040 -0.039
(0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027)
Married up 0.210*** 0.211*** 0.221*** 0.222***
(0.063) (0.063) (0.064) (0.064)
Married down 0.155** 0.157** 0.158** 0.161**
(0.066) (0.066) (0.067) (0.067)
Cohabitation -0.114 -0.352
(0.182) (0.267)
Long term unemployed_f -0.277** -0.274** -0.284** -0.286**
(0.128) (0.128) (0.130) (0.130)
ESeC 1_f 0.547*** 0.548*** 0.550*** 0.551***
(0.106) (0.106) (0.108) (0.108)
ESeC 2_f 0.410*** 0.410*** 0.403*** 0.403***
(0.098) (0.098) (0.099) (0.099)
ESeC3_f 0.123 0.119 0.112 0.106
(0.126) (0.126) (0.127) (0.127)
ESeC4_f 0.158 0.161 0.161 0.163
(0.140) (0.140) (0.141) (0.141)
Missing 0.018 0.018 0.011 0.006
(0.092) (0.092) (0.093) (0.093)
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Long-term unemployed_m -0.786*** -0.785*** -0.785*** -0.786***
(0.124) (0.124) (0.126) (0.126)
ESeC 1_m 0.594*** 0.593*** 0.592*** 0.593***
(0.068) (0.068) (0.069) (0.069)
ESeC 2_m 0.253*** 0.253*** 0.250*** 0.250***
(0.062) (0.062) (0.063) (0.063)
ESeC3_m 0.348*** 0.348*** 0.345*** 0.345***
(0.071) (0.071) (0.072) (0.072)
ESeC4_m 0.225** 0.224** 0.212* 0.214*
(0.107) (0.107) (0.109) (0.109)
Missing 0.142 0.141 0.153 0.154
(0.130) (0.130) (0.131) (0.131)
Age_m -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
wave2 -0.062 -0.062 -0.061 -0.061
(0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053)
wave3 -0.218*** -0.218*** -0.211*** -0.210***
(0.055) (0.055) (0.056) (0.056)
wave4 -0.275*** -0.275*** -0.268*** -0.268***
(0.056) (0.056) (0.058) (0.058)
wave5 -0.006 -0.006 -0.002 -0.001
(0.057) (0.057) (0.060) (0.060)
wave6 0.046 0.045 0.074 0.073
(0.059) (0.059) (0.063) (0.063)
wave7 -0.031 -0.031 -0.016 -0.016
(0.061) (0.061) (0.068) (0.068)
cohabshare 0.073
(0.060)
married (1year) 0.143 0.436
(0.200) (0.291)
married(1-10year) 0.090 0.307
(0.187) (0.272)
married( 10+) 0.143 0.397
(0.197) (0.279)
married (1year)xshare -0.092
(0.066)
married(1-10year)xshare -0.064
(0.061)
married( 10+)share -0.079
(0.060)
Observations 16817 16817 16526 16526
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table A7:Random intercept proportional odds model (coefficients)
The regression of cohabitation (marriage duration) and income share on financial satisfaction:  UK
(The table refers to the tables 5.3 to 5.6)
Financial satisfaction (1) (2) (3) (4)
pk002_f
Woman's Income share 0.013 -0.006 0.014 0.094**
(0.019) (0.021) (0.020) (0.038)
Working 0.429*** 0.431*** 0.449*** 0.453***
(0.082) (0.081) (0.085) (0.085)
age_f -0.018** -0.019** -0.024** -0.026***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Household income 1.120*** 1.123*** 1.157*** 1.156***
(0.079) (0.079) (0.083) (0.083)
Financial hardship -3.357*** -3.356*** -3.380*** -3.379***
(0.070) (0.070) (0.073) (0.073)
Number of children -0.227*** -0.228*** -0.204*** -0.203***
(0.033) (0.033) (0.035) (0.035)
Married up -0.021 -0.022 -0.046 -0.046
(0.073) (0.073) (0.076) (0.076)
Married down -0.009 -0.006 -0.036 -0.029
(0.082) (0.082) (0.086) (0.086)
Cohabitation -0.363*** -0.732***
(0.087) (0.182)
ESeC 1_f 0.167 0.169 0.145 0.152
(0.142) (0.141) (0.148) (0.148)
ESeC 2_f -0.038 -0.040 -0.073 -0.074
(0.139) (0.139) (0.145) (0.145)
ESeC3_f -0.058 -0.048 -0.101 -0.080
(0.229) (0.229) (0.238) (0.238)
ESeC4_f -0.170 -0.167 -0.220 -0.215
(0.136) (0.135) (0.142) (0.142)
Missing 0.228 0.249 0.200 0.242
(0.177) (0.177) (0.190) (0.190)
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ESeC 1_m 0.269*** 0.266*** 0.239*** 0.235***
(0.087) (0.087) (0.090) (0.090)
ESeC 2_m 0.043 0.039 0.041 0.038
(0.090) (0.090) (0.093) (0.093)
ESeC3_m 0.280*** 0.283*** 0.261** 0.258**
(0.107) (0.107) (0.111) (0.111)
ESeC4_m 0.161 0.157 0.117 0.105
(0.152) (0.152) (0.162) (0.162)
Missing -0.358** -0.366** -0.359** -0.379**
(0.145) (0.145) (0.153) (0.153)
Age_m 0.009 0.011 0.012 0.014*
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
wave2 0.057 0.058 0.068 0.067
(0.079) (0.079) (0.081) (0.081)
wave3 -0.022 -0.020 -0.008 -0.007
(0.080) (0.080) (0.083) (0.083)
wave4 -0.008 -0.004 -0.009 -0.006
(0.084) (0.084) (0.088) (0.088)
wave5 0.012 0.016 0.015 0.020
(0.086) (0.086) (0.091) (0.091)
wave6 -0.015 -0.011 -0.027 -0.023
(0.089) (0.089) (0.097) (0.097)
wave7 -0.317*** -0.312*** -0.308*** -0.304***
(0.095) (0.095) (0.105) (0.105)
cohabshare 0.093**
(0.040)
married (1year) 0.345*** 0.442*
(0.110) (0.242)
married(1-10year) 0.434*** 0.977***
(0.121) (0.224)
married( 10+) 0.396*** 0.784***
(0.142) (0.229)
married (1year)xshare -0.018
(0.057)
married(1-10year)xshare -0.146***
(0.050)
married( 10+)share -0.100**
(0.048)
Observations 10322 10322 9708 9708
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table A8:Random intercept proportional odds model (coefficients)
The regression of cohabitation (marriage duration) and income share on financial satisfaction: pooled models
(1) (2)
Financial satisfaction
Woman's Income share -0.003 0.001
(0.011) (0.012)
Working 1.282*** 1.340***
(0.073) (0.083)
Inactive 1.050*** 1.084***
(0.075) (0.086)
age_f 0.003 -0.000
(0.005) (0.006)
Household income 0.830*** 0.852***
(0.044) (0.049)
Financial hardship -2.423*** -2.510***
(0.036) (0.040)
Number of children -0.108*** -0.107***
(0.018) (0.020)
Married up -0.027 0.004
(0.044) (0.048)
Married down 0.018 0.040
(0.046) (0.051)
Cohabitation -0.200***
(0.075)
Long term unemployed_f -0.200 -0.339
(0.194) (0.211)
ESeC 1_f 0.239*** 0.187**
(0.080) (0.085)
ESeC 2_f 0.112 0.079
(0.075) (0.079)
ESeC3_f -0.086 -0.099
(0.126) (0.133)
ESeC4_f 0.038 0.016
(0.077) (0.081)
Missing 0.172* 0.227**
(0.095) (0.102)
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Long-term unemployed_m -0.563*** -0.486***
(0.135) (0.161)
ESeC 1_m 0.235*** 0.255***
(0.050) (0.054)
ESeC 2_m 0.032 0.049
(0.048) (0.052)
ESeC3_m 0.197*** 0.160**
(0.068) (0.074)
ESeC4_m 0.025 0.052
(0.088) (0.096)
Missing -0.188** -0.163*
(0.088) (0.099)
Age_m -0.005 -0.005
(0.005) (0.005)
wave2 -0.183*** -0.187***
(0.041) (0.042)
wave3 -0.254*** -0.255***
(0.043) (0.044)
wave4 -0.182*** -0.178***
(0.045) (0.047)
wave5 -0.194*** -0.176***
(0.046) (0.056)
wave6 -0.226*** -0.289***
(0.047) (0.058)
wave7 -0.315*** -0.414***
(0.048) (0.061)
Denmark 1.686*** 1.070***
(0.075) (0.109)
UK -0.257*** -0.301***
(0.056) (0.100)
cohabXden -0.472***
(0.116)
cohabXfra -0.065
(0.104)
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married (1year) 0.259***
(0.098)
married(1-10year) 0.247**
(0.107)
married( 10+) 0.200*
(0.110)
married (1 year)Xden -0.060
(0.157)
maried(1-10year)den 0.508***
(0.165)
married(10+)xden 1.187***
(0.158)
married (1 year)xfra 0.071
(0.157)
maried(1-10year)xfra -0.036
(0.146)
married(10+)xfra -0.019
(0.129)
Observations 28547 24011
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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